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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The most explosive source of conflict in the Thai countryside in the last 
decade, although by no means the only one, has been over the control and 
ownership of natural resources. This thesis explores the conflict over natural 
resources which has manifested itself largely as conflict between villagers on 
the one hand, and the state and corporate sector on the other. The discussion 
attempts to explain the basis of the conflict and explore protest themes and 
discourse using the protests over the Kor Jor Kor forest resettlement scheme in 
Northeast Thailand in 1991 and 1992 as a case study.
This thesis was inspired primarily by my experiences with Thai rural non­
government organisations (NGOs) and villages in 1991 and the coverage of the 
democracy demonstrations in Bangkok by the Australian media in 1992. The 
attention drawn by NGOs to the disruption in many rural peoples' lives as a 
result of modernisation in the face of the official rhetoric of Thailand’s 
economic success inspired my interest in the other side of the development 
story. Furthermore, the Australian media's portrayal of a vibrant and growing 
Thai urban middle class as the primary force for political change in Thailand 
and a largely conservative and malleable rural population did not fit my 
experience and prompted me to explore the character of contemporary 
opposition in more detail.1
At this point a brief word needs to be said on my approach to the question 
of rural protest and dissent amongst villagers. This thesis tends to focus on 
organised protest and the alliances that have been formed between villagers
lrThe tendency of commentaries on the May 1992 events to portray poorer rural inhabitants in this way 
has also been commented upon by Hirsch (Hirsch 1993:5).
and urban middle class forces. Large parts of this thesis are devoted to 
discussion of the discourse articulated by many rural based NGOs with other 
middle class forces and some village leaders as part of the conflict over natural 
resources. This approach carries the danger that my analysis will focus entirely 
on the discourse of NGOs, which is accessible and readily available in English, 
at the expense of village perceptions. However discussion also covers village 
protest in some detail and describes the point at which middle class discourse 
and village demands converge.
The idea that peasants are not interested in visions of the future but only 
the existing system is a persistent theme in peasant studies. James Scott has 
forcefully emphasised this, and he concludes that "the great bulk of peasant 
resistance is not to overthrow or transform a system of dominance but rather to 
survive it, today, this week, within it" (Scott 1987:424). However I would like to 
join Van der Geest in his emphasis on contemporary Thai peasants as literate 
and actively involved in the construction of imagined communities. In answer 
to Scott, Van der Geest concludes that "on the contrary locally based struggles 
can coalesce around radically different visions of how the larger social context 
should be constituted, visions which themselves are products of changes in the 
global system" (Van der Geest 1993:135).
Furthermore such alliances are important in strengthening protest and 
influencing broad change. Examination of everyday forms of peasant protest in 
the tradition of James Scott is a valuable addition to the study of rural societies 
and its strength is the avoidance of overemphasising elite versions of discourse 
(Scott 1986). However, as Turton points out concerning everyday forms of 
resistance "Avoidance protest can protect but not transform...if the history of 
agrarian revolutions are any guide, non-peasant, elite allies are essential to the
mobilisation and success of peasant resistance once it moves beyond the protest 
of avoidance" (Turton 1986 :83).
Conflicts over natural resources
As agri-business and the state have increased their economic activity and 
utilisation of natural resources in the countryside the 1980s and 1990s, conflict 
with villagers has been common. Natural resource conflicts have become high 
profile concerns and alliances have been formed between villagers, monks, 
non-government organisations (NGOs), intellectuals, students and other 
middle class forces in protest.
At this point it is worth briefly qualifying the emphasis on resource 
conflicts as the major conflict in the Thai countryside. Resource conflicts do not 
represent the only public protest in this period. For example, there were 
significant protests for higher rice prices in 1984 and for higher rice and 
pineapple prices in 1987 (FEERYB 1984:303, 1987:207). Nevertheless, conflicts 
over natural resources make up the great majority of the public protest 
reported and have been almost overwhelming in their number in the last 
decade.
As early as the 1970s there was protest over resource allocation and 
environmental issues such as the plans to build a dam in Khao Yai National 
Park. However, the Nam Choan Dam campaign is one of the first famous 
resource conflicts that involved broad alliances and attracted support from a 
wide alliance of villagers and urban groups. As a result of the campaign the 
government was forced to postpone the project indefinitely (Rush 1991:76; 
Hirsch 1993:17-18).
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The 1989 logging ban came soon after the dam campaign. After 
deforestation caused floods which killed hundreds of villagers in Southern 
Thailand an existing anti-logging campaign by villagers and NGOs intensified. 
Villagers in Northern Thailand were deeply involved in the anti logging 
campaign because logging directly resulted in degradation and appropriation 
of their farm land. Villagers organised petitions, held rallies and roadblocks 
and took other resistance action. These actions were coordinated with allies in 
the media, conservation groups, schools and government by NGOs such as the 
Project for Ecological Reconstruction (PER) (Rush 1991:76).
In Southern Thailand conflicts over marine resources between small-scale 
fishing communities and the large-scale modern fishing industry have been 
common whilst the construction of large scale hydro electric dams, resorts, and 
golf courses have sparked conflict over land rights, water rights, and 
compensation levels all over Thailand. Pollution by agri-industries such as 
aqua culture, and mining activities have also sparked protest in all regions. As 
protests proliferated, NGOs worked increasingly to provide local movements 
with middle class allies (Field notes 1993).
During the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, most major conflicts 
in the Northeast, known in Thai as Isarn, have stemmed from three major 
issues: salt mining; dam construction; and the ownership and use of forest land. 
Salt mining in the region resulted in farmers suffering damage or destruction to 
their crops as a result of the rise in water salinity in the late 1980s and led to a 
concerted campaign against the salt mining industry and for the desalination of 
the Siew river. This campaign was organised by villagers with NGOs, students 
and environmentalists (Tasker 1990:28). The construction of Pak Mun Dam in 
the early 1990s in Ubon Ratchatani resulted in years of conflict with the 
government and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) as
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villagers and their allies attempted to avert displacement and gain 
compensation. Conflict over forest land constitutes the third, and most 
significant and protracted conflict. Eucalyptus plantations established by the 
government and forestry companies on forest land which had previously been 
utilised and sometimes conserved by the village and the relocation of villagers 
from forest reserve land, has led to bitter conflict between villagers and the 
state allied with industrial forces (Field notes 1993). However this is by no 
means an exhaustive list, with the 1992 molasses spill in the Chi river which 
resulted in widespread protest in Maha Sarakham and Kalasin one notable 
example (1 April 1992, 3 April 1992, 6 April 1992 BP).
The dispute over eucalyptus plantations in the latter half of the 1980s is 
fundamental to understanding conflicts over forest land and the KJK 
resettlement program. There was widespread and sustained opposition to 
eucalyptus plantations in the countryside. Protests from villagers demanded 
that land expropriated in order to grow eucalyptus plantations be returned, 
permission be given to replant with other species and in some cases that 
eucalyptus plantations be outlawed altogether. In 1985 demonstrations 
occurred in Surin, Roi Et, Buriram and Sri Saket provinces. Eucalyptus trees 
were damaged and government property destroyed or damaged (Orawan 
1992:72-73).
In 1987 villagers in Roi Et pulled up trees and confiscated tractors and 
demanded that natural forest be retained. In the same year Ubon villagers 
marched to demand that there be a complete halt to all plantations because 
they were encroaching on farmland. Soon afterward villagers in Roi Et 
protested that eucalyptus plantations were replacing their community forests. 
Thousands gathered in Nong Yai on two occasions in 1986, the second time to
demand the acquittal of villagers charged with destroying 400 rai of 
eucalyptus plantations (Orawan 1987:72; Apichai 1992:201-202).
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Apichai describes the "fiercest” protest as coming from villagers of Dong 
Yai forest in Buriram province, an area that was to be a centre of conflict during 
the KJK program. In 1987 2000 villagers burned down eucalyptus nurseries 
and destroyed 200 rai of eucalyptus plantations with the demand that the 
government return all land expropriated for plantation use. Arrests followed 
this incident but violence was to continue in other provinces. In fact, soon after 
this there was direct armed conflict between officials and villagers over 
eucalyptus plantations in Kalasin province (Apichai 1992:201-205).
The Kor Jor Kor forest resettlement scheme
The case study used in this thesis is a conflict which arose over forest land 
in Northeast Thailand. This conflict occurred as a result of a government 
project to resettle poor villagers living in degraded forests. The project was 
called the "Land Redistribution Project for the Poor in Degraded Forests" and is 
known in Thai by its abbreviated name Kor Jor Kor. The project aimed to move 
as many as 5.8 million people from forest reserve land into resettlement villages 
under the military. The program began in the Northeast in March 1991 with a 
plan to move nearly 1 million people out of forest reserves. It was planned 
that the bulk of this vacated land would be commercially reforested with 
eucalyptus trees.
The KJK program came into fruition for a number of reasons and served 
various purposes. It was first and foremost presented as a conservation 
program designed to benefit the poor and landless. It was described by the 
army's deputy commander as being "a response to the national forest policy in
which forests and in this country will be saved and expanded" (17 Sep 91 The 
Nation ). Forest preservation and regeneration legitimised the program and at 
one level KJK was simply a conservation program born out of a badly planned 
conservation effort. However, as we shall see, both parts of the state involved 
in planning and implementing KJK, the military and the Royal Forestry 
Department (RFD), had stronger political and economic motives than either 
forest protection or regeneration.
The KJK program resulted in widespread protest in both Northern and 
Northeast Thailand from villagers and various middle class forces including 
NGOs, environmentalists, monks, students. After a concerted campaign the 
program was cancelled in mid 1992.
Fieldwork and sources
Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out from August to September 1993 
in Thailand. I visited various NGOs and villages and spoke with students and 
academics in Bangkok and Northern, Northeast and Southern Thailand. In 
Northeastern Thailand, the region which this thesis concentrates on, I visited 
NGO-CORD, the Northeast Farmers Federation, two forest temples and their 
neighbouring villages and attended meeting of Northeast village leaders in 
Khorat and a forum on community forests at Khon Kaen university. Fieldwork 
was carried out as a series of interviews and discussions with NGO workers 
and villagers in both Thai and English.
I have relied largely on written sources in English. I have used two 
English language newspapers, the Bangkok Post (BP) and The Nation 
intensively. I have also used the newsletter of the Thai Development Support 
Committee (TDSC), the Thai Development Newsletter (TDN), as a primary
source. I have translated selected texts in Thai to ensure the English language 
material is representative.
Chapter plan
Chapter two of this thesis discusses changing interpretations of the Thai 
countryside and the rural protest movement of the democratic 1972-76 period. 
Three main themes are introduced; utopian perceptions of the village by both 
conservatives and radicals; the importance of social differentiation within rural 
society as a basis for conflict; and the significance of middle class alliance with 
villagers in protest.
Chapter three examines the changing rural sector in order to understand 
the basis of recent natural resource conflicts. Environmental degradation and 
the effect of dwindling resources on the countryside is discussed in the context 
of modernisation and the expansion of cash cropping. This chapter explains 
how trends in income distribution and differentiation have come to foster a 
notion of distinctly different urban and rural interests Thailand and examines 
the question of internal social differentiation in the village and how the 
ownership and control of land have changed since the 1970s.
Chapter four is a discussion of the economic and political motivations of 
the state in the countryside. There is particular reference to state forest policy 
and the political and economic motivations of government, state and corporate 
sector in the formation of the Kor Jor Kor resettlement program.
Chapter five is a description of the alliances that formed between middle 
class groups and villagers in the resource conflicts. This chapter analyses 
Communal Culture, the strong tendency to characterise the resource conflicts
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as being based on a conflict between the urban, state and corporate sectors and 
rural, peoples' sector, and the prevalence of utopian visions of the village. The 
work of NGOs is examined in detail and the strength of themes of democracy 
and environmentalism examined.
Chapter five describes the development of protests over the KJK forest 
resettlement program, protest themes and the way protest interacted with 
middle class groups. This chapter also examines a growing tension between 
villagers over issues at stake in the forest.
Chapter six describes three main developments in the aftermath of KJK. 
The first is the effect of protest on government policy. The second is a broad 
discussion of rural protest after KJK, and the third is evidence of some 
reexamination of some of the fundamental ideas of Communal Culture by 
NGOs.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THAI COUNTRYSIDE
This chapter discusses utopian views of the Thai countryside by Thai and 
Western scholars, the rural protest movement of the 1970s and the effect of this 
movement on interpretations of the Thai countryside by scholars. 
Characterisations of a self sufficient rural population which lacked serious class 
stratification, poverty and traditions of dissent were challenged with the 
beginnings of Thai Marxist analysis in the 1970s and the development 1973-76 
farmers' movement and rural insurgency. The chapter considers the 
importance of social differentiation in the 1973-76 protests, the significance of 
the farmers' alliance with middle class forces and the persistence of the vision 
of the pre capitalist village as self sufficient, non stratified and abundant.
Challenges to utopian visions of the countryside
Thai history seems to contain more continuities than other Southeast 
Asian nations, threads of culture and social formation are more easily followed 
without great dramas of war and revolution. Much of the writing of Thai 
history in English has been characterised by a lack of emphasis on radicalism 
and dissent. Reynolds writes, "Thailand is written in most histories by English 
speakers as a country without radical politics and radical writing....the writing 
of Thai history is monumentally uncontroversial" (Reynolds 1987:9). Rural 
dissent and it's driving force, factors such as poverty and exploitation, have not 
been obvious to outside eyes and have often been measured against dramatic 
events in other parts of Asia. In fact in English language literature on Thailand
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characterisations of a passive and largely happy rural population were not 
really challenged until the 1970s.
European imperialists who stressed the fruitful abundance of rural 
Thailand and the lazy and passive nature of the natives (Bowie 1992:779) paved 
the way for later versions of history to focus on abundance and passivity. The 
work of Western scholars which accumulated over the 1950s and 1960s was 
generally characterised by a view of village society as being self-sufficient, free 
of widespread poverty and free of serious class stratification. Wilson is one 
example cited by various historians to illustrate this characterisation. His 1962 
history described a "sturdy and wholesome peasantry" able to engage in a 
subsistence lifestyle easily as a result of abundant land reserves and a relatively 
benign state. He concluded that stable subsistence had shaped the Thai 
peasantry into a fundamentally conservative element in Thai society whose 
"inarticulate acquiescence to central government and indifference to national 
politics are fundamental to the political system" (Wilson 1963:258).
Such portrayals of rural Thailand mirror the strong tendency of official 
Thai historiography to focus on rural abundance and utopian images of rural 
life. Utopian visions of historical abundance and the benign rule of the state 
suited the needs of a royal state consolidating their administrative hold over 
the population in the nineteenth century and the needs of the Thai government 
maintaining their hold over their nation state in the twentieth century. These 
images were used as part of the creation of a common national identity and 
have been integral to the idea of a Thai identity, a process Bowie describes as 
"fabrication through repetition" (Bowie 1992:798).
Thailand began to develop its own Marxist tradition in the post World 
War Two period. The naming of social formations along Marxist lines and the
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emphasis on feudalism and the exploitation of the peasantry by scholars and 
students began to challenge the official picture of conditions in rural Thailand. 
During the 1950s the concept of a Thai feudalism, sakdina,t was applied to Thai 
conditions and expanded in two major studies, Udom Sri«&/aiVs 1950 study, 
Thailand:A Semi Colony and Jit Poumisak's 1957 study The Real Face of Thai 
Feudalism Today (Reynolds and Hong 1983:81-83; Reynolds 1987).
Both studies identified the pre 1855 period, before the Bowring treaty with
Britain, as a backward agrarian order with authoritarian rule and exploitative
foemiiAK
means of production. Jit Poufli]$ak's more detailed study of pre 1855 
conditions used sakdina, ,which literally meant power over irrigated rice fields 
and was the legal system of allocation of social rank in numerical hierarchical 
order in Ayuthia and the early Bangkok period, as a direct translation of 
feudalism. He concluded that Thai pre-capitalist formations mirrored the 
European experience of feudalism. Jit's use of the term sakdina is described by 
Reynolds as a significant turning point in the way Thai society was understood 
by both Thai and European scholars and one which "put in place a 
characterisation of Thai society that unsettled the foundations of rule in Thai 
society" (Reynolds 1987:150).
Both Udom and Jit characterised post 1855 Thailand as a semi-colonial, 
semi-feudal society with rural Thailand suffering from the concentration of 
power in capitalist and landlord hands. The conditions of the peasantry were 
described by Jit as deteriorating, with starvation, high rents and interest rates, 
corrupt government officials and declining morals besetting peasant society as 
a result of landlord and capitalist exploitation. The semi-colonial, semi-feudal 
thesis was to remain the dominant theoretical formation used by the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). It underpinned their adoption of Maoist 
principles and their concentration on the peasantry until the demise of the
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party in the 1980s. It would also spark intellectual debate as intellectuals 
discussed the naming of pre capitalist and post capitalist social formation from 
the 1970s (Reynolds and Hong 1983:77-83).
The English language histories of the late 1950s and 1960s placed little 
emphasis on growing Marxist traditions. In fact most studies found little 
evidence of Marxist activity and tended to judge the question as unimportant 
for the Thai experience. At the same time, Thai intellectuals of this period 
tended to repudiate the relevance of Marxism for Thai society. After the 1958 
coup and the beginning of repressive government, censorship and proscription 
had brought an end to Marxist analysis. It was replaced with the proliferation 
of studies friendly to the regime's political philosophy which stressed 
indigenous values and institutions and the inapplicability of Marxist analysis to 
Thai society ( Reynolds and Hong 1983:91-95).
Rural Dissent
Nevertheless there were signs of rural unrest during the 1950s and 1960s. 
There was protest from farmers over the loss of land and various other issues 
affecting agricultural production and livelihood. However protest was 
localised, did not result in any broad alliances and certainly did not excite a 
great deal of intellectual analysis. Collective petitioning of bureaucratic 
authorities by farmers from a few districts and provinces protesting at the loss 
of land did lead to the passing of the 1950 Rent of Paddy Land Act, the Land 
Code of 1954 and the establishment of a committee in 1968 to hear farmers' 
grievances. Turton concludes that these protests had limited and localised 
aims and that measures adopted by the government actually had little effect on 
farmers' problems (Turton 1987:36).
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The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was active in the countryside 
from the 1950s after their acceptance of the concept of peasant revolution and 
the acceptance of Maoism in the late 1950s. They were particularly strong in 
the Northeast, South and hill tribe areas of the North where ethnic tension left 
the central Thai state with limited legitimacy. The CPT was able to utilise Lao 
ethnic feeling in Northeast Thailand. The leader of the Samakhi Tham 
movement of the 1960s in Isarn who campaigned for union with Lao and 
collective farming was made a CPT martyr after his murder by the Sarit 
government, boosting recruitment in the region considerably. By 1969 armed 
insurgency was underway in fourteen Northeastern provinces and was to 
remain a threat to the state for the next decade (Chai Anan and Morell 1981:83).
However it was not until the opening up of the political situation in the 
1970s that the socio analysis of the late 1940s and 1950s was rediscovered by 
students and intellectuals and there was a flourishing of Marxist ideas 
throughout Thai society. Intellectuals debated the naming of social formation. 
Was pre 1855 Thailand based on feudalism or an Asiatic mode of production 
or perhaps a mixture of both? Was 1970s Thailand a mixture of feudalism and 
capitalism or were there just feudal remnants in ideology and consciousness 
and what was the relevance of Maoism? (Reynolds and Hong 1983:91-95; 
Turton 1984:25; Bowie 1992:803).
At the same time social movements proliferated. The growth of organised 
peasant protest which took place from 1973 was unprecedented in Thai history. 
Large protests against the low price of paddy were followed by protest around 
indebtedness and land confiscation. In early 1974 farmers from Central and 
then Northern provinces assembled in Bangkok demanding land restitution. 
The failure of government to take any action resulted in an escalation of 
protest, supported by student organisations. By November 1974 there was
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protest from farmers from twenty five provinces, including the Northeast, 
centering around relief from indebtedness and involved demands for 
limitations on land ownership, the allocation of land for small farmers rent and 
tenancy regulation and various other demands. During 1974 a national 
coordinating body, the Peasants Federation of Thailand (PFT) was formed.1 At 
rallies by the PFT in Bangkok in 1975 all provinces were represented (Turton 
1978:122,1987:36-37; Anan 1989:101-102).
The most high profile demands over this period were tenancy and 
landlessness, which were most common in the Central and Northern provinces. 
The government responded by passing the Agricultural Land Rent Control Act 
and the Agricultural Land Reform Act in 1974. After a new and more 
conservative coalition government was formed in 1975 the PFT campaigned 
extensively for the implementation of the Land Rent Control Act. PFT activists 
educated villages of their legal rights, denounced corrupt officials, landlords 
and other local powers. This work was carried out in the face of concerted 
official opposition. Local officials, landlords and the government condemned 
the PFT and labelled them subversive. Political terrorism against the 
organisation became increasingly common and twenty one PFT leaders had 
been assassinated by mid 1975, presumably by landlords and right wing 
groups (Turton 1987:39-40; Chai Anan and Morell 1981:225).
The 1976 military coup forced social movements underground and many 
activists, including the leader of the PFT, went into the forest to join communist 
insurgents. Nevertheless, the events of 1973-1976 marked a significant change 
in the place of the countryside in the political arena. Chai Anan and Morell 
claim that "after 1973 farmers were involved in the political process for the first 
time" and Wattana marked this period as having changed the relationship
lrThe PFT is sometimes translated as the Peasants Federation of Thailand (PFT) and sometimes the 
Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT).
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between the state and peasantry forever" (Chai Anan and Morell 1981 Wattana 
1991:185). The problems of the countryside became central concerns for the 
governments of 1973-76 and rural issues had the highest profile in the 1975 
election campaign (Girling 1981:175).
New Portrayals of the Thai countryside
Certainly after this dramatic period the image of a happy and passive 
rural population would never again be as pervasive or convincing. Prior to this 
period there had been little interest from Western Marxist intellectuals in 
Thailand's revolutionary possibilities or the revolutionary potential of the Thai 
peasantry. However after the growth of the PFT and the growth of rural 
insurgency after the PFT had been repressed after 1975, comparisons with 
Indochina and speculation on Thailand's revolutionary possibilities were more 
common. A well-known collection of articles from Europe and the United 
States Marxist intellectuals stressed the potential of Thailand’s revolutionary 
situation and their struggle against imperialism. In the "social war against 
imperialism" described by this study, the Thai farmer occupied the central role 
(Fast, Turton and Calwell 1978). In a similar vein Luther posed the possibility 
of Thailand becoming the next Vietnam, describing a growing militancy and a 
trend towards armed insurgency in the countryside (Luther 1978:29).
Communist insurgency in rural Thailand, the PFT and the mobilisation of 
rural people in support of the state made their way into English language 
histories of Thailand during the late seventies and eighties. Village based 
studies in both Thai and English became more popular and there were new 
studies of the pre capitalist peasant rebellions in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century which refuted the distortions of official 
historiography in new historical narratives (Turton 1984: 65; Chatthip and
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Pranut 1980:118-131). At the same time the growth of peasant studies world­
wide in the 1970s included extensive study of South east Asian peasants, 
including Thailand. Questions about peasant ideology and the reasons for 
peasant rebellion focused attention on the ideas and motivations of peasant 
populations (Scott 1976; Turton and Tanabe 1984).
In all of these discussions around the orientations of protest the problems 
and exploitation of the peasant are well in view and the farmer no longer 
characterised by passivity. However, despite the proliferation of writings 
around the PFT and rural Thailand, themes of passivity and social equality are 
still used in the contemporary context also. Note Lewis's 1990 study 
concluding that "Thai peasants are less discontented than peasants of other 
Asian countries as the land is fertile and the yield high.... there is relative 
economic and social equality within the Thai village, consequently fewer 
country folk than in many other countries seem to live with a daily sense of 
injustice" (Lewis 1990:1364). The 1989 Asian Year Book compiled by the Far 
East Economic Review defined democratic forces in Thailand as elitist and 
based only in Bangkok and stressed the absence of any significant rural based 
pressure groups despite the growing rural protest over resources (FEERYB 
1989:239). Furthermore the political malleability of rural populations has 
remained a common theme in international media coverage of Thailand over 
the 1990s.
A fundamental aspect to a lack of attention to rural protest and the 
characterisation of a passive rural population is the idea that the initiative and 
momentum behind organised rural protest is the urban middle class. As we 
shall see, this characterisation was certainly made of the PFT and the rural 
campaigns of 1973-1976.
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Alliances between farmers and students
The role of students and other middle class activists is often stressed as 
the fundamental force behind political change. In Wyatt's 1984 history he 
mentions farmers' role in the 1973-76 period only in passing, concluding that 
the middle class were the really important actors and that "at best farmers' 
discontent may have served to legitimise student and middle class commitment 
to political change" (Wyatt 1984:297).
Certainly students and academics were very involved in the social 
movements of the 1973-76 period. For the participants in the debates over the 
naming of social formations , such questions had great impact and were closely 
related to action and visions of a new future for Thai society. New links and 
alliances were built between students, intellectuals, workers and farmers and 
this fostered intense intellectual interest in peasant dissent in universities. It 
was a time of polarisations in Thai society, and many intellectuals and students 
were closely involved with social movements involving urban workers, farmers 
and monks. Marxism, specifically Maoism, was a pervasive political ideology 
amongst students and intellectuals and influenced the social movements. 
Hong Lysa describes many Thai Marxist intellectuals of the period as having 
"an unquestioning reverence for and application of Maoist principles" and a 
"grotesquely tinted ideological colouring" (Hong 1991:101).
The PFT alliance with students drew the organisation into national politics 
with the PFT supporting the Socialist Party in the 1975 elections. PFT 
connections with the CPT seem to have seem weak although Marxist ideas 
were influential. (Turton 1987:39; Cohen 1982:8). The English language 
literature on the farmers movement identifies a peasants movement in its own
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right but portrays the alliance with students as essential to the formation of the 
PFT. Turton describes student organisations as supporting and involving 
farmers in campaigns from the beginning of the first few farmers' protests in 
1974 and many spontaneous rural protests converging with the student 
initiatives (Turton 1987:37). Anan also describes protests as initially being 
encouraged by students who became increasingly involved in agrarian conflicts 
and greatly assisted the organisation of peasants into the PFT, but he also 
points out that as protest escalated peasants developed their own leadership 
(Anan 1989:101). In comparison, Cohen believed that the first protests in 1974 
did not involve students and that peasants actually initiated the alliance. 
However he saw the PFT as the creation of student radicals although it 
subsequently developed to represent the interests of the peasantry (Cohen 
1982:8).
Whichever of these interpretations is the most accurate portrayal of the 
relationship between students, the PFT and farmers it seems clear that students 
were important in the coordination of protest and the formation of a national 
organisation. Whether organised protest and the PFT was the initiative of 
middle class forces or local farmers, their interests converged and an alliance 
was formed. Wyatt's dismissal of the farmers' discontent as simply a 
legitimiser for middle class political ambitions overlooks the political potential 
of farmers' discontent and the alliance as the result of converging interests.
The importance of growing social differentiation in the countryside
In the English language literature the farmers' protests and the PFT are 
commonly represented as having been primarily concerned with land rents and 
landlessness. The proliferation of English language material on rural Thailand 
and rural protest in the 1970s included a strong tendency to identify increasing
20
social differentiation within the peasantry and growing landlessness and 
tenancy as the impetus for rural protest. The significance of growing 
landlessness and tenancy in Northern and Central Thailand, the emergence of 
unequal relations amongst the peasantry as the result of the penetration of 
capital and the urgent need for land reform were all central matters under 
discussion (Bowie and Phelan 1975 Cohen 1977 Luther 1978 Lin and Esposito 
1976 Thaxton 1971 Seiko 1981 Keyes 1976 Turton 1978 1982 1987 Anan 1989 
Chai Anan and Morell 1981 Wattana 1991). Similarly the Thai language 
literature written during and after the 1973-76 period tended to attribute rural 
mobilisations to increasing social differentiation in the countryside (Bowie 
1992:803).
From the perspective of the 1990s and with the knowledge of 
contemporary rural conflict contemporary rural conflicts where urban-rural, 
state-village conflict is so central and differentiation and class antagonism 
within the village so far out of focus, discussion of rural protest in the 1970s 
seems very focused on growing inequalities within the countryside and village 
society. Nevertheless there was still a tendency in the literature to see the 
protests as a confrontation between peasants en masse and a national elite.2 
Walker's 1983 thesis, reviewing the English language literature on the farmers 
protests of 1973-76, criticised this tendency in English language analysis. He 
described this approach as underestimating the relation between rural class 
structure and peasant political activity. He described the essence of the 
protests as a call to the government to intervene and radically transform the 
nature of social relations within the countryside and saw protests as reflecting a 
real change in forms of consciousness in peasant culture, a new recognition of 
local class differences. He uses the bitter disputes between landlords and
2Walker cites Turton 1978:127 and Cohen 1981:274 as examples of this tendency (Walker 1983:90).
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tenants and wide ranging calls for land reform as evidence for this (Walker 
1983:90).
However class differentiation at the local level as the central element of 
rural protest and conflict in the PFT period and over the 1970s is problematic. 
Ramsay advances two main factors to support his thesis that tenancy and rural 
class differentiation were not so central to rural conflict in the 1970s as is 
commonly argued. First, conflict between tenants and landlords was less 
intense in the more differentiated Central region and more evident in the less 
differentiated North. Second, and more convincingly, the CPT were able to 
recruit the most villagers and sustain serious insurgency in the least 
differentiated Northeast as a result of poverty and ethnic tension (Ramsay 
1982:183). McVey also touches on this point when she observed in the mid 
1980s that rural unrest at that time was "based in the country's peripheral 
regions and not as we might expect from the usual emphasis on Southeast 
Asian peasant studies on its relatively densely populated and highly 
differentiated central rice plains"(Mcvey 1984:109).
Indeed even in the PFT protests it seems that despite the central 
importance of land inequality and local differentiation the farmers' movement 
did identify the state as a central enemy. The PFT tended to identify the 
struggle as being against "government and capitalists" (Turton 1987:41). 
Furthermore, many of the wide range of demands that the PFT brought 
together concerned conflicts which explicitly involved the state as the 
protagonist. Although the central demands centred around permanent 
solutions to the problems of debt, tenancy and landlessness, demands also 
included issues such as price regulation, the removal of corrupt officials and 
help for flood victims. There were even examples of the kinds of conflict over 
natural resources which became more common in the eighties and nineties.
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There was conflict between farmers and the state over dam construction and 
forest conservation. For example students supported a farmer’s campaign in 
Northern Thailand to regain land in a teak forest reserve where they had lived 
for a generation before the Forestry Department expelled them . A 1976 film by 
students described students supporting farmers to try and prevent the 
construction of a dam on the Mekong river by the government (Cohen 1981:7;; 
Bartak 1993:23; Seri 1991: 95).
Growing social and economic cleavages within the countryside were 
clearly important in fuelling the PFT protests. Nevertheless a growing 
antagonism and conflict between state and countryside is evident in the 
protests themselves and in the persistence of communist insurgency in various 
parts of the countryside. The emphasis on the state-village, urban-rural conflict 
in the resource conflicts follows this history, it was by no means a new 
phenonomen.
Utopian visions of the pre capitalist village
Furthermore the focus on growing social differentiation in the countryside 
was often not as contradictory to utopian visions of the countryside as first 
appears. The emphasis on growing social differentiation within the countryside 
as a result of the penetration of capitalist forces implicitly, and sometimes 
explicitly, was accompanied by an idealised vision of a pre-capitalist village 
characterised by social equality, self sufficiency and communal living. For 
example Seiko argued that the penetration of capital was responsible for the 
destruction of the self sufficient rural economy and the disintegration of rural 
communities (Seiko 1981:16) Cohen described a marked change in the 
consciousness of villagers whom he described as developing a new 
consciousness of internal differences in village society and the gap between
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rich and poor (Cohen 1981:193). In fact an emphasis on the destruction of the 
self-sufficient and non-differentiated village community was already arising as 
a theme before the farmers movement of 1973-76. In a 1971 study Thaxton 
described commercialisation and technology as being imposed on the village 
by a corrupt bureaucracy, undermining the moral basis of peasant society and 
beginning a process which would "wear away at the very essence of communal 
life" (Thaxton 1971:257).
Bowie is strongly critical of Thai and English language literature, 
particularly Thai and western Marxist scholars, for perpetuating myths about 
the pre-capitalist village. She writes of "an odd convergence between 
conservative and progressive intellectuals with conservatives romanticising the 
past and progressives glorifying the past in order to dramatisize the bad impact 
of capitalism." Whilst Bowie recognises that many myths about a Thai rural 
paradise for past and present Thailand have been challenged and the question 
of exploitation has come into focus she finds many examples of how the past is 
misrepresented. For Bowie the main issue at stake is that the literature 
envisages the pre-capitalist pre 1855 village as self-sufficient, egalitarian and 
abundant with few links to the market. Bowie describes quite a different 
picture of the Thai countryside before 1855 with thriving and growing trade, a 
marked division of labour, distinct class differentiation, poverty and marked 
social change (Bowie 1992:819).
In the debates amongst intellectuals from the 1970s over the naming of 
social formations in pre 1855 Thailand the characterisation of pre 1855 Thai 
society as being based on the Asiatic mode of Production (AMP) by Chatthip 
was to foster the idea that villages in pre capitalist Thailand tended to be 
autonomous from the kingdom run by one central despot. While the king may 
have owned the land, peasants had effective control over its clearing,
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occupation use and inheritance. According to Chatthip AMP meant that the 
state and village were quite separate and the state did not interfere with 
production at the village level. Aristocrats were not the direct owners of the 
land and tribal and kin based cultures, involving communalism and 
cooperation, were maintained in village communities until the advent of 
capitalist relations of production and modernisation began to degrade these 
characteristics (Chatthip 1991:32).
Conclusion
Utopian views of the countryside and characterisations of a passive 
population certainly changed with the growth of Thai Marxist analysis and the 
proliferation of rural protest and insurgency in the 1970s. However although 
the portrayals of passivity, self sufficiency, a lack of stratification and 
abundance in the countryside were challenged by alternative descriptions, the 
vision of the pre-capitalist village characterised by these characteristics remained 
persuasive. This was to be fundamental for the development of Communal 
Culture in the late 1980s.
In analysis of the demands of the farmers' movement of 1973-76 land rents 
and a growing landlessness were central to the movement. However, although 
social differentiation was important in the growth of the farmers' movement, it 
seems it was also overemphasised by the literature. This analysis blurs the 
distinction between the 1973-76 protests as centrally focused on social 
differentiation and the resource conflicts focused on village and supra-village 
conflict.
Finally, the formation of new alliances between currents within the 
middle class and rural areas and the importance of these alliances provide an
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interesting comparison with the natural resource protests of the 1980s and 
1990s where middle class groups have also played a central organising and 
coordinating role.
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CHANGING RURAL SECTOR
This chapter discusses the development of rural Thailand in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The persistence of poverty in the countryside, despite Thailand's 
economic success story, exists alongside a deepening regional, urban-rural 
polarisation. Although social and economic cleavages within the village 
have also increased, regional, urban-rural polarisation is more dramatic. 
Extensive environmental damage in the countryside and growing pressure 
on land has taken place as part of Thailand's economic development and 
laid the basis for conflicts over natural resources.
Poverty and differentiation in the countryside
The growth of rural poverty and social differentiation within the 
village in the 1970s as an associated part of rural capitalist development has 
already been touched on in the previous chapter. Authors such as Wattana 
describe the accelerated growth of rural poverty and increased indebtedness, 
landlessness and insecurity as a result of the capitalist penetration of the 
agricultural sector (Wattana 1991:4). W itayakorn describes the 
transformation of central Thailand's agrarian economy as a process of 
"pauperisation" with increasing landlessness and conflict (Witayakorn 
1983:349) and Seri estimated that in 1974 80% of Thai peasants were in debt 
over 4000 baht, leading to increasing levels of land dispossession (Seri 
1991:96).
According to Warr's analysis of socio economic surveys, which he 
warns is based on data which is "deeply flawed and incomplete", the
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incidence of poverty in Thailand decreased consistently between the years of 
1976 and 1986. In the early 1980s the incidence of poverty seemed to worsen 
but it then declined during the mid 1980s (Warr 1993:41). Pranee also 
describes the reduction of poverty since the 1960s with the incidence of 
poverty dropping from about 40% of the total population in 1960 to about 
21% in 1988 (Pranee 1992:6).
Nevertheless Porpora and Lim describe only a slight improvement of 
real income in the Thai countryside in the two decades prior to 1987 
(Porpora and Lim 1987:88), and the message coming from many NGOs and 
activists describes widespread poverty. In 1990 NGO leader Prawase Wasi 
described a countryside of increasing poverty. He wrote, "Although praises 
are sung for the country's economic progress, alongside the advances are 
stark poverty and an ever increasing gap between the rich and poor. The 
transformation is sweeping along, pushing the poor aside" (Prawase 
1990:12).
Sanitsuda's collection of articles and interviews about the life of Thai 
villagers Behind the Smile, typically the first recommended reading for the 
casual Western visitor to a Thai development NGO, paints a picture of 
despair and marginalisation. She describes environmental degradation, 
labour migration, evictions from land for eucalyptus plantations and tourist 
resorts, the tyranny of the market and loss of control of production processes 
as widespread phenonoma destroying the fabric of rural life and 
marginalising rural populations (Sanitsuda 1990).
In their analysis of rural-urban migration in Northeast Thailand 
Popora and Lim describe widespread migration as evidence of the 
difficulties of maintaining subsistence in this region. Remittances from
28
migration exceed subsistence needs, and a substantial proportion of 
remittance is spent on consumption. It also seems that the socially 
acceptable level of subsistence in the countryside has risen. However 
Porpora and Lim are quick to emphasise that consumerism is a secondary 
motive behind migration and that without consumerism as a factor peasant 
subsistence at the original level would be problematic (Porpora and Lim 
1987:78-79).
Such analysis is focused on urban-rural differences. However in some 
of the English language literature the growth of internal differentiation in 
the village is discussed, although it is glaringly absent in literature produced 
by NGOs. In a 1982 study of rural Thailand, Turton raised the issue of a 
"new rural middle class" which was beginning to reproduce itself and 
identified this class as forming a crucial support for the state in the village 
(Turton 1982:27). Wattanna also identified the development in the 1970s of 
a dominant stratum with external connections and alliances which linked 
the majority of villages with the state and the market (Wattana 199:117).
The state is directly implicated in the development of internal 
differentiation as it increased its presence in the village in order to combat 
insurgency and push forward the project of rural development. In addition 
to the cooption of many village officials most government benefits seem to 
have reached richer farmers who could then be drawn into state 
frameworks (Hirsch 1990:110). Wattana believes all agrarian reforms were 
designed to develop a rich peasant class who could then be drawn into state 
structures (Wattana 1991:154). This is discussed further in the chapter three.
In a 1984 study Turton elaborated on his analysis and found "in village 
after village we find a small minority, some 5% more or less, of households
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who possess a degree of wealth, control of resources, prestige and power 
which sets them apart from the majority". He defines this stratum as 
including large landowners, commodity dealers, shopkeepers, village 
officials, some teachers, rice millers and money lenders who have links and 
alliances with state and market structures. At the same time he described 
the emergence of a new rural working class, farmers who may own their 
land but lack power over the means of production in the sense that they 
lack control over distribution, exchange and consumption (Turton 1984:30- 
33). Hirsch, drawing on Hart, also stresses the importance of looking beyond 
ownership to the dynamics of production control (Hirsch 1993:102).
In a 1989 study Turton concluded that internal social and economic 
differentiation was marked in the village, that the village could no longer 
be conceptualised as distinct from the supra village sector and that class 
elements are represented by local power groups within the countryside. 
Similarly Hirsch concludes that the concept of social formation 
characterised by village and supra village is no longer appropriate (Hirsch 
1990B:30; Turton 1989:75).
Nevertheless authors shy away from making firm class analysis. The 
cooption of dominant rural groups into state machinery is described by 
Turton and Girling as flexible, reflecting fluid political and social relations 
(Hart 1989:34-35). According to such analysis class formations are not tight, 
Turton and Hirsch describe class formation and class consciousness as being 
in a fluid form. However Hirsch remarks that "class formation is 
incomplete", inferring that he believes the situation will become more clear 
cut in the future (Turton 1989:75 Hirsch 1993:89).
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Trends in the ownership and control of land
Although there has been no marked polarisation between a landlord 
class and a landless class in Thailand growing rates of tenancy and 
landlessness were characteristic of the 1970s and seem to have increased in 
the 1980s, despite smallholdings remaining the dominant form of 
agricultural organisation. In 1960 it was estimated that 16% of the total 
agricultural labour force were landless and by 1976 estimates had risen to 
25%. A steady increase in wage labour occurred at the same time as a steady 
decline in exchange labour. The total land area operated by tenants rose 
from 3.8% in 1963 to 23 % in 1976. Tenancy became most common in the 
two most highly commercialised areas of Thailand, Central and Northern 
Thailand. In comparison, these trends remained at a much lower level in 
the Northeast region (Wattana 1991: 110-112).
In addition to increasing tenancy and wage labour there was also an 
unequal distribution of land. 1978 figures show 43% of farmers operating 
13% of land holdings and 44% operating 16% (Turton 1987:21). During this 
time there was some polarisation of land, with the sale of land by those 
already pocessing substantial land holdings and the entry into the market of 
new urban based interests. Indebtedness and an inability to repay loans 
were leading factors in this dispossession (Turton 1982:53).
In 1975 it was found that landless farmers were renting 13 million rai 
(2.08 hectares). By 1994 the figure had risen to 15 million rai (2.4 million 
hectares). The Office of Agricultural Economics also estimates that there are 
now two million farm labourers. Variations between regions remain with 
the Northeast at a lower level than Central or Northern Thailand (TDN
no:26 1994:53). Nevertheless in comparison to the increase in land under 
cultivation this is not a large increase.
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Turton's 1987 study comments that local studies indicate a considerable 
increase in the use of wage labour and a decline in the use of exchange 
labour through the 1980's, but he does not mention tenancy as a major 
factor (Turton 1987 :23 ). The involvement of capital and urban interests in 
the ownership of rural land has continued to increase since the 1970s 
(Hirsch 1989:1), but it seems that tenancy as such has not increased 
dramatically.
In a 1993 interview Anan concluded that tenancy was currently not a 
major source of conflict, but it should not be written off as an issue in the 
countryside altogether, because there are landless farmers involved in 
unequal and exploitative arrangements with landlords that hold the 
potential for conflict and protest (Anan 1993 Field notes). Nevertheless 
other forms of organisation in the rural sector are currently more obvious 
causes of a loss of control by small holders. For those involved in 
arrangements such as triple cropping, share cropping and tenancy, new 
forms of such arrangements have tended to mean that landowners have 
acquired a greater control over agricultural decision making. As 
agricultural production has come to involve greater inputs of capital, 
cultivators have become more vulnerable and less able to exercise control 
over production processes. In a Northern study Anan concludes that some 
farmers are becoming more like contracted workers (Anan 1989: 127).
One new development in the rural sector since the 1970s which is 
affecting the position of small holders is the emergence of large scale agri­
business. This second wave of diversification has involved livestock
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farming, canned pineapples, aquaculture, rubber and eucalyptus plantations 
and flour milling among other things. Production is geared to the export 
market. The government began promoting agro- business in the late 1970s 
and by the sixth economic pan (1986-1996) it had become the top priority in 
the industrial sector. Products are produced from the raw materials, 
processed and exported by the same company, a process called "vertical 
integration" where the same company is often involved in financing, 
shipping and insurance as well as agricultural production (Hirsch 1989:7). 
Companies tend to avoid employing labour directly but use "contract 
farming." In this system the company plans the production process and 
sells the agricultural inputs such as chemicals and fertilisers to the farmer 
(Orawan and Darunee 1992:85).
Non Government Organisations have warned that the activities of 
agro-business and the increasing incidence of share cropping with agri­
business companies will lead to a situation where farmers are very much 
like contracted workers as a result of the company's greater control over 
production processes (TDSC 1990: 4). Both Rapin and Girling discuss this 
trend, and Girling actually speculates on the possibility of this leading to a 
Latin American scenario where agricultural production becomes divided 
between large land owners and wage labourers (Girling 1986:190 Rapin 
116:1990 ) However even if this scenario is played out NGO sources predict 
that agro business will not be able to absorb the majority of Thai farmers and 
will leave the bulk of farmers as small holders outside of the contract 
farming system (TDSC 1990:3).
Small holders remain the biggest proportion of agricultural labour 
throughout Thailand. Although the term "small holder" seems to infer 
some fundamental control over production, the loss of control over the
33
means of production is the major problem for small holders as mentioned 
in the discussion of local differentiation. This loss of control is 
fundamental to the resource conflicts and current activist discourse. Turton 
gave one of the earliest analysis of this in English language literature. He 
listed the lack of land title, mining and plantation activities, state forestry 
schemes, illegal logging, hydro electric projects, deforestation, new inputs 
and technology as all leading to a loss of control and choice for small 
holders (Turton 1984:34).
One final qualification regarding the category of small holder needs to 
be made. It is not a clear cut category. Hirsch calls the term small holder "a 
problematic category", because of social differentiation within the village 
which gives some small holders significantly more power than others 
(Hirsch 1990A:172). Turton also questions the category; pointing out that 
people may be many things at once, they may simultaneously be landowner, 
wage earner, petty trader or hirer. Once again, the fluid nature of class 
formation makes the naming of rural groups less than straight forward 
(Turton 1984:34).
Regional differentiation
The divide between rural and urban Thailand and regional disparities 
in wealth and economic development are more clear cut and have been 
expressed by many academics with varying degrees of vehemence. Turton 
identifies "massive regional disparities"(Turton 1989:65). Warr concludes 
that "absolute poverty is a rural phenonomen, especially concentrated in 
the North east region (Warr 1993:41). Wattana describes a "skewed pattern 
of development" (Wattana 1991:100), while Lewis describes the Thai 
economy as suffering from "extreme dualism" (Lewis 1990: 1373). Chai-
Anan characterises Thailand as a "bifurcated society" with the peoples' rural 
sector and the corporate industrial sector in deep conflict (Chai- Anan 
1992:2).
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Although it seems poverty incidence in Thailand declined consistently 
between 1976 and 1986, national figures on income distribution indicate that 
the last twenty years has brought with it a steadily increasing inequality. 
Warr warns that reliable data is hard to come by and sodo economic surveys 
seriously flawed but he advances a set of figures which indicate a widening 
income gap. According to his calculations the poorest gained in real income 
by 35% and the richest by 103%. Post-1986 income disparity has continued to 
increase with no indications of levelling off (Warr 1993:41).
The widening income gap reflects a regional polarisation between 
urban and rural areas with Northeast Thailand remaining the poorest 
region. The rate of poverty incidence in 1988 indicated that 11.7 million 
Thais could be classified as living in poverty, based on a method of 
calculating nutritional adequacy. An analysis of those 11.7 million found 
89% living in rural areas and only 11% in municipal districts. The 
Northeast of Thailand has the highest rate of poverty incidence and 
Bangkok the lowest. Bangkok's income share was calculated at 32% of the 
total and Northeast Thailand's share as only 20.4%, a clear disparity in the 
light of the Northeast's much higher proportion of Thailand's population 
(Pranee 1992:7).
The new wealth in Thailand is part of the country's much proclaimed 
economic success story, which is the product of the conscious restructuring 
of the Thai economy over the last twenty years. In the late 1960s the Thai 
government embarked on a concerted program of industrialisation which
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brought rapid and fairly stable economic growth. By the end of the 1970s 
the manufacturing sector had overtaken agriculture in value added at 
current prices and by 1985 textile products exceeded rice in export value ( 
Suehiro 1992 :32).
The emphasis on industrial development meant that the agricultural 
sector was comparatively neglected, a criticism which is commonly made in 
the English language literature on the Thai rural sector. Authors are also 
quick to point out that despite comparatively low levels of investment the 
agricultural sector was the main impetus of initial economic growth 
(Wattana 1991: 3, Warr 1993:46, Chai-Anan 1992:2, Hirsch 1989:1 Porpora and 
Lim 1987:78). Taylor writes that "essentially the success of Thailand's 
industrialisation and modernisation program has been made possible by the 
contribution of impoverished, dependent and increasingly indebted small 
farmers" (Taylor 1994:2). This reflects a common theme advanced by many 
rural NGOs who see industrial development as possible only because of the 
contribution of small farmers who can proudly be referred to as the 
fundamental basis of the Thai nation (Field notes). 1
Porpora and Lim describe initial industrial development as relying on 
the foreign exchange earnings from rice, whilst a price premium on rice 
exports maintained low food costs in urban centres ensuring low wages and 
a cheap labour force for foreign investors. They conclude that "the burden 
of Thailand's urban industrial growth has been borne by the peasantry" 
(Porpora and Lim 1987:78). This transfer of wealth away from the 
countryside during the process of agricultural growth is described by Turton 
as stemming from the fact that "capital accumulation is restricted and
 ^This theme hass actually also long been used by Thai governments, and is one of several 
examples in where the rhetoric of the state and movements of dissent converge. This 
tendency is discussed further in chapter three.
surplus from agriculture is maximised'' and is described as a "massive 
transfer" of wealth from paddy producers (Turton 1989:61).
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Investment in the rural sector has focused on commercial production 
for the export market. As a result the level of investment has differed 
considerably between regions. Infrastructure and investment has been 
concentrated in the more fertile Central Thailand. Central Thailand has a 
far greater percentage of agricultural land irrigated and higher levels of 
chemical inputs and mechanisation, particularly in comparison to 
Northeast Thailand. Furthermore educational and medical facilities are 
much more developed (Turton 1989:56, 1987:19).
Meanwhile it seems that the industrial sector has failed to absorb large 
numbers of the rural population. Recent discussions on the proportion of 
the population still working in the agricultural sector differ from source to 
source, but it seems that a majority of the population are still involved in 
the agricultural sector although the magnitude of this majority is uncertain. 
Pranee states that 67% of the labour force was involved in the agricultural 
sector in 1989 (Pranee 1992:4 ), Warr's mid 1990 figure is 70% (Warr 1993:2), 
while FEER journalists used a figure of 60% in 1994 (Fairclough and Tasker 
1994:23) and Hirsch's description of demographic forecasts describes a 
predicted increase in the agricultural workforce until at least the end of the 
1990's (Hirsch 1990B :2).
Any speculation on these figures is complicated by a high rate of 
seasonal and non permanent migration from rural to urban areas and the 
often part-time nature of involvement in agriculture. This is particularly 
characteristic of Northeastern Thailand where seasonal or non-permanent 
migration out of the village has been increasing since the 1970s. Large
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numbers of rural migrants are involved in the service industry and 
constitute the backbone of Thailand's manufacturing industry. In fact the 
industrial labour force in Thailand is tied to the countryside, typically 
migrants send remittances back to their families and a large number will 
return to their village, although it seems that increasing numbers of 
migrants who plan to return remain in the city through necessity 
(Fairclough and Tasker 1994:24, Popora and Lim 1987:88).
Both seasonal and permanent migration have a major impact on 
village life. Few villages in the Northeast are irrigated and during the dry 
season villages empty as people flock to Bangkok and other urban centres. 
Sanitsuda describes exploitative work conditions for many rural workers in 
the city and villages occupied by only the elderly and children for the dry 
season. She describes the strain of life for both those who have left the 
village and those who have stayed, leading to family breakups and the 
breakdown of social cohesion in the village (Sanitsuda 1990:31). Similarly 
Fairclough and Tasker conclude that migration has a serious impact on 
village life and "the strain on traditional family structures is intense" 
(Fairclough and Tasker 1994:23). Rural-urban migration and sad stories of 
the villager living in the city alienated from his/her family and roots are 
also common themes in popular culture (Field notes 1993).
With these uncertainties and qualifications in mind it seems clear that 
the agricultural sector involves a majority of Thailand's population who are 
not in any permanent sense being drawn out of the rural sector into the 
industrial workforce. In fact it is precisely this issue that absorbs economists 
analysing the Thai situation. Warr, for example, concludes that there are 
two main structural issues in the Thai economy: how rapidly the 
adjustment of output and employment from the agricultural sector to non
agricultural sectors will occur and where expanding non agricultural 
activities will be located (Warr 1993:49).
Agricultural transformations and the destruction of the environment
At the same time as wealth has become concentrated in urban regions, 
developments in rural Thailand have led to environmental problems and 
increasing pressure on land. Transformations in the agricultural sector 
during the 1970s centred around the encouragement of export production 
and the diversification of agricultural production away from rice, processes 
which linked the rural economy much more strongly to the international 
market. This did not involve any great intensification of agricultural 
production but was achieved through expansion, increasing the amount of 
land under cultivation rather than increasing yields. The area of cash crop 
production increased fivefold from 6 million rai in 1959 to 32 million rai in 
1985. At the same time agricultural productivity per hectare has remained 
one of the lowest in the world (Pinkaew and Rajesh 1992:xiii; Hirsch 
1990B:5).
Despite receiving less investment and less attention, Northeast 
Thailand was fundamentally affected by this process. During the early 1960s 
large numbers of villagers entered into a market oriented mode of 
production and began to grow kenaf and new varieties of rice. In the late 
1960s Cassava followed as a popular crop for cultivation. This expansion 
occurred by pushing farmland further and further into forest land. 
Indigenous forest was replaced by monoculture crops. As villagers were 
lent money by the government credit agency the process was intensified as 
they attempted to free themselves from debt by pushing the land frontier 
forward (Seri and Hewison 1990:106).
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The expansion of acreage and the process of deforestation was also 
intensified by population growth. The population of Northeast Thailand 
doubled between 1960 and 1980. Furthermore, the drop in productivity of 
the traditional variety of rice and government rice policy which kept the 
price of rice low encouraged the expansion of acreage. The electrification of 
the Northeast in the 1970s also pushed the process along as electric 
consumer goods led to a greater need for cash (Porpora and Lim 1987:84-85).
Deforestation occurred in Northeast Thailand and right through out 
Thailand at a rapid rate. According to Royal Forestry Department (RFD) 
statistics in 1961 forests covered 53% of Thailand's land mass but in 1989 
only 27.95% (Pinkaew and Rajesh 1992:21). This figure is disputed by 
environmentalists on the basis of satellite photographs which seem to 
indicate that forest cover is actually below 20% (Hirsch 1990A:167). Between 
1961 and 1985 Thailand's average rate of forest destruction has been around 
three million rai per year. In Northeast Thailand the percentage of 
cultivated land has increased dramatically. Fifty years ago only 7% of land 
mass was cultivated, and 42% of the region was still forest. Currently only 
15% is under forest cover and most of the land suitable for cultivation is 
already being utilised (TDSC 1990:5). The North east still has the highest 
rate of forest destruction (Sirisambhand 1988: 64).
This process of deforestation is linked very clearly to the expansion of 
cash cropping. Hewison and Seri describe the process of deforestation in 
North eastern Thailand as being a result of villagers’ response to Thailand's 
path of economic development concluding that:
"there is no longer a richness in nature as before and the villagers
have largely destroyed this themselves because they wanted money.
They did this under pressure from traders who wanted their r
products for export and the government which needed exports 
to support economic development: export policies determined 
villagers' actions" (Seri and Hewison 1990:107).
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Hirsch discusses this dynamic in detail. He stresses that deforestation 
by villagers has not occurred as a result of underdevelopment and a process 
where poverty stricken villagers were forced to move into forest reserves, 
but as a direct result of the kind of development path that Thailand has 
taken. Population growth in Thailand has grown more slowly than the 
increase in the amount of land being used for agriculture and most newly 
cleared land has been used for growing commercial crops. It is therefore not 
simply population growth that has led to the destruction of forest but the 
growth of commercial agriculture. Furthermore the lack of investment in 
intensifying productivity, with most state investment flowing into
infrastructure such as roads, has meant that large areas are used for
Ccomparatively low yields (Hirsch 1990:3). Hirsch writes that an explanation 
of deforestation "should come from a look at the processes of development 
rather than a situation of underdevelopment" (Hirsch 1994:9)
This is also stressed by Thai environmental NGOs who are quick to 
deflect the blame for deforestation away from villagers and place it on 
government policy and the promotion of export crops (TDN 1990:2; Field 
notes 1993). The search for a culprit, someone on which to place a definite 
blame for environmental destruction, is called "the politics of blame" by 
Hirsch. Much of the discussion about environmental destruction occurs as 
a debate over who is the culprit and who is the victim of degradation 
(Hirsch 1993:4). Who can be blamed for forest destruction: the villager or the 
development process that caught the villager up in a world of debt, 
consumerism and a growing need for cash? This question is fundamental
in the debates over the conflicts over natural resources and who should 
have control over resources, villagers or state and business.
As way of a brief qualification on the emphasis on cash crops it is 
important to remember that there have been other major influences on 
deforestation which implicate the state and corporate sector as major 
contributors to forest destruction. Logging concessions given by the 
government are one major cause of destruction and resulted in such 
widespread protest that the government introduced the 1989 logging ban 
(Pinkaew and Rajesh 1992:15). Another key industry which has resulted in 
deforestation is the tourist industry. This is illustrated by the fifty golf 
course projects destroying about 100,000 hectares of farmland and the forty 
golf course and thirty five resorts which were under investigation for 
encroaching on forest land in 1992 (Pinkaew and Rajesh 1992:xiv).
Encroachment into protected forest areas has also been intensified by 
governm ent resettlem ent program s where large infrastructure 
development such as dams and roads have displaced local people. An 
added factor has been anti-insurgency activities by the state which have in 
some areas encouraged settlement in forest reserves. In the late 1970s 
national security-related programs had a marked effect on deforestation 
with accelerated deforestation coinciding with a peak in political opposition 
and tension over national security issues (Thomas 1993:6).
Illegal logging also remains a major factor in forest destruction. Illegal 
logging has thrived since the 1989 logging ban. NGO sources argue that 
illegal logging is integrally tied up with influential figures, even at a 
national level, and local officials, particularly forestry officials. Although 
the 1989 logging ban has slowed the destruction of forest, it has not stopped
42
it. A leading NGO in the field, the Project for Ecological Reconstruction 
(PER), identify timber entrepreneurs, government officials, police and 
villagers in their employ as the groups engaged in illegal logging (Pinkaew 
and Petchmala 1992:29).
The expansion of the land frontier for agriculture slowed during the 
late 1970s, because land suitable for agriculture started to run out. The 
exhaustion of land suitable for agriculture seems to be a fairly well accepted 
fact, although one forestry expert claims that by Asian standards Thailand is 
not yet over-populated and that significant amounts of land suitable for 
agricultural expansion remain (Scholz 1988 :45). This conclusion seems out 
of tune with other authors and Hirsch talks about the closure of the land 
frontier as "a much heralded event"(Hirsch 1990C:3).
Deforestation has resulted in serious environmental problems. The 
constant expansion of the land frontier and the moves to farming on more 
marginal lands has meant that average yields for some crops have declined. 
The increased cultivation of such crops as cassava and kenaf which deplete 
soil quality has also led to declining productivity since the 1970s in 
Northeast Thailand. Even more importantly deforestation has led to 
flooding, soil erosion and the siltation of waterways (Hirsch 1989:4; Porpora 
and Lim 1987:88). Furthermore deforestation is also blamed for increasingly 
erratic rainfall (Sanitsuda 1990:19).
As the natural resources of the countryside suffer increasing 
degradation the options for Northeast farmers become more and more 
limited. The abundance of land and forest provided a safety net which has 
been largely destroyed. The forest can no longer be relied upon as a 
guaranteed source of edible plants or potential agricultural land. NGOs
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point out that villagers are the first to be affected by environmental 
depletion and are therefore committed to restoring diminishing resources 
(Field notes 1993).
In a 1993 interview Anan identified problems of drought, lack of water 
and environmental problems as the most fundamental problems for 
Northeastern farmers. In fact he commented that for Northeast farmers the 
major problem is simply that farming is becoming less and less "viable" for 
these reasons (Anan Field notes 1993). NGO development workers from 
Surin, Sakon Nakon and Khon Kaen listed debt, drought, environmental 
degradation including pollution from industry and conflict over resources 
such as water, farmland and forest as major day-to-day problems for 
Northeastern farmers (Field notes 1993). Both Anan and NGO workers also 
mentioned increasing problems for farmers throughout Thailand with new 
forms of land and production control. Anan identified problems with 
contract farming in Southern Northeast Thailand and NGO workers also 
mentioned contract farming as a source of concern for development 
workers in Northeast Thailand (Field notes 1993).
Conclusion
Economic and social cleavages at village level are increasing in the 
Thai countryside and in themselves beg further analysis. Nevertheless 
small holders continue to dominate the rural sector and tenancy has not 
increased dramatically. In fact village level differentiation is overshadowed 
by an urban-rural polarisation. Poverty persists at a much higher level in 
the countryside and is accompanied by depleted natural resources, resources 
which previously provided a safety valve for poor rural dwellers. Who is to 
blame for the depletion of natural resources, state or villager, is
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fundamental to the conflict over natural resources and debate over who 
should manage natural resources. From this picture the basis for the 
conflict over natural resources between state and village starts to emerge. 
Chapter three goes further to explain the role of the state and corporate 
sector in the conflict with villagers over natural resources, with specific 
reference to the KJK forest resettlement scheme in 1991 and details of the 
conflict over forest land.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE STATE AND THE COUNTRYSIDE
Chapter four discusses the increased presence of the state in the 
countryside in a process of incorporating the periphery, a process motivated 
by political and economic circumstances. Since the 1980s an increase in the 
direct economic involvement of the state and big business in the 
countryside, in the context of dwindling resources, laid the basis for conflict 
over natural resources. The state has facilitated the involvement of the 
corporate sector in the country at the same time as increasing the 
involvement of the public sector in large infrastructure projects in rural 
areas. This is well illustrated through an examination of state involvement 
with forest land in rural Thailand. However in the case of forest land and 
the KJK forest resettlement the political ambitions of the military added an 
extra dimension to the conflict over forest land.
Greater state involvement in the countryside
The state has had a strong political and economic agenda in rural 
Thailand since the 1960s when the transformation of the economy and the 
problems of insurgency became pressing concerns. In 1960 the country's 
first economic development plan proposed a new agricultural system based 
on the intensification of cash crop production through fertilisers, pesticides, 
high yield varieties and mechanisation (Orawan and Darunee 1992:83).
Following the start of communist insurgency in the countryside, 
agricultural development, investment, infrastructure and the promotion of 
modern technologies have been closely linked to attempts to suppress 
insurgency. The Accelerated Development Program initiated in 1965, with
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substantial United States funding, concentrated on the Northeast and 
introduced a range of development programs in sensitive areas. The 
majority of the budget was spent on road construction which was typical of 
rural development programs in this era. Emphasis was on big 
infrastrucural development with anti-insurgency in mind (Girling 
1981:117).
As insurgency and rural protest escalated over the 1970s military 
presence in the countryside grew considerably. Programs of both military 
assault and indoctrination were accompanied by a growing paramilitary 
presence in the village. The National Defence volunteers, Reservists for 
National Security and Village Scouts are all such examples. The violently 
anti communist Village Scouts were created in 1971 by the Border Patrol 
Police, the Village Scouts later received royal patronage and played an 
important role "at an elemental level of mass emotion" with their main 
aim being to defend the country against communism. The Village Scouts 
were organised in every province and numbered about 2 million in 1981 
(Girling 1981:213; Wattana 1991:197).
Rural issues became central concerns for governments in this era for 
the first time. Both Wattana and Chai Anan and Morell identify the 1973-76 
period as the point at which the relationship between state and countryside 
changed forever because it became impossible for the national public debate 
to ignore rural issues. Land reform became a central election issue in the 
1975 election and campaign promises to carry out land reform proliferated. 
Electoral politics also meant that the countryside gained explicit political 
importance as parties sought votes in the countryside. 1979 was made Year 
of the Farmer and the problems of rural Thailand remained at the forefront
of government policy throughout the 1980s (Wattana 1991:197, Chai Anan 
and Morell 1981:201).
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Over the 1980s government presence at a village level increased 
considerably. Hirsch describes the state as increasingly acting in the village 
instead of just on the village (Hirsch 1991 :328). He describes a broad range 
of government activity at a local level. One significant development in the 
early 1980s was the increase in the role of district councils and village 
committees as part of the machinery of government. As a result, traditional 
village institutions lost power and procedures became bureacratised (Hirsch 
1990:230). Furthermore, there was a greater policing of villages and more 
political surveillance (Turton 1984:60).
At the same time, government policy in the 1980s and 1990s was 
characterised by the articulation of concern for the living conditions of the 
rural poor. From the Fifth Economic Development Plan in 1982 there was a 
reduction in the emphasis on national security and a greater emphasis on 
cooperation instead of control. The Fifth Economic Development Plan 
emphasised the distribution of income in the countryside, the problems 
surrounding land use and the increasing rates of tenancy, the destruction of 
forest. The plan also promoted agri business as an important part of 
economic policy in the countryside (Rapin 1990:73).
The concern with rural insurgency continued to influence policy 
making in the late 1970s and 1980s. It was recognised that there was a link 
between rural poverty and communism, and this recognition led to 
attempts to address the problems of rural poverty. For example Prem's first 
policy speech took the improvement of living standards and the task of 
narrowing the income divide as central themes. Prem saw rural poverty as
a danger for the country proclaiming that "the weakness that threatens the 
whole future of the nation is rural poverty" (Hewison 1989:35; FEERYB 
1981:283).
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In the Sixth Economic Development Plan (1987-1991)'there was an 
emphasis on human development, support for local people's participation 
and strengthening local organisations in order to achieve basic human 
needs (Rapin 1990:80; Turton 1987:31). In fact an apparent concern by 
governments to develop the countryside has included a strong tendency to 
stress the importance of participation by rural dwellers in development. 
The populist element that Hewison describes as being a part of all 
government programs since 1932 has intensified since the 1970s as 
governments attempted to draw the countryside into the development 
project, a trend that is also in line with changes in emphasis in the world 
bank (Hewison 1989). Development and participation have become 
catchwords in government rhetoric throughout the Prem, Chatchai, Anan 
and Chuan administrations. Hirsch's discussion of "Development 
Discourse" describes policy in the 1980s as being characterised by a picture of 
farmers as the backbone of the nation who have rights, duties and 
responsibilities to participate in the spirit of development and advance their 
villages towards modernisation (Hirsch 1989:53).
Interestingly, the ideas of participation and the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens are also strong themes in the protests discussed in 
this thesis. In discussion of ideological domination and the control of the 
Thai countryside, Turton claims that formal statements with a modernising 
and populist content are one way of legitimising oppositional discourse 
(Turton 1984:56). Of course it is possible to view such statements as actually 
originating in the village, with villagers under pressure from an
increasingly intrusive state, demanding more participation and rights and 
these demands then being incorporated by the state in the effort to control 
dissent in the countryside.
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Another important trend over the 1980s in the approach of 
government to the countryside, which is particularly relevant to the 
conflicts under discussion, is the increasing attention given to 
environmental concerns amongst government institutions. One obvious 
example of this is the 1989 ban on logging. This decision was taken after 
intense public pressure by a cabinet which had several ministers with 
enormous vested interest in the timber industry (Pasail 1989:40). In the case 
of the logging ban, significant pressure came from villager and rural areas to 
ban logging, particularly from Northern Thailand, and ideas around 
environmentalism can be seen as flowing as much from village to state as 
the other way around.
There is a strong contradiction between government rhetoric on the 
environment and local participation, on the one hand, and their economic 
intentions on the other. There has been an increase in state facilitation of 
agro business activity in the countryside and the construction of large scale 
infrastructure in the 1980s. Agri business in the form of plantations, 
factories and real estate developments, as well as state activities such as the 
construction of hydro electric dams and highways and attempts to claim 
forest land as state property, represent these forces at work. The most clear- 
cut example of this was the government's economic forest policy which 
ignored environmental concerns and the participation of local 
communities because of the potential of the paper pulp in the latter half of 
the 1980s. This dynamic is clearly illustrated in the case of the KJK forest 
resettlement scheme.
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The incorporation of the countryside into a wider sphere of influence 
has occurred both politically and economically and the government's 
political presence in the countryside has increased since the 1970s. In terms 
of the conflict over natural resources the new economic role for the 
countryside has had more direct effect. However, before going on to 
examine the case of forest land and KJK it is important to consider the role 
of the military.
The Military and the Countryside
The countryside was a power base for the military since the beginning 
of anti-insurgency operations in the late 1960s. When insurgency ended in 
the mid 1980s the military suffered a relative decline in Thai society 
alongside the growing strength of parliamentary politics and the 
consolidation of capitalist groups independent of the military. The military 
retained its strong orientation to the countryside, particularly in Isarn, and 
became increasingly involved in economic development in cooperation 
with business and government. Nevertheless it maintained a strong 
political agenda and attempted to strengthen its political position with a 
military coup in 1990.
As early as the 1960s the military increased its presence in the 
countryside in order to combat insurgency using military operations and by 
building links with the mass of rural people. It established village 
organisations and rural development programs in areas of communist 
influence. With massive financial support from the United States as a 
result of American policy to contain communism in the region, the Thai 
military expanded it's role in Thai society in this period. This continued in
the 1970s and into the next decade. After 1976 the military continues its 
fight against insurgency and continued to build and organise alliances and 
organising village based organisations. Organisations such as the National 
Defence volunteers, the Volunteer Development and Self Defences Villages 
program and the Militia Reservists for National Security gave the military 
the infrastructure to mobilise mass support (Suchit 1987:52-54).
At the same time some development programs created by the military 
in the following decade were aimed at eradicating social injustice and 
countering the growing power of local business interests. Mass movement 
programs organised by the military also developed democratic organisations 
and educated villagers on election procedures and voting (Suchit 1987:14). 
In the early 1980s some military factions advocated increased political 
involvement, with the leading clique in the military pushing the 
importance of an intensification in the military's role in democratic 
development as the best method to combat communism (Suchit et al. 
1991:7). In an early 1980s policy statement the military concluded that a 
dictatorial government was the major cause of communist offensives and 
that democratic measures must be used to counter communism. 
Paradoxically this "political offensive strategy" was very critical of some 
parties and parliamentarians; it stressed their corruption and self interest to 
such an extent that senior military officials attacked the whole concept of 
the democratic system, observing that the appointed senate could be more 
responsible and undemocratic than the unprincipled elected representatives 
(Suchit 1987:70-71).
At the same time the military also exposed a critical analysis of capitals 
role in rural Thailand. A policy statement criticised exploitative business 
interests as being the basis of insurgency: "some economic groups have been
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able to take advantage of and use monopolistic power which inflicts social 
injustice and material hardships on the people, creating the conditions for 
war" (Suchit et al. 1991:211). There were factions within the military which 
had a deep understanding of village life and were genuinely outraged at the 
exploitation of villagers by officials and other local power groups (Girling 
1981:131).
However the military's relative decline position within the state has 
been the most important influence on both the changing orientation of the 
military to the countryside and on its broader ideological evolution, 
including the new critique of capital and parliament. Pasuk and Hewison 
both describe the decline of the military as a process involving tension with 
an increasingly powerful and consolidated capitalist class beginning to 
entrench its rule. As domestic capital has become more independent from 
military ties, the corporate sector has shifted from being an ally to a 
competitor of the military (Pasuk 1992; Hewison 1992,1993) . In the early 
1980s the military had to start to fight for control over economic policy. 
After the US withdrawal the military experienced a fiscal crisis and 
attempted to increase its share of the national budget in return for the 
management of rural development programs. This brought it into conflict 
with the growing corporate lobby intent on influencing economic policy and 
increasingly trying to limit the role of the military and the size of its budget. 
This process continued over the next decade. With the end of communist 
insurgency in 1984 and the election of the new Chatchai government in 
1988, which was a government dominated by provincial politicians and 
provincial business interests, the place of the military began to change very 
markedly. Direct military influence in the assembly was removed and gave 
civilian politicians the opportunity to intensify attempts to stem the flow of 
state funds to the military. In parliamentary scrutiny of the military budget
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in 1989 and 1990, Mps campaigned for cuts to the military budget for the
i
first time. In 1991 the Chatjchai administration continued the reduction of 
state funds to the military by cutting its budget and refusing a military 
program for arms. Within months the Chaichai government was forced 
out by a military coup (Pasuk 1992:14).
The growing strength of the parliamentary system meant that the 
military had to participate in the electoral process and relied on the 
countryside as a source of votes for its preferred parties. As insurgency 
dwindled and the military looked for a new role in Thai society it continued 
to view the countryside as a power base and looked for an expanded 
economic role. In the mid 1980s the military's "Dream of peace" program 
set up a mix of local level infrastructure and ideological training with the 
military using their own personnel and local volunteers. In 1987 this was 
followed by the Isarn Khiew, Green Isarn program, which was launched by 
the military after comments by the king that the military should help 
drought-stricken farmers in the Northeast. The Green Isarn program was a 
program of investment and public works. The program's main emphasis 
was to develop agriculture and the forest in order to support 
industrialisation in the country as a whole and coincided with corporate 
and government interests (Hirsch 1987:34).
Green Isarn aimed to increase crop production for the canned food 
industry, livestock and milk production for local and export markets and to 
shift forestry production to supply pulp, furniture and fuelwood 
production. Orawan uses a quote from General Chavalit, the Thai army 
commander at the time of the conception of Green Isarn, which clearly 
displays a strong economic vision for Northeast Thailand: "We have to 
change the attitudes of Northeastern farmers and persuade them to replace
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the old subsistence agriculture with large plantations for industry. The 
private sector has to be prevailed upon to establish agro industry factories in 
the Northeast because 70 to 80% of the people there are farmers" (Orawan 
1992:69).
Orawan describes Green Isarn as a "triple alliance, of the state and 
army, Thai business and multinationals" with international consultants 
integrally involved in the plan and international agencies offering low 
interest loans and grants (Orawan 1992:68) Green Isarn included 
commercial forestry and this gave the military long experience in the area 
and added to their commitment to the KJK program. After completion in 
1991 surveys from the Community Development Department suggested 
that the scheme had some positive effects although it ended in the midst of 
widespread criticism for it's ineffectiveness and speculation on its hidden 
political agenda (29 Sep 1991 BP).
By 1990 the military had officially declared war on poverty. This was 
proclaimed by the military to be the most important enemy of all Thai 
people and it was announced that the primary mission of the military in the 
next decade would be to fight poverty (Suchit et al. 1991 :22). Nevertheless it 
is worth noting that despite broad changes in policy, Communism and 
insurgency did not altogether disappear as factors in the legitimisation of 
the military role. Despite the end of insurgency in 1984 and the collapse of 
the communist bloc, some military leaders continued to resurrect the 
communist spectre. This is evident for example in the treatment of the 
forest monk, Pra Prajak, who was labelled a "Russian Monk" and 
"Communist Monk" (TDN 1993 no:22:15).
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In February 1991 a military coup overthrew the elected Chatchai 
government on the grounds of widespread corruption. Pasuk and Baker 
theorise that-at the time of the coup the military were interested curbing 
the power of the parliamentary system and drawing closer to big business. It 
attempted to carry this out by installing Anand Panyarachun, an influential 
figure in formal business associations, as Prime Minister immediately after 
the coup. However Anand's government concentrated on the kind of 
economic restructuring that the corporate sector had been proposing for 
many years, rejected military demands for arms and could not be pressured 
to allocate large infrastructure projects to companies with close links with 
the leading military clique (Pasuk and Baker 1993:24).
The m ilitary and KJK
The military coup in 1991 was an attempt at the reassertion of military 
power and Kor Jor Kor was to be an integral part of this reassertion. At the 
same time the military had a strong set of economic objectives in the 
countryside which helped motivate their commitment to KJK. The 
military's economic and political objectives in the forest coincided with 
those of business and government and led to the formation of the KJK 
program.
Over its eighty years of existence the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) 
had only been able to reforest 4 million rai of land and forest reserves were 
being steadily more populated over time. This failure by the forestry 
department was used as a pretext by the military dominated agency, the 
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), to propose KJK. In 1990, 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon, as head of ISOC, proposed the program and 
had it approved by the Chatchai government. KJK was made the executory
arm of the National Forest Plan and was officially aimed at helping the RFD 
increase Thailand's forest cover.
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Having initiated the KJK program through ISOC, the military had a 
strong commitment to the program from its inception. General Suchinda, 
who originally proposed the program, was a leading figure in the 1991 coup 
and he was to remain a key figure until mid 1992. After writing a 
constitution which guaranteed the military significant power over the 
cabinet and assembly, elections were held in March 1992, but the leader of 
the largest party in the elections was pushed aside and Suchinda was made 
prime minister. As a result the KJK program continued to be of high 
priority under Suchinda and no negotiations on it would be entered into 
until Suchinda was replaced later in the year.
Hewison argues that one major reason behind the 1990 coup was the 
military's discomfort at the growing power of the various political interest 
groups that had gained influence during the Chatchai years. These political 
interest groups include the alliances built between NGO groups, villagers 
and others over the eucalyptus plantations and other resource conflicts in 
the countryside. (Hewison 1992:5). The discomfort of the military with 
these forces certainly helps explain the forcible nature of the military's role 
in the KJK program and the abuse of human rights which took place.
Despite the fact that the military's new orientation to the countryside 
was in large part a direct result of tensions with parliament and capital, the 
military entered into an alliance with both the bureaucracy and forces of 
capital in attempts to enforce the KJK program. Both the Royal Forestry 
Department (RFD) and business groups had considerable investment in the 
forest resettlement program and their interests were to coincide with the
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reassertion of military control and the military's interest in commercial 
reafforestation. This overlapping of economic interests portrays the over­
simplicity of viewing the interests of the military and corporate sector as 
being in direct confrontation and blurs the divisions described by Pasuk.
KJK occurred during a time of intense anti-military feeling in urban 
Thailand, and the peak of the KJK controversy coincided with the disgrace 
of the military over the massacre of democracy demonstrators in May 1992. 
The second Anand administration entered into negotiations with the anti 
KJK movement in the aftermath of the May demonstrations, and the 
decision to revoke the program in mid-1992 was to be another defeat for the 
military.
The relationship between the RFD and the military is interesting in 
itself. Several NGO activists interviewed in 1993 advanced the theory that 
KJK was one major reason leading to the loss of political power by the 
military in 1991-1992, and whimsically suggested that the whole program 
was a clever and intricate plot on behalf of anti military forces in 
government to discredit the military in Thai society (Field notes 1993). It 
seems more likely that both institutions were involved for their own 
reasons. Both the RFD and military had strong motivations, and some of 
these coincided, especially given their mutual support for economic forests 
and eucalyptus plantations.
In fact the RFD and the military have a history of alliance dating at 
least from their close cooperation during the threat of communist 
insurgency. Thomas describes RFD units as finding a "natural alliance with 
military units". This alliance was formalised in a new forest village 
program under the local development for security project in the late 1970s.
The RFD at this time expanded to include community planning, 
infrastructure construction and rural development activities despite a lack 
of training in these areas (Thomas 1993:7).
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The commitment of government, business and the military to 
plantation forestry as the answer to Thailand's dwindling forest resource 
drove the creation of the KJK program alongside the military's reassertion 
of political power The way in which the idea of economic forests was 
adopted under a conservationist guise and the effect this had on farmers is 
discussed in the next section.
Economic forests and farmers
Reforestation for economic gain has, in part, emerged as such a 
prominent issue because officially all reserve forest land in Thailand 
belongs to the state. The state, under pressure from business interests, 
would like to reforest forest reserves profitably. There are genuine 
environmentalist principles adhered to within the forestry department and 
the RFD has actually become increasingly factionalised in the 1990s between 
those who want to simply protect forest and those who want to expand 
economic forestry. However the RFD has been receiving significant 
revenue from commercial forestry for the last decade and its ties with the 
plantation sector are strong (Taylor 1994:8). This situation has meant the 
RFD has not been sympathetic to alternative methods of forest management 
such as local reforestation through community forests whereby villagers act 
as protectors of forest, as advocated by many rural based NGOs and villages. 
Instead it has built a commitment to removing villagers from reserves. 
The following description of state forest policy illustrates the strong
economic motives of forest policy and how these tendencies ultimately led 
to forced evictions.
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The Reserved Forest Act was passed in 1964. Currently 42% of land in 
Thailand is classed as forest reserve land. This area of forest reserve actually 
exceeds the area of forested land but it is land's status as state owned rather 
than the amount of forest cover that defines it as forest reserve (Hirsch 
1990:168).
Hirsch estimates that 20% of Thai farmers live and cultivate on forest 
reserve land (Hirsch 1990:168), while Lohmann believes as much as 15% of 
Thailand's whole population are in reserves (Lohmann 1990:3) Uhlig 
estimates that at a conservative estimate some 5-6 million people live in 
reserves (Uhlig 1988:11). The legal status of settlers on reserve land is 
ambiguous. They are called squatters by the Thai government, but there are 
varying forms of legal documentation that can sometimes be used to claim a 
legal right to land. Some pocess tax receipts, pre titling ownership 
documents and various other forms of documentation, although in fact 
records that exist are often in conflict. In fact outside of RFD land only 15% 
of land is fully scaled and titled. RFD land is in an even worse situation 
with only general surveys in existence and unclear boundaries complicating 
the situation (Handley 1991:15).
Land titling has long been a problem in Thailand and has led to some 
marginalisation of those farmers without title deeds. A lack of systematic 
titling has meant that farmers have a lack of security and are less likely to 
invest in more intensive or sustainable production but instead tend to 
expand production into outlying areas. Furthermore, untitled farmers are
generally unable to get access to credit facilities and other supports needed 
for investment in production without title deeds (Hirsch 1989:4).
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Whilst the World Bank is currently carrying out a program to 
complete the titling of private land the problem of land titles on public land 
remain a problem for the Thai government. Various government schemes 
have given some "squatters " legal documents to their land in the last 
twenty years and the Ministry of Interior continued to officially recognise 
new villages in forest reserves until 1986 because of concerns about rural 
political stability (Thomas 1993:6). Since this time there has been a 
concerted effort by the Thai government to deal with the problem. In 1988 
the Thai government began an effort to give official land titles to settlers in 
forest reserves. Those in reserve areas were divided into communities 
settled before 1967, communities settled between 1967 and 1975 and those 
settled 1975-1981. Under this scheme the first group receives proper land 
titles, the second group receives deeds to make use of the land and the 
group settled before 1975 receive permission for temporary usage. However 
before settlers in forest reserve are issued land titles they can be evicted at 
any time (Apichai 1992:193).
Government measures to provide legal status for some reserve settlers 
represent only one part of an inconsistent approach to "squatters". In large 
part this inconsistency derives from the fact that at precisely the same time 
that some squatters are granted title, forest reserve land continues to be seen 
by the government as an economic commodity belonging to the state, and as 
such government and agro business have claimed large tracts of forest land 
for commercial forestry with little or no regard for "squatter" inhabitants.
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In 1985 The National Forest Policy of Thailand was introduced. This 
policy aimed to increase forest cover back to forty percent of land mass for 
two main purposes. Twenty five percent of the total was to be "economic 
forest" which would be used for wood and forest products for economic 
purposes. The plan explicitly stated that this would be achieved by the 
provision of incentives by the state for the promotion of silviculture by 
private enterprise. Only fifteen percent of land was to be put aside as 
conserved forest (Apichai 1992:189; Orawan 1992:49; Lohmann 1991:6).
The National Forest Policy followed the emphasis on economic forests 
in the Fifth Economic Development Plan (1982-1986) in which the 
government planned an annual planting area of 300 000 rai of economic 
forest. The private sector was encouraged to participate in the reforestation. 
In March 1984 the government passed a resolution, proposed by the Joint 
Economic Commission of the state and private sector, to promote private 
sector reforestation. Soon afterwards a commission for forest planting by 
the private sector was established by the government. These developments 
marked the beginning of the government's promotion of eucalyptus 
plantations as the core of reforestation policy. Since this time the 
rehabilitation of degraded forest land has taken the form of eucalyptus 
plantations except for some replanting of teak species in Northern Thailand 
(Orawan 1992:57; Hirsch 1990:169).
The interests of state and capital in reforestation with eucalyptus 
plantations the interests have coincided on a national, and even 
international level. By 1992 about 500 000 rai of eucalyptus had been 
planted in Thailand, 200 000 rai of which was in the Northeast. Eucalyptus 
farms are geared to supply paper pulp and chip wood to expanding domestic 
and international markets and have strong international and domestic
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support from industry. Apichai describes the development of the eucalyptus 
industry as occurring under "strong pressure from business through 
political connections, transnational corporations and international aid 
agencies as well as financial institutions". The rapid increase in the demand 
for paper pulp world wide and the rapid decrease in the supply of raw 
materials has generated high levels of interest in Thailand as a potential site 
for the production of eucalyptus. Apichai documents the strong influence 
of Japanese and Taiwanese transnationals in the concerted political lobby for 
the development of the eucalyptus industry (Apichai 1992:189-191). 
Lohmann also gives a long list of international organisations involved in 
the promotion of eucalyptus including aid agencies from Japan, Canada, 
Finland and Australia (Lohmann 1991:10).
The emphasis on eucalyptus is an international trend articulated by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank in 
1985 in the Tropical Forestry Action Plan which recommended economic 
forests and eucalyptus plantations as the solution to tropical forest 
destruction. Thailand's Tropical Forest Action Plan, begun in 1991, has been 
supported by Finland's bilateral aid organisation and has been formulated 
in conjunction with the Finnish consulting engineering firm Jaakko Poyr 
Oy, renowned for it's commitment to plantation forestry and economic 
forests (Taylor 1994:33; Orawan 1992:66-67;Lohmann 1991:15).
There are also strong links between domestic business and political 
actors in the promotion of eucalyptus in part brought to light by various 
corruption scandals The Democrat Party has controlled the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the RFD within this ministry since 1981 and has been 
particularly implicated in corruption scandals concerning the use of forest 
reserve. The most well-known example of this prior to the KJK campaign
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was evident in the 1990 Suan Kitti scandal when workers from the Suan 
company were arrested for clearing forest reserve land in order to plant 
eucalyptus trees. The owner of Suan kitti was a patron of the Democrat 
party, and as a result the Director General of the RFD displayed particular 
leniency to the case, arguing in favour of Suan Kitti. Apichai cites this and 
other examples as evidence of the strong influence of patron-client relations 
between politicians, the bureaucracy and business and concludes that this 
situation means that government policies will be geared to the needs of 
business as indicated by the support of government for the eucalyptus tree 
(Apichai 1992:195-197).
The extent of government promotion of eucalyptus illustrates the 
importance of commercial forestry in the official vision for an agri 
industrialised Thailand. Reforestation is carried out by plantation firms 
including Thai national firms, joint ventures and transnational firms all of 
whom received various incentives from the government. Incentives for 
eucalyptus plantations included duty exemption on imported machinery 
and raw materials and various tax exemptions. Land was granted in the 
form of thirty year concessions at remarkably cheap prices. In 1990 five 
paper mills, eight eucalyptus plantation projects and twelve wood chip 
companies received privileges from the Board of Investment, and in 1992 
six more received similar privileges. A plantation bill was also introduced 
with the intention of supporting and accommodating tree plantation 
projects and ensuring that land is available for commercial reforestation 
(Orawan 1992:66-68; Apichai 1992 : 193).
The use of forests for eucalyptus cultivation has affected villagers in 
plantation areas through formal evictions and through changes in the local 
environment. Environmentalists, villagers, NGOs and academics have
6 4
opposed eucalyptus plantations on the grounds they destroy the livelihoods 
of villagers and actually increase the rate of deforestation in the process. 
Plantations in Northeast Thailand have resulted in the displacement of 
villagers previously living in forest reserves without providing any 
significant demand for labour, let alone work which might be attractive to 
farmers who are traditionally small holders. It is difficult to see where 
displaced farmers can go. Migration to urban areas provides limited options 
of a permanent nature because the industrial sector has not and is not 
producing large numbers of permanent jobs. At the same time agricultural 
labouring is lowly paid and insecure. One final option is for farmers to 
move on to new lands but in the face of the shortage of land this can only 
lead to an even greater pressure on forested land (Lohmann 1991:7-8).
Eucalyptus plantations have had wider effects than just the direct 
displacement of farmers. Plantations have also consumed communal 
grazing grounds and community woodlands. The nature of the eucalyptus 
tree means that when it relaces the degraded forest villagers then receive 
few of the benefits they traditionally get from the indigenous forest. 
Lohmann points out that eucalyptus cannot be used for fodder. It damages 
the soil, depletes the water table and provides little firewood. He says, "it 
provides none of the natural forest products that rural dwellers on the edge 
of the market economy rely on and every five or six years it is cropped" 
(Lohmann 1989:10). Documentation from environmentalists on the 
destructive effects of eucalyptus are detailed and describe lowering of the 
water table, reduction in the fertility of the soil, high fire danger and 
adverse affects on wildlife (Apichai 1992 200-201; Orawanl992:72).
At a meeting of village headman from around the Northeastern 
region which was organised by a Surin-based NGO in late 1993, villagers
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and NGO workers were quick to voice their hatred of the eucalyptus tree. Of 
ten village headmen interviewed, all firmly believed that the eucalyptus 
tree was as a danger to the local environment. In fact in discussions over 
comparisons of the Thai and Australian environment villagers were quick 
to advise that Australian authorities cut down Australia’s eucalyptus trees 
and plant less selfish species to improve the fertility of the land. It was 
clearly indicated that villagers have experienced the eucalyptus tree as a 
destructive force (Field notes 1993).
During the late 1980s there was widespread and sustained opposition to 
eucalyptus plantations. Protests and rallies demanded that land 
expropriated to grow eucalyptus plantations be returned, that permission be 
given to replant with other species and in some cases, that there be a 
complete stop to eucalyptus plantations (Orawan 1992:72-3). This conflict 
came to a head over the Suan Kitti scandal. After this incident all 
reforestation was suspended by the Chatchai government. However in 
March 1992 the Suchinda government introduced the Tree Farm Act 
permitting land in degraded forest reserves to be leased out to agri business 
for commercial reforestation (Orawan 1992:75).
Hirsch describes conflict within and between these actors. If there is 
fundamental conflict between them there is also inconsistency in state 
policy, competition between commercial interests and competition for land, 
class divisions and factionalism between small holders (Hircsh 1993:8). 
There are obvious conflicts between RFD officials trying to protect the forest 
and officials involved in illegal logging . There is in fact a high casualty rate 
among RFD employees patrolling forests from illegal logging interests (10 
August 1993 BWR ). There is also obvious tension between those villagers 
working to conserve the forest and those employed to illegally cut trees.
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The tension within these forces is worth keeping in mind in this conflict 
between state and commercial interests which, of course, emphasises the 
conflict of interests between state and the small holder.
Nevertheless the fundamental dynamic behind forest management 
was the use of plantations to reforest. Under KJK it was planned that 14, 720 
sq km of a total 22, 530 sq km was to be reclaimed by the state would be 
replanted with eucalyptus trees (Hubbel and Rajesh 1992:2) The level of 
distrust and anger directed at the state, notably the Forestry Department, by 
villagers over the promotion of eucalyptus plantations was very high at the 
time that the KJK program was launched. Forestry officials were old 
enemies for villagers opposing eucalyptus and the economic agenda of the 
state to develop the forest would bring about fundamental conflict under 
KJK.
Conclusion
The motivations of military, RFD and corporate sector for resettling 
villagers out of the forest, in the name of forest regeneration and assisting 
the landless, clearly converged. The political motivation of the RFD to 
bring forest under their control and the political needs of the military 
attempting to maintain their hold on political power led to forceful policies 
in the forest. Just as importantly the economic interests of both the state 
and corporate sector led to an interest in taking control of forests. The 
reasons given by state and corporate sector for the eviction of villagers from 
the forest were interestingly enough the same reasons used by the forces 
opposing eviction. Forest conservation and regeneration and the 
democratic rights of the villagers in the forest were the rallying cries of the 
movement against KJK.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MIDDLE CLASS ACTIVISM AND COMMUNAL CULTURE
Chapter five explores the middle class forces which have joined with 
villagers in the conflict over natural resources against the state and 
corporate sector. Through an analysis of Communal Culture1 discourse and 
the work of NGOs the tendency for these forces to form romantic notions of 
the village and push internal village differences out of focus is discussed. 
The strength of themes around democracy, social justice and 
environmentalism are also examined and found to be fundamental to the 
middle class visions for the countryside.
Middle class activism
The chief allies of villagers in the resource conflicts have been middle 
class elements. These include NGOs, students, academics and monks. In 
the farmers' movement of the 1970s the student movement took a central 
coordinating role. In the resource conflicts this central role has been taken 
by NGOs.
After 1976, the erosion of faith in Maoism, and the disintegration of 
the CPT there was a large flow of middle class activists into NGOs. This 
process began in 1978-79 and NGOs proliferated over the 1980s. They 
became particularly active after 1987 as economic development intensified. 
Many NGO activists still claim descent from the 1973-76 movement and 
emphasise their shared history. A leader of a Bangkok NGO which is active 
in promoting democratic ideals, the Campaign for Popular Democracy
1 Communal Culture is sometimes known as "community culture". One example of this is Chatthip 
( 1993).
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(CPD), commented in 1993 that "NGOs owe their fundamental strength to 
the student and intellectual movement of October 14. This is a special 
characteristic of Thai NGOs: many of them have a shared history "(17 Oct 
1993 BP; TDN 1987:29).
By the 1990s NGOs were well established as a prominent component of 
Thai political life. NGO's are under the public eye in Thailand, in fact one 
Bangkok journalist described "NGO" as "one of the most familiar acronyms 
in Thailand" (17 Oct 1993 BP). NGOs are widely perceived as an important 
political force and evoke both passionate praise and condemnation. The 
concept of a Thai NGO movement integrally involved in social change and 
acting as advocates of the powerless was developed in Thailand through the 
1980s and has come even more to the fore since the resource conflicts and 
the 1992 democracy campaign. Defining the Thai NGO movement is 
problematic however. Which NGOs are part of this movement and how 
can we define such a movements ideology and culture? This is certainly 
under discussion in many Thai NGOs who puzzle over the concept of an 
NGO "movement". Some activists conclude that NGOs should be more 
structured and political with a clear platform of beliefs, and others are 
committed to the loose networks and individual autonomy that currently 
exists (Field notes 1993).
A good beginning is to try to make some distinctions about which 
NGOs this discussion covers. NGOs are commonly divided into two 
categories in Thailand: the welfare sector and the development sector. A 
total of 13,683 organisations were registered under the Private Organisations 
Relations Division in the welfare category in 1991. Research from 
Chulalongkorn university identified 395 organisations as registered as 
"development organisations"(TDN no:22 1993:53). These "development"
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NGOs, as well as the uncertain number of organisations not registered, 
include organisations working on human rights, economic development 
and democracy. This includes NGOs with nationally high profiles such as 
the Campaign for Popular Democracy, an integral part of the 1992 democracy 
campaign (Field notes 1993).
The NGOs active in resource conflicts, and more specifically the KJK 
project, are predominantly those NGOs grouped under the umbrella body 
the "NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development" (NGO-CORD). 
NGO-CORD was first established in 1985 and is a coordinating body aimed at 
fostering communication and cooperation amongst the 220 development 
NGOs in rural areas. NGO-CORD has area committees for North, South 
and Northeast Thailand. However there are Bangkok based development 
NGOs not directly involved in NGO-CORD who engage in advocacy work 
for villages and have been involved in campaigns, such as the Campaign 
for Popular Democracy, human rights NGOs and environmental NGOs 
(Field notes 1993).
Nevertheless there is some evidence of tension between urban NGOs 
and rural based NGOs. Organisers of the 1992 democracy demonstrations 
and participants were criticised for not involving themselves in the protests 
against KJK and the Pak Mun Dam, and some democracy campaigners are 
said to have condemned KJK protests because they created a situation which 
the military could define as chaotic and use as an excuse to carry out a coup 
in the name of reimposing order (17 Aug 1992 BP).
In fact there is also some regional disparity between NGOs. In the 
opinion of the Thai worker on NGO funding for AIDAB, Northeastern 
NGOs tended to be "quite desperate" and were more hostile and militant
than their Northern or Southern counterparts who were more able to forge 
links with local government forces. He explained this situation as 
stemming from the escalation of state and industry's economic activity in 
Isarn (Field notes 1993). These comments came after the KJK campaign and 
during the revival of the Pak Mun Dam campaign and reflect the feeling of 
urgency at work in Isarn in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore 
Hirsch describes NGOs in the central region as far more concerned with 
local class relations than other rural NGOs because of the greater social 
differentiation in this region (Hirsch 1993:151).
There have been considerable tensions between government and 
NGOs throughout the country. Provincial politicians in the Northeast have 
been vocal in their condemnation of NGOs as tools used by foreign powers 
to propagate foreign economic policy and allege that funds are granted to 
NGOs with many conditions attached (17 Oct 1993 BP). NGOs have also 
been accused by the military of receiving funds from the KGB to propagate 
communist ideas and various campaign leaders have been said to be under 
communist control although this old and somewhat tired use of 
communist paranoia seems to have all but disappeared by the mid 1990s. 
NGOs are also condemned for their political motivations and in the case of 
the Pak Mun Dam and KJK campaigns they were accused by government 
ministers of coercing villagers to join rallies (1 Sep 1991 BP). Furthermore 
the NGO criticism of industrial culture has been ridiculed by the 
government who see no practical alternatives to it However the reality is 
that the government has had to work increasingly with an ever more 
articulate and organised movement. Indeed more liberal elements of 
government encouraged the development of NGOs and participation of 
NGOs in policy making (Gohlert 1990; 17 Oct 1993 BP).
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Whilst NGOs are the focus of the broad movement critical of 
government development policy and there is nothing in Thailand 
resembling the student movement of the 1970s, students are still an 
identifiable group in Thailand. The Students Federation of Thailand (SFT) 
have participated and organised protest in the resource conflicts and in the 
democracy movement of 1992. According to SFT documents, from 1987 and 
the emergence of escalating problems on the road to NICdom, the 
organisation started to work more closely with environmentalists and 
villagers. A student committee for the conservation of natural resources 
has also been formed, bringing together students from sixteen institutions 
to campaign around environmental issues (SFT 1991:3). Students are 
sometimes perceived as a particularly militant group and have been accused 
of inciting villagers into militant action. On the other hand students were 
also portrayed as NGO cannon fodder in the 1992 massacre of democracy 
demonstrators by Siam Rath (17 May 1993 BP).
Academics have also been influential in the campaigns, often giving 
public comments and organising public forums. In fact many NGO leading 
figures are eminent academics such as Professor Saneh Chamarik and 
Professor Prawase Wasi, and the national newsletter of the Thai 
Development Support Committee (TDSC) is full of contributions from 
academics. NGOs have also built strong links with professional groups, 
lawyers, nurses and teachers who participate in campaigns in both urban 
and rural Thailand. These links are a source of pride to many NGOs who 
seek broad and diverse alliances in order to strengthen their campaigns 
(Field notes 1993).
The cooperation of forest monks with villagers and NGOs has also 
been important. The monkhood in Thailand is comparatively
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undifferentiated. Unlike other Buddhist countries such as Sri Lanka, 
monks have not come to form distinctive power groupings (Taylor 
1993A:78). Nevertheless, individual monks have become affiliated with 
social movements since the 1970s and a number had a high profile in 
politics during the polarisation's of the 1973-1976 period.2 Alliances 
between local villagers and monks have become increasingly common in 
conflicts over natural resources, particularly forests. Forest monks have 
become important agents of forest protection and have convened local 
conservation groups and facilitated local environmental campaigns. Forest 
monks in Northeast Thailand have been particularly active (Taylor 
1991:110).
Communal Culture
"Communal Culture" is the one brand of intellectual thought that is 
rooted firmly in the activism and movements of the 1990s. Communal 
Culture has been developed as an ideology by intellectuals and 
development workers, particularly those in regional areas. It is the main 
school of thought in NGOs and influences NGO policy and activity 
significantly.
The central motif of the Communal Culture school is the village. It 
advocates the need to strengthen village culture, communal culture, in 
order to withstand the pressures of industrial capitalism. A village is seen 
as having a value system , a culture which has developed over time and has 
ensured community harmony. It is believed that there is no need for the
2In fact the activism of monks on the left and the right became such a point of contention in this period 
that Chai Anan and Morell conclude that monks' involvement was one of the main factors that resulted in 
the withdrawal of support for the farmers' movement and student movement by many ordinary people 
who had previously joined the student demonstrations (Cha Anan and Morell 1981:221).
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villager to surrender to modern capitalist culture and rupture the ideal and 
harmonious society of the village. The role of the development worker is 
to reinforce the continuity of the community's culture and join villagers in 
social construction by helping to revise and analyse the history of 
communities, which will in turn lead to a realisation of their heritage and 
spiritual recovery. It is in this way that communal Culture describes it as 
being possible to develop a genuine ideology of the disadvantaged which is 
resilient to the domination of the ideologies associated with privileged 
urban groups, the state and industrial capitalism (Field notes 1993; TDN 
1987 no: 14:30; Chatthip 1993:118-122).
Of the four leaders of Communal Culture identified by Chatthip, 
Bamrung Bunpanya and Prawese Wasi, both active and high profile NGO 
leaders, articulate the idea of Communal Culture in the most overtly 
political terms. At the centre of their analysis is the need to decrease the 
power of the state and decentralise power and decision making in Thai 
society. This is fundamentally connected with a rejection of centralised 
industrial capitalist society and the promotion of a return to self-reliant 
lifestyles and subsistence production for the benefit of people and the 
environment. In a 1987 NGO press forum Prawase advocated a return to 
the "communal culture of self help" and to subsistence production as the 
basis for village life. Prawese described a village which had changed its 
production system from production for profit to subsistence production and 
concluded that communal culture had begun to be restored, villagers were 
happier and the village became a place where "murder is a thing of the past 
... back is our precious culture" (TDN no:14 1987:11).
The analyses of both Bamrung and Prawase point to the "triple 
alliance" of state, capital and international capital in the same tradition as
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Orawan (described in the last chapter) with the West directly implicated in 
the destruction of the communal culture of the village. Local wisdom, Thai 
wisdom uncorrupted by Western culture, is Prawase Wasi's inspiration. He 
believes it can show how "man, nature and society can be in harmony. We 
must learn from our small people" (8 Oct 1991 BP) and sees an "Eastern" 
world view as a guiding light for an environmentally sound system of 
development in comparison to Western materialism which he sees an 
environmentally destructive (11 Mar 1992 BP). Prawase Wasi is particularly 
forthright in his criticism of western culture describing it as having spread 
materialism and destroyed indigenous culture, ie village culture. Prawase 
believes "we modelled our system and based our beliefs on the belief that 
the West is the ultimate model, leading us to look down on our cultural 
background ... authorities are victims of the education system which teaches 
contempt for villages" ( 8 Oct 1991 BP). 3
Bamrung identifies two main cultures in Thai society: village culture 
and capitalist culture. He describes the state as the agent of capitalist culture 
and says that it caters to the needs of the westerner not those of Thailand. 
He characterises village culture as being in touch with nature, kinship and 
community, representing the oldest kind of community and one which is 
truly Thai. Villages need to return to self reliant lives, strengthen their 
village culture and utilise their ancient knowledge and expertise (Chatthip 
1993:120).
Bamrung is from an Isarn farming family and is particularly focused 
on Isarn village culture and Isarn identity. He portrays the grassroots
3In fact Prawase goes as far as to lay the blame for child prostitution on western culture and influence.
He said child prostitution "lays bare the fundamental attitudes in Western society , the rotten moral core 
of a world view based on affluence as the primary criteria. This way of thinking has spread to other parts 
of the world with depressing results" (TDN no:20 1991/2:13).
movement as a back to the roots movement to save Isarn identify from 
being swallowed by industrial capitalism. He says:
To regain self confidence, to shake off our sense of inferiority, we must 
go back to our identity. This cultural, ideological aspect is not at the 
Fringe of grassroots democracy and environmentalism. It's at its very 
core (27 July 1992 BP).
Both Bamrung and Prawase advocate an explicit role for the middle 
class. Bamrung identifies the middle class as playing a crucial role in 
strengthening the village. Although he views the middle class as an 
entrenched part of Thai Society which will not disappear, the village needs 
to enter into an alliance with the middle class to resist the state. The middle 
class is currently the agent for the importation of Western ways of thinking 
but its role should be transformed into the agent for the expansion of village 
culture. The middle class should disseminate village culture, increase the 
distribution of resources from the city to the countryside and oppose state 
pressure on the village (Chatthip 1993:121). In Prawase's analysis the 
middle class should also play an important role in strengthening 
communal culture and local knowledge. NGOs need to encourage the 
reconditioning of village culture back to its original base. In addition, a 
stronger form of Buddhism needs to be added to village culture in order to 
fully unite communities and to enable them to resist the state, greed, 
selfishness and exploitation (Chatthip 1993:125-126).
Chatthip's belief in Communal Culture leads him to utopian 
conclusions. In analysis of communal culture Chatthip concludes that 
communal culture can lay the basis for the success of anarchism in 
Thailand. Restoring the village economy, self reliance and recovering the 
consciousness of communality from past generations will provide the
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environment in which anarchism can be fostered. Chatthip believes that 
the significance of anarchism is that it is an ideology consistent with the 
people's spirit, with feelings and emotions, it stresses kind heartedness and 
humanity which are "characteristics of Thai consciousness which from 
ancient times have been inseparable from Thai communities" (Chatthip 
1993:136).
Going "back to the roots" of Thai culture is an idea that has been 
evident amongst progressives in Thailand for some time. In a 1980 
international conference Sulak Sivaraska, a well known social critic and 
activist, identified the need for a Buddhist road to development, a path that 
is neither socialist or capitalist because it is important to keep the state from 
becoming too powerful. He looked for inspiration back to the agrarian 
communal society of Thailand's past where he described people as "living 
in villages never thinking of killing or stealing", a situation which has 
changed because of the advent Western materialism. Sulak’s solution was 
"Buddhist economics" where if people are going to be poor they can be poor 
together but remain full of generosity and able to share their labour and 
thought (TON no 14 1987:11).
Buddhism and Communal culture
Buddhism is drawn in as an integral part of all spheres of political 
debate in Thailand and is used as a legitimising tool for diverse political 
viewpoints and visions for the future. Against the background of 
increasing criticism of Buddhist clergy for misconduct and various long 
running and lurid scandals there are increasingly fragmented 
interpretations of Buddhism. Amongst these interpretations is a moral 
reformism warning against materialism and stressing the importance of
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traditional values. This idea is entwined with respect for nature and 
environmentalism and manifests itself most strongly in the case of forest 
monks, some of whom have entered into political alliances with villagers 
in forest conservation campaigns.
In urban Thailand Buddhist sects such as Thammakai and Santi 
Asoke set forth with a new vision for the future in the 1980s. While 
Thammakai operates as a money making venture with "unabashed 
materialism", Santi Asoke has a moral reformist platform condemning 
amoral capitalism and encouraging work, diligence, moderation and a 
simple moral lifestyle; a radical ascetism which advocates a need to return 
to early social values and go back to Buddhist communalism (Taylor 
1989:112-114). The leader of Santi Asoke, Pra Bhodirak was actually deemed 
a dangerous religious teacher and disrobed in 1989. However Santi Asoke 
has remained a relevant force in Thai politics with Chamlong, leader of the 
May 1992 democracy demonstrations and leading figure in the Palang 
Dhama Righteous Force party, retaining strong affiliations with Santi 
Asoke. Chamlong in his farmers’ shirt and with his simple lifestyle is very 
much part of a "back to the roots" vision based on Buddhist spirituality in 
Thailand and he and Palang Dhama were popular in rural development 
NGOs in the interviews I carried out in 1993. However although Santi 
Asoke has established bases in rural centres, these are made up of 
professionals and bureaucrats who often originate from Bangkok and Santi 
Asoke is essentially an urban middle class phenonomen (Taylor 1993039- 
42; Field notes 1993).
Sulak Sivaraksa's, use of Buddhism also centres around the 
destructive influence of materialism and the importance of spiritualism. 
Sulak describes modern development as encouraging competition and
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success, whereas Buddhism encourages collaboration and contentedness. 
Materialism is seen as harmful to Buddhism, and he believes that the poor 
need to be warned about the exploitation inherent in modern development 
and the reality behind modern materialism. For Sulak, Buddhism is a 
prescription for the restructuring of human consciousness and society 
(Sulak 1984:104-108).
Pra Buddhadsa was an eminent example of a visionary Buddhist monk 
in this tradition. Buddhadsa has portrayed political conflict and social 
tension as arising from the modern world. Moral laxity was seen by 
Buddahadsa as arising from the dominance of the desire for material objects 
at the cost of spiritual values; he saw materialism as a dangerous force for 
humanity. Buddhadsa was actually a political conservative believing in 
absolute monarchy and benign dictatorship (Jackson 1988). Nevertheless his 
stress on the need for greater spirituality and less materialism is a familiar 
theme, and one I have often heard articulated in the rural development 
NGO (Field notes 1993).
International trends and Communal Culture
If Communal Culture draws inspiration from Buddhist critiques of 
modernisation some of its fundamental ideas conform to the discourse of 
rural based movements in Europe, Africa and America over the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. The idealisation of peasant life and the rejection of 
centralised state power and industrialisation are familiar themes. During 
industrialisation hostility to the suffering and dehumanisation inflicted by 
change arose and rural movements in nineteenth Europe were 
characterised by populist ideas which criticised industrial capitalism and 
championed the moral superiority of rural village life (Kitching 1989:77-79).
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Kitching defines similar ideas which have arisen from the experiences 
of developing countries in the twentieth century and highly influenced 
modern development theory, as neo populism. He describes neo populism 
as emphasising the primacy of agricultural development, opposition to 
large scale industrialisation and anti urbanism with nationalist overtones. 
His presentations of the work of three modern neo populists, Nyerere, 
Lipton and Shumacher all provide interesting parallels with Communal 
Culture. The vision of small scale agricultural producers remaining a 
dominant force in society, hostility to centralisation and a belief in the 
nobility of traditional rural life are all cornerstones of neo populist thought 
evident in communal culture. Kitching argues that in fact widespread 
industrialisation cannot be avoided and rejects the possibility of small scale 
agriculturalists remaining a dominant force in society. He argues that those 
people advancing such ideas in the name of rural populations are working 
against the interests of those people they are trying to assist (Kitching 
1989:77-79).
Evaluations of Communal Culture
Many of Communal Culture's basic assumptions can be criticised. 
Communal Culture’s claim to represent the true essence of "Thainess' in 
the face of Western style thought is called into question by the fact that it 
strongly conforms to global trends in development theory. Calls for 
decentralisation and self reliance can also be criticised by those, such as 
Kitching, who argue that industrialisation and the centralisation of the 
nation state are an inevitable part of development. However the most 
relevant issue to this thesis is Communal Culture's interpretation of the 
village and its past.
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Communal Culture rests on a utopian vision of the pre-capitalist 
village and can easily be accused of being backward-looking and simply 
wanting to return to a glorified past. Communal Culture's description of 
the pre-capitalist village has come under criticism from Kemp. Kemp's 
criticisms stem from his rejection of the traditional communal village. His 
research leads him to believe that there is a historical absence of village 
community in rural Thailand and that there is no evidence of a framework 
of sustained cooperative or communal goals (Kemp 1988:326-327). Hirsch is 
also doubtful about the portrayal of the traditional Thai village as a 
harmonious rural community, pointing to cleavages in village society 
which he believes contradict such a vision (Hirsch 1991:322). Nevertheless 
he does not write off the existence of elements of harmony and communal 
action although he recognises that traditional forms of cooperation have 
been decreasing (Hirsch 1990:149).
Hirsch's main interest is actually in the role of the state in shaping 
conceptions of the village and he sees the village itself as fundamentally 
changed by the state. According to this analysis, the back to the roots vision 
imposes an identity on the village rather than seeking it out (Hirsch 
1991:322-327). The extent to which the nature of the village has changed is 
very important for Communal Culture. Apichai argues that traditional 
traditions and norms that supported communal action have been eroded to 
the extent that village level organisations are not sufficiently united or 
strong to undertake the management of natural resources (22 Sep 1993 BP). 
However for activists in rural NGOs the erosion of communal values is not 
complete, although communal values need to be strengthened.
Seri Pongphit's reply to Kemp's criticisms centres around the and 
repudiation of the notion that the "back to the roots" concept is simply an 
effort to return to a glorified past. He describes the call to go "back to the 
roots" as a strategy to strengthen communities, taking the best of traditions 
and renewing them. He says, "it is not an escape from change, but a strategy 
for survival to avoid being broken down, losing human dignity and 
freedom, not only socially and culturally but especially politically and 
economically" (Seri 1989:6).
Two main points need to be made here. First, there is extensive and 
mounting evidence from NGOs of the communal management of 
resources and the ability of villages to organise against outside attack, 
particularly in the Northern village but also in the Northeastern village. 
Turton has also commented on the notable ability of the Northern village 
to form extensive organisations against outside attack (Turton 1984:4).
Second, it would be wrong to over-emphasise the romantic vision of 
the village. Utopian visions of the village and over-emphasis on the unity 
of the village do have the potential to distort reality. However, in the 
practical application of Communal Culture in NGOs, just as Seri argues, 
equally important themes involve strong ideas around, democracy, social 
justice and environmentalism. These themes are all fundamental to the 
resource conflicts. Nevertheless the stress on the village as a largely 
undifferentiated unit is having its problems for NGOs as will become clear 
in following chapters. The view of the contemporary village as 
undifferentiated and characterised by a unity of interests is evident as a 
problem for NGOs. Although in fact in the natural resource conflicts there 
often has been a unity of interests at village level, this was not always the
case, and Communal Culture can assume a unity of interests when none 
exists.
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The work of NGOs
The role of the NGO in the village is described by the Thai 
Development Support Committee (TDSC), the NGO which acts as an 
central information base or development NGO and produces a quarterly 
newsletter, as being to strengthen the community and popular wisdom, to 
encourage those with traditional knowledge, to make villagers aware of 
their self esteem and collective power and thus enable them to bargain for 
their democratic rights. Reducing dependency on external sources in the 
form of the market demand for village products and the provision of 
production inputs is central to this, with NGOs working to give the control 
of the production process and marketing back to villagers (TDSC 1990:8).
This is essentially seen as a process that strengthens villagers enough 
to be able to survive within the free market system. Professor Saneh 
Chamarik from NGO CORD stated a representative view when he stressed 
the role played by NGOs in strengthening communities in order that they 
are able to live in the existing system. Thus he does not reject business and 
industry because he believes villagers, business and industry can coexist 
harmoniously in the right environment (1 Sep 1991 BP)
The state is described by many rural NGOs as having taken the 
independence and power of decision-making away from the people. Since 
the absolute monarchy centralised the Thai state and expanded its power the 
state has steadily been increasing its level of intrusion into villagers’ lives.
83
First, the development process itself has disempowered villagers, and this 
process is intensifying with increasing agri-business activity. The 
encouragement to plant monoculture crops has tied villagers into debt and 
the world market and has taken away their self reliance. Cash cropping has 
all occurred in the name of industrialisation which can offer villagers no 
security and has resulted in a widespread destruction of the very 
environment villagers rely upon. Furthermore, changes have impacted 
greatly on rural culture and rural family structures, which have begun to 
disintegrate with urban migration. The result is the beginning of the 
erosion of community bases of mutual help, accompanied by an associated 
loss of indigenous culture and tradition (Field notes 1993; Vitoon 1991).
Second, the extension of central control to the periphery has gradually 
stripped villagers of their community rights over land and resources. 
Before the 1930s community rights were recognised but now villagers' 
community rights are ignored, and it is assumed that the state and industry 
are the rightful guardians of natural resources (TDN No 24 1994:14; Field 
notes 1993).
NGOs argue that there is an international aspect here to complete the 
triple alliance of state, domestic capital and international capital. NGOs 
recognise that the production of tapioca and cassava which destroyed vast 
tracts of forest in Northeast Thailand were produced in order to supply the 
animal feed market of the EEC (TDSC 1990:2). Furthermore the role of 
donor governments, multilateral development banks and transnationals in 
rural development is a focus for some NGOs. A notable example is 
Professor Saneh Chamarik who describes the theft of resources as being 
strongly linked to the interests of transnational companies and the desire of 
rich countries to centralise resource control (TDN no 21 1992:14).
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One fundamental assumption behind this analysis is not simply that 
industrialisation is anti-rural and anti-people but that it is simply not 
desired by the bulk of the rural population. In 1991 NGO-CORD and several 
faculties at Chulalongkorn university organised Chao Ban Weti, the 
People's Forum, or in direct translation the "villagers' forum", an 
alternative to the 1991 World Bank meeting in Bangkok. The forum 
attracted 500 villagers, 400 Thai activists and intellectuals and 100 
international guests. In the Declaration of the People's Forum, the state is 
criticised for undertaking the task of development as a process that is done 
to the people not with the people. The declaration states that "it is thus not 
surprising that despite many changes of government the people's hardship 
and suffering has never been alleviated" (People's Forum 1991:1).
The declaration stresses the importance of Thailand as an agricultural 
c o u n try  w ith  deep ro o te d  fo u n d a tio n s  for d ev e lo p m en t in  th e  ag ricu ltu ra l 
sector. The emphasis on export oriented industrialisation is criticised:
"But for all its positive effects, this impressive economic 
growth has made poorer a large number of people - those who 
have lost the opportunity to be self reliant and have been become 
pawns in the main current of development policy. They have 
lost pride in their traditional way of life, in their age old artistic 
and cultural heritage. Existing community resources have been 
rapidly depleted: and with deteriorating mental health, social 
violence has been on the increase. While the economy continues 
to expand, the country is facing a growing social crisis" (Peoples 
Forum 1991:1).
Promoting alternative agriculture is part of the NGO's vision of 
returning power to the village. Alternative agriculture is in large part based 
on the promotion of indigenous plant species which are resistant to disease 
and do not require chemical pesticides. It also involves intercropping with
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various crops which ensures the farming family can provide most of their 
own food. NGOs argue that the kind of alternative agriculture they 
promote gives power over production back to the farmer by encouraging 
networks of communal help in the village and community activities and 
values. (TDCS 1990:4).
Similarly, the promotion of traditional handicrafts is a common 
theme. This theme tends to focus on village women and was described by 
many NGO workers as strengthening the economic power of the women 
and strengthening their status in village society. Interestingly enough, one 
source also concluded that weaving gives women tranquillity and stops 
them from craving unnecessary material things and should also be 
encouraged amongst middle class women (Field notes 1993; TDN no:21 
1992:22).
T he loss of c u ltu ra l h e rita g e  is v e ry  cen tra l to  NGO an a ly sis . The 
documentation of village history and village culture and the strengthening 
of village culture are regarded as a central tasks. In fact among NGO 
workers there is a strong sense that village culture is different from the 
culture of the NGO worker themselves, they view it as a culture to be learnt 
and disseminated. At the same time discussion around the natural advent 
of cultural change and the desirability of cultural flexibility was under way 
amongst NGO workers. Nevertheless the prominence and self- 
consciousness of this notion of culture can be disconcerting for the Western 
visitor to the rural development NGO alerting him/her to his/her position 
as "other”. However, the stress on alliances between different groups is 
fundamental to NGO thought and activity and the exchange of cultures 
widely considered the task of NGOs by the workers I interviewed (Field 
notes 1993).
86
Although development NGOs perceive the main arena of conflict as 
between rural-urban, villager and the state and corporate sector, they do not 
perceive villagers as an undifferentiated mass. There is of course the 
strong idea that each village has its own culture and history and there is 
considerable interest in the differences between ethnic groups, such as hill 
tribes and Muslim southerners. Women are also perceived as a distinct 
group. The particular problems of women are usually seen as linked to the 
commercialisation of agriculture and loss of self reliance (Field notes 1993).4
Nevertheless the issue of class differentiation is not in focus in rural 
development NGOs. NGO workers were clear that as the main conflict of 
interests was between urban and rural Thailand it was important for NGO 
workers to work with all classes in the village against outside interests. 
Older NGO workers I interviewed laughed at their insistence on only 
working with the rural poor in the late 1970s, concluding that at this time 
they were still under the influence of Marxism but had since learnt to work 
with everyone in the village, an essential process in strengthening the 
village according to Communal Culture (Field notes 1993).
The promotion of village organisations, ongkarn chum chon, or 
community organisations, is seen as the central task of NGO, activity and 
other activities such as alternative agriculture and handicrafts are often 
portrayed as a means of strengthening and creating village organisations 
rather than as an ends in themselves. Community organisations are
4 There were two main responses from NGOs workers in Northeastern and Southern NGOs when I 
questioned them about women and rural development. One response was that the role of women in the 
village had been eroded by industrialisation and traditional village culture had different but equal roles for 
men and women. The second was more critical of traditional village life and believed women's role in the 
village would become more equal over time. (TDN 21 1992:22 Field notes 1993).
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organised and encouraged around cooperatives, credit unions, village 
decision making bodies and other village issues. Rural development was 
explained to me by NGO workers as not a revolutionary social movement 
or an attempt to separate urban Thailand from rural Thailand but as a 
movement to strengthen the people and to build their organisations. 
Community organisations are a mechanism to strengthen people's 
communities so that they can fully function and form the basis grassroots 
democracy (Field notes 1993; TDN no: 24 1993:60).
Grassroots democracy is a chief slogan of the NGO movement and one 
that centres around the notion of the decentralisation of power. The world 
is seen as confined and directed by the industrial sector which focuses on 
centralisation for its own interests. The calls for decentralisation have 
adopted an almost militant tone over the 1990s, becoming notably more 
militant and urgent over the KJK campaign. The notion of grass roots 
democracy is inextricably linked to environmentalism. The democratic 
right of villagers to manage their own natural resources and their superior 
skill and knowledge in managing resources in comparison to the state has 
been a constant theme of participants in the resource conflicts. These 
demands have been one of the most vocal and visible manifestations of 
Thailand's environmental movement.
The Thai environmental movement can be most aptly described as a 
spectrum of campaigns and organisations centred around environmental 
issues, with the movement calling for decentralisation of natural resource 
management currently the most high profile part of that spectrum. Prawase 
identifies four kinds of environmentalism in Thailand: those
environmentalists who are simply nature lovers; international 
environmental groups; conservationists in alliance with villagers and those
struggling for the decentralisation of political power and the right of 
villagers to control natural resource management (10 Sep 1992 BP). Hirsch 
describes various kinds of environmentalism in Thailand. These include 
the environmentalist campaigns run by prominent business groups and 
individuals during the 1990s and environmentalist strands within the 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he concludes that "in an organisational sense, 
environmentalism in Thailand is associated first and foremost with NGOs" 
(Hirsch 1994:7).
NGOs advocating local control over natural resources describe 
environmental disaster as the result of taking environmental management 
out of the hands of villagers and putting it in the hands of elites. As a 
result, not only have rural people failed to gain equal benefit from 
economic growth, they have also been forced to bear the cost of a degraded 
and polluted environment. The Thai government is seen by them as 
currently unable to take care of existing ecosystems or restore degraded ones, 
and it is argued that the government should hand over control of resources 
to local people who are more able to manage resources (Field notes 1993).
Advocacy of the decentralisation of resource management is of course 
based on a faith in the inherently eco-friendly nature of traditional village 
life. Environmental destruction is seen as caused by industrialisation and 
the development process. This is in direct comparison to traditional culture 
which lives in harmony with nature. TDSC describes a "balance between 
human life and ecology as "the guiding force in Isarn culture" (TDSC 
1990:4). This sentiment was reflected in many interviews I conducted with 
NGO workers who concluded that villagers practicing traditional 
agriculture lived in harmony and had a strong respect for nature (Field 
notes 1993; TDN no:24 1994:8).
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Traditional resource management and conservation methods are both 
researched and promoted by NGOs. The muang fai irrigation system of the 
North and the muang pracha asa irrigation of the Northeast involve the 
small scale diversion of streams and rivers to irrigate crops. Both involve 
cooperation and collective management, sometimes within one village or 
even across four or five sub districts. NGOs stress the democratic spirit 
required by this system as well as its ecological sustainability (TDN no:25 
1994:41; Field notes 1993).
NGOs also advocate local forest management which they argue is 
appropriate given the ability of village communities to cooperatively 
manage forest and to ensure conservation of forest land. The knowledge 
and wisdom of villagers over their local forest ecosystem is described as 
being based on a mutual reliance and respect for the forest. Community 
forests are traditionally very important for villagers' lives. They are 
managed by the village and are used for various purposes including spirit 
worship, the collection of edible plants and insects and the collection of 
materials for medicinal purposes and cattle grazing The Project for 
Ecological Recovery (PER) estimate that 90% of Isarn villagers collect 
vegetables and herbs from community forests for subsistence purposes 
(Chantawong 1992:178). Taylor provides a detailed and inspiring account of 
local management of forest. In a series of surveys he found that villagers 
were clearly aware of the limits of sustainable forest exploitation and were 
able to establish and maintain forests (Taylor 1994).
Conservationist initiatives from villages have been well-documented 
by NGOs. Many protests against logging, dams and pollution have been 
initiated by villagers throughout the country. In the few years preceding the
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1989 logging ban village protest against commercial logging was common 
particularly in Northern Thailand. Villagers blocked logging roads, 
obstructed logging operations, occupied logging camps and made work 
difficult for timber companies in the Northern, Northeastern and Southern 
provinces. Furthermore independent village conservation groups have 
been formed in some villages. NGOs have been able to tap into existing 
protest and organisation as well as being able to initiate activity themselves 
(Pinkaew and Rajesh 1992:13; Field notes 1993).
Democratic ideals are fundamental to all these ideas. In interviews 
with young students and NGO volunteers involved with KJK protests the 
need for democracy and people's participation was their strongest theme. 
Their view was that big business in alliance with the state was the new 
enemy of villagers and the environment. They concluded that the 
government would never change policy unless villagers were empowered 
and a real process of democracy undertaken whereby villagers have the 
ability to choose and regulate their own lifestyle. Empowerment of villagers 
was the hope and dream of this group which was seen as the only hope for 
Thailand (Field notes 1993).
Of course the development of Thai NGOs, including the activities they 
engage in and the ideas they espouse, are closely related to international 
trends. The funding agencies from Western countries that grant money to 
the NGOs under discussion espouse many similar view, the Australian 
example being Community Aid Abroad. They have a vision of a global 
poor united in the struggle against the erosion of their rights caused by the 
centralising tendencies of the nation state, the centralisation of resource 
control and the tyranny of the market. Twelve countries from Africa, Latin 
America and Southeast Asia were represented at the 1991 People's Forum.
Saneh concluded at the end of the forum that "there is a consensus here, an 
awareness emerging that goes beyond national boundaries, beyond those old 
versions of national sovereignty" (TDN no: 21 1992:14).
It is easy to identify a movement of NGOs from poor countries with 
similar forms of organisation and demands. In 1993 a NGO Declaration on 
Human Rights represented a diverse range of countries and among other 
dem ands called for democracy, sustainable development, self 
determination, freedom of information and international solidarity (NGO 
declaration 1993).
Conclusion
The discourse of Communal Culture articulated by many rural 
development NGOs means that many organisations espouse an overly 
romantic notion of the village and overlook increasing class differentiation 
within the village. This tends towards a portrayal of the village as victim of 
the triple alliance of state, capital and the West without recognising the 
strong ties these forces have with the village or the role they may have 
played in shaping the village. On the other hand NGOs do work in alliance 
with villagers in the very real conflict of interests villagers have with the 
state and corporate sector. NGOs are able to articulate many village 
concerns through themes around Buddhism, pride in culture, 
environmentalism, democracy and the ability of local villages to manage 
their own resources. The point at which communal culture and village 
protest meet is described in the following account of the protest movement 
over the KJK forest resettlement scheme in 1991.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE KOR JOR KOR PROTESTS
This chapter presents a case study of the protests against the Kor Jor 
Kor forest resettlement program in 1991 and 1992 in Northeast Thailand. 
The case study clearly illustrates the conflict of interests between the 
villagers living on forest reserve land and the alliance of military, RFD and 
big business determined to remove them. The notion of a fundamental 
conflict between the state and corporate sectors on the one hand and the 
village on the other, and the idea of an urban-rural divide in Communal 
Culture discourse, can be seen to reflect basic realities about the conflict. 
However the case study also illustrates some tension and divided interests 
within the village over land and forest. Protest themes in the KJK protests 
emerge as far from utopian but centred around the rights of villagers as 
Thai citizens, social justice, democracy and environmentalism. The alliance 
between villagers and forest monks and NGOs emerges as important 
element in the facilitation of a coordinated region wide movement.
An appropriate starting point for an account of protest and the 
movement against KJK is with the analyses made by Murray and Taylor, 
who have both written about the KJK protests. Murray describes the 
protests as coming from people with no choices left, a kind of moral 
economy over the ownership of resources as suggested by Hirsch (Hirsch 
1994:13). Murray describes villagers as lacking real options "it is their own 
backs that are up against the wall of a finite, already occupied land resource 
base. It is their very livelihoods and lives under threat"(Murray 1992:5). He 
describes the major concern of protesters as being the lack of concern for 
villagers as human beings with basic human rights. In fact he believes that
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the way in which the resettlement scheme was carried out was the most 
fundamental point of conflict; it was the nature of the process rather than 
the fact of resettlement itself which led to the protests. He concludes that 
villagers might have accepted that changing national needs required them 
to move if the scheme had been carried out in a democratic manner and if 
villages had been provided with proper alternatives (Murray 1992:24).
In comparison Taylor concentrates more on the roles of 
environmentalism and the role of Buddhist theology. His emphasis is on 
"a new national green consciousness informed by Buddhist theology", and 
his analysis is focused firmly on the example of Dong Yai forest in Buriram 
and the relationship between villagers and their local conservationist monk 
Pra Prajak Khuttajitto (Taylor 1993B:7). It is significant that Taylor's 
concentration on Pra Prajak and Dong Yai Forest involves a change of 
emphasis from some of his earlier work on forest monks. In a 1991 work he 
conducted a survey of fifty eight forest monks throughout Thailand and 
concluded that monks considered villagers to be the greatest danger to the 
forest (Taylor 1991:113). In Taylor's description of the struggle of Dong Yai 
villagers and Pra Prajak against KJK, it is the state which emerges as the 
cause of forest destruction, while villagers are portrayed as its protector 
(Taylor 1993).
Nevertheless, Taylor does discuss the existence of conflicting interests 
within villages over forest land and conservation. He discusses the 
situation within Dong Yai forest where some villagers were dependent on 
employment from commercial logging while some attempted to bring an 
end to logging (Taylor 1993:7). Murray places little emphasis on this factor 
in the Dong Yai story, instead his emphasis is on the role of officials in 
illegal logging and land scams (Murray 1992:13).
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The Dong Yai story is a useful starting point as it illustrates both these 
dynamics, namely the central role of authorities in forest destruction and 
the divided interests that may arise within the village between those 
villagers involved in conservation and those involved in logging. It is also 
the most famous of the forest conflicts in the KJK period.
Conflict in Dong Yai Forest
The KJK program began to make headlines in the Thai and English 
language press in September of 1991 as evictions began in Northeast 
Thailand. Evictions in the Dong Yai Forest Reserve, situated on the 
boundary of Buriram and Nakorn Ratchisma provinces received the most 
publicity at this time and continued to do so throughout the duration of the 
KJK program and into 1993. Murray comments that "no other controversy 
encapsulated as many aspects of land-use conflicts surrounding forest areas 
as did the events in the Dong Yai forest reserve" and Taylor characterised 
the conflict as a "cause celebre" (Taylor 1993:4; Murray 1992:16).
The Dong Yai forest was declared a national forest in 1959. At that time 
twenty five villages were already located in the reserve and had been there 
for more than a generation. After 1966, insurgency turned the attention of 
central authorities to the area. There was some movement away from those 
parts of the area where fighting was intense, with 100 families temporarily 
moved by authorities between 1969 and 1972 and agricultural activity 
restricted by fighting until 1982 (9 August 1991 BP).1 However at the same 
time authorities actually encouraged village settlement in the reserve in
h  have used predominantly English language newspapers in this account for reasons of time. However 
based on some translations of articles from Siam Rath it would seem that the Bangkok Post. The Nation 
and Siam Rath shared a basically common analysis and account of the KJK protests.
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order to combat communist insurgency. Settlers were given land on the 
understanding that they would be able to stay and as a result a large number 
streamed steadily into the area to grow cassava. This movement of people 
into the forest reserve was further intensified when land was granted to 
surrendering insurgents in an attempt to undercut insurgency (15 Sept 1991 
BP; Murray 1992:17; Taylor 1993:6)
In fact this historical irony, whereby the military first encouraged 
settlers to move into the forest for security reasons and then evicted them 
under KJK, was a factor which outraged opponents of the KJK project. The 
historical role of villagers as "protectors of national security" had a high 
profile in the English language press. The military’s actions were portrayed 
as denying villagers their fundamental rights as citizens and discounting 
the role that they had played in the fight against communist insurgency. A 
Bangkok Post editorial accused the military of treating villagers like 
"sacrificial lambs" who could be disposed of at will when they no longer 
served the interests of the military (16 Sep 1991 BP ).
After insurgency ceased to be a threat in the 1980s official policy was 
inconsistent and confused. In 1980 officials decided the area needed 
rehabilitation and set up four projects in the area which involved some 
relocation and the promotion of cassava and eucalyptus crops. The projects 
did not succeed in stopping encroachment by villagers and loggers and were 
plagued by corrupt land deals where investors hired villagers to encroach 
on reserve land with the alleged support of officials. The fundamental 
problem at this time was that there was no land to resettle all the relocated 
villagers. For the 1200 families officials they tried to move, only some 300 
alternative sites were found (15 Sep 1991 BP).
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In 1982 RFD officials arrived in the area with the stated intention of 
evicting some villagers from the reserve. However they apparently 
changed their mind and issued a warning not to encroach further into the 
forest. Some villagers claim that since that time they have been paying 
1000-2000 baht a year in protection money to forestry officials, a claim 
confirmed by local NGOs in the Northeast (9 Sep 1991 BP; Field notes 1993). 
A policy change seemed to take place in the late 1980s. In 1988 officials are 
said to have promised that the existing villages in the area would be 
officially recognised, land would be allocated, roads constructed, electricity 
provided and an irrigation program launched (10 Sep 1991 BP ).
Pra Prajak arrived and settled in the forest in the mid 1980s at the time 
when village leaders were demanding an end to eucalyptus plantations and 
the issuing of land title deeds. Pra Prajak said his decision to stay in the 
forest was based on the teachings of Lord Budda who had told his followers 
that they should live and meditate in the forest and were obliged to protect 
it. Pra Prajak was asked by villagers to stay in the forest and assist them with 
a forest preservation committee which villagers in Pakham sub-district had 
already formed. This committee involved every village in Pakham 
subdistrict, aimed at the curtailment of illegal logging and an end to the 
spread of eucalyptus plantations and received a conservation award from 
the Siam Environmental Club in 1990 (25 Sep 1991 BP; Field notes 1993). Pra 
Prajak and the Pakham villages started to gain a real public profile after the 
eucalyptus plantation conflicts and the arrests in early 1991 detailed in 
chapter three. However these arrests were not the major factor in the 
growth of the public profile of Pra Prajak and the Hua Nam Pod villagers. It 
was under KJK that the area gained its public notoriety.
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Under KJK the Dong Yai Forest was identified as an area needing 
relocation, and in April 1991 2000 families living in the forest received an 
order from the provincial governor to leave their land by the end of the 
month. Local military units were sent to explain the need for relocation but 
agreed to delay relocations until mid May. After this date it was indicated 
that villagers who stayed on would be subject to forcible eviction, 
imprisonment and fines (28 Feb 1991 The Nation).
Open conflict started in late August 1991 when soldiers from the 
Second Army Region (SAR) clashed with villages in Sra Takien in Soeng 
Sang district when they attempted to appropriate land in order to resettle 
villagers from the forest reserve. More than 100 villagers who were tilling 
the land refused to give it up, and "pushing and shoving" was reported 
between officials and villagers in early September (6 Sep 1991 BP). News of 
the conflict reached a meeting of Pra Prajak's conservation group and he led 
400 people to Ban Sra Takien to offer support. However they were met by 
armed soldiers and police before reaching the village. A violent scene 
resulted and ten villagers were arrested on charges of physical assault and 
obstructing law enforcement. The police were accused by villagers of 
physically assaulting Pra Prajak whilst official reports accused Pra Prajak of 
hitting a policeman. Pra Prajak was arrested a day later in connection with 
this incidence on charges of illegal assembly and creating unrest (6 Sep 1991 
BP).
The arrests created division in the Pakham conservation committee. 
Pra Prajak and supporters continued to advocate strengthening the 
conservation committee and the alliance of villages in the Dong Yai forest 
to oppose any eviction attempts. However several village leaders faced 
criminal charges wanted to limit their activity and were uncomfortable with
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a confrontational approach. For this reason, Pra Prajak formed a new 
conservation committee but the new group was also divided over the 
strategic approach of their activism (15 Sep 1991 BP).
If the Pakham villager's conservation committee illustrate the will and 
ability of some villagers to protect the forest they had neighbours with other 
motivations. Friction with other villagers in the area resulted. In August 
conflict broke out between Pra Prajak's conservation committee and other 
villagers when a local vigilance group from the conservation committee led 
by Pra Prajak were patrolling the forest for illegal logging activity. The 
group caught ten villagers in the act of illegal logging in the Dong Yai forest 
and allegedly physically assaulted one of the illegal loggers. This villager 
later pressed charges at the local police office. This incident was not only 
later used by the military to discredit Pra Prajak, but it also led to hostility 
from the home village of the illegal logger, Ban Sook Samran. Two weeks 
after the incident a group of villagers from Ban Sook Samran partly 
destroyed Pra Prajak's religious centre in Hua Nam Pod and later returned 
to ransack another building (15 Sep 1991 BP). The villager who was 
allegedly beaten later reappeared as part of a pro KJK and anti Pra Prajak 
demonstration which met a government delegation to the area in mid 
September (18 Sep 1991 BP).
Pra Prajak described the hostility from Ban Suk Samran as a military 
plot and denied that the villager had ever been beaten claiming that he had 
simply been blindfolded. Local villagers claimed that the Ban Suk Samran 
villagers involved in the destruction of temple property were paramilitary 
men organised by the local military. In turn the military claimed that the 
situation was caused by a local rivalry (11 Sep 1991 BP ).
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In this mood of confrontation and amidst widespread condemnation 
of the KJK program by NGOs, students and academics, the military began 
forced evictions and publicly declared that Pra Prajak's temple complex at 
Hua Nam Pud was illegal and a liability to the forest. The day following Pra 
Prajak's arrest the local military was poised to move into Ban Sra Takien 
and Ban Nong Yai. The Union of Civil Liberties reported that twenty 
soldiers had destroyed Pra Prajak's living quarters and that two hundred 
police and soldiers tore down his residence and teaching stage (9 Sep 1991 
BP).
In early September village leaders from Dong forest and 
representatives from human rights groups headed for Bangkok with a 
petition for the king. Petitioners asked that villages in the reserve be 
legalised but also recognised that some relocation might be inevitable and 
added fair relocation conditions to their demands. The petition called for 
the registration of the villages in the reserve, official permission to continue 
living in the reserve, the allocation of 25 rai for any villagers relocated and 
that plots for relocated villagers be taken from land poached by merchants 
rather than from land already used by villagers for subsistence. A further 
request was made that a guarantee be given that villagers would not be 
harassed or arrested while the requests were being processed (10 Sep 1991 
BP).
Amidst controversy the Second Army Region (SAR) sent 300 soldiers 
on September 10 to dismantle houses in Hua Nam Phud a week earlier than 
scheduled. Residents were shifted to Ban Dong Pattana. The next day the 
residents of Ban Nong Yai were evicted and shifted to Ban Sra Takien (11 
Sep 1991, 12 Sep 1991 BP). Heavily armed soldiers guarded the dismantling 
of houses and the transfer of residents to their new villages. Accounts from
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villagers described village leaders down on their knees asking soldiers for 
negotiations without success. Villagers reported that they had to carry their 
own belongings and soldiers refused to assist them. Several hundred rai of 
tapioca fields were ripped apart four months before the harvest was due ( 
Field notes 1993).
The coercion which characterised the relocations resulted in a 
considerable media outcry about human rights and the use of violence. The 
Nation condemned the "unprecedented level of violence in Pakham" (18 
Sep 1991 The Nation) the Bangkok Post and Siam Rath called for an end to 
human rights abuses (19 Sep 1991 SR; 18 Sep 1991 BP). The basic abuse of 
human rights principles by the military was common theme. "Brute force 
has a way of stifling open public debate and tends to leave deep scars in the 
victims of violence and society at large" concluded The Nation (18 Sep 1991 
The Nation).
At the time of the first relocations in Buriram the military maintained 
a publicly confident posture and reported to the press that evictions had 
gone ahead with very little resistance. The SAR reported that three hundred 
and fifty households had complied with the evictions in Ban Nong Yai, and 
only thirty eight had opposed the move and refused to leave. An 
announcement was made that the thirty eight families resisting the 
relocation would not be compensated and that the whole of the Hua Nam 
Pud mountain would be cleared within three days (12 Sep 1991 BP).
The thirty eight families resisting the eviction set up camp in a temple 
pavilion in Ban Sra Takien with a large banner reading "Thai People's 
Refugee Camp". How could Thai people be treated as displaced people 
within their own country asked villagers? Demands from the thirty eight
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families centred around requests for a well prepared site and time to harvest 
their tapioca crops. Food was provided to the villagers by the monks from 
the temple who donated some of the food they collected every morning. 
The 'Thai People's Refugee Camp" was to remain at the temple for the next 
nine months with problems caused by insufficient food, sickness and 
discomfort, making life for the thirty eight families very unpleasant (1 Oct 
1991,17 Jun 1992 BP; Field notes 1993).
Villagers who did comply with the eviction order faced similar 
problems of discomfort and insecurity. Three weeks after the relocation 
hundreds of Nong Yai and Hua Nam Pud villagers were living in 
temporary shelters which did not offer adequate protection from the rain. 
The villagers had to rebuild their own homes but had no money for roofing 
materials. There were no schools or toilets provided. Villagers had to pay 
for their own toilets with loans to be paid back at 15% interest. Water was 
also a problem; the military provided two trucks of water a day for a village 
which villagers found inadequate. Water had to be collected from a water 
source 2km away from the resettlement site. Furthermore, compensation 
was inadequate. On relocation 15 rai plots were supposed to be allocated 
for each family but villagers only received 1 rai to build on and were 
promised the remaining 14 rai in 1992. Families were given 150 kg of rice, 
tins of canned fish which were found to be past their expiry date and 2000 
baht in compensation. For the many villagers who had invested all their 
money in their tapioca fields and borrowed money for seeds and fertiliser 
this was a financial disaster (1 Oct 1991 BP; 30 Sep 1991 The Nation ).
Villagers from Nong Yai resettled in Sra Takien also experienced 
hostility from Sra Takien villagers who had portions of their land taken to 
accommodate the relocated villages. If land had already been planted land
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holders received 2000 baht compensation, but if the land had not yet been 
planted villagers did not receive any compensation at all (1 Oct 1991 BP;; 
Field notes 1993). NGOs, academics and students warned that a lack of land 
for relocation could lead to serious conflict between villagers and that taking 
away a villager's land results in a feeling of desperation that could lead to 
violence (17 Sep 1991 The Nation). It was noted that KJK had already led to 
unemployment, homelessness and added to rural-urban migration (24 Nov 
1991 BP).
At the same time the military continued to attempt to relocate Pra 
Prajak’s temple in Hua Nam Pod sanctuary within Dong Yai forest. Pra 
Prajak continued to insist that his decision to remain in the forest was based 
on the teachings of the Lord Budda who told his followers to live and 
meditate in the forest. Legal experts concluded that the temple was legal 
and senior monks supported Pra Prajak's claim that his presence was 
important in protecting the forest and that damage done to the forest in the 
temple area was done before Pra Prajak's arrival. Buriram's chief monk and 
the eccelestial council announced they understood Pra Prajak's decision to 
remain in the forest. Support for Pra Prajak from international 
organisations, NGOs, students and intellectuals was also forthcoming. 
However he also received several death threats (20 May 1991 BP; 25 Sep 1991 
BP).
In the new year problems continued and the thirty eight families 
remained at their refugee camp. For the military and RFD the most 
pressing dilemma was where to procure land to accommodate evicted 
villages. In order to overcome this otherwise insolvable problem the RFD 
simply readjusted the borders of Thaplan National Park, built a 14km road 
through the forest and by April 1992 had allocated 4000 rai within the
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national park to six hundred families. By June, 10 000 rai of healthy forest 
had been cleared in time for the planting season. Pra Prajak and Pakham 
villagers unsuccessfully attempted to stop the clearing of forest by ordaining 
trees (16 Jun 1991 BP).
Meanwhile illegal logging was on the increase in Dong forest. By early 
1992 the conservation committee had dissipated as a result of conflict over 
tactics. Pra Prajak reported that he could no longer protect the forest and that 
illegal logging had become rampant, in addition to the logging by officials to 
relocate evicted villagers. He was reported as saying that he could hear "the 
thunderous sounds of trees being felled each night from deep in the 
forest...although I can stay here there is nothing I can do now" (3 Jun 1992,, 
12 Mar 1992 BP).
After the disgrace of the military which resulted from the May 
massacre in Bangkok the thirty eight families in the Sra Takien temple 
made the decision they would return to their homes in mid June, hoping to 
take advantage of the democratic atmosphere and the need of the military to 
maintain a low profile. Villagers demanded that they be able to farm for 
the next planting season until they could be provided with land that was 
not confiscated from other villagers and did not destroy healthy forest. 500 
villagers headed back to Ban Nong Yai and set up temporary shelters. 
However the reports of new hope and new beginnings were short lived and 
300 police and forestry officials moved in and forcibly removed the 
villagers. Villagers were dragged, beaten and pushed from the site and 
seventeen villagers were arrested and charged with conspiracy to obstruct 
authorities and trespass in the second eviction of Nong Yai village. The 
remaining villagers returned to Wat Sra Takien (17 June 1991 BP; Field 
notes 1993).
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Criticisms made by academics, students and NGOs in relation to the 
KJK protests at this time tended to raise fundamental criticisms of Thai 
society and the relationship between rural and urban Thailand and villagers 
and the state. Authorities were accused of being so deeply involved in 
illegal logging that it was necessary for the Pakham conservation committee 
to be destroyed to prevent exposure of illegal logging involving local power 
groups and officials (16 Sep 1991 BP). The need for participation in decision 
making and the management of the forest were common themes. The 
decentralisation of natural resource management was frequently advocated, 
not only on the grounds that the Forestry Department was incapable of 
safeguarding the forest because it did not have adequate staff, but more 
fundamentally because this was seen as an aspect of the democratic rights of 
villagers (24 Nov 1992, 25 Sep 1992,1 Oct 1992 BP; 17 Sep 1991 The Nation).
Relocations in other provinces
As relocations in the Northeast continued, other conflicts occurred in 
various provinces during the second half of 1991. Although one other area 
in addition to Dong Yai had an organised conservation movement village 
based protest tended to concentrate on the coercive nature of the relocations 
and the inadequacy of alternative sites rather than environmentalism. 
NGO leaders, particularly Bamrung Bunpanya, increasingly drew attention 
to the destructive effects of the relocations on Isarn ethnicity and at the 
same time criticisms of the military became more open and harslu
In Kon Kaen villagers were evicted from Dong Larn National Park in 
Pü Pa P)aTil sub-district without being issued documents for their new land, 
which was in any case rocky and less fertile than their original plots (17 Sep
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1991 The Nation ). The eviction process itself was coercive; 300 soldiers 
dismantled houses and fired shots (19 Sep 1991 BP ). Tractors were used by 
the military to dismantle fences erected by villagers who resisted eviction, 
and in one incident 300 soldiers took over a temple compound, destroyed 
temple property and were accused of "insulting Buddhism" by students 
from the Northeastern students Coordinating Committee (17 Nov 1991 BP). 
Trauma and stress were reported amongst villagers and village leaders 
unsuccessfully called for a delay and asked for a review of their relocation 
(19 Sep 1991 BP ).
Evictions from the Dong Mae Ped reserve in Kalasin were enforced, 
even though the villagers there pocessed legal documents for their land and 
had used them to secure loans to send their children to jobs in the Middle 
East. The 15 rai granted to relocated villagers was distributed on a family-by­
family basis which meant that large extended families did not have enough 
land to adequately support themselves. They were not provided with basic 
infrastructure and were refused permission to participate in replanting 
schemes. Criticism from villagers in this area centred around the 
inadequacies of their new villages and hostility regarding the fact 
authorities would replant with eucalyptus trees but destroyed their fruit 
trees (17 Sep 1991 The Nation; Field notes 1993 ).
Resettlement of villages on the edge of the Huay Kha Kaeng wildlife 
sanctuary in Uthai Thani occurred without adequate preparation by 
authorities in late 1991. Villagers were initially provided with only 7 rai of 
land per family. Again basic infrastructure such as an irrigation pond, 
school or health station was not provided (14 Nov 1991 BP). At the same 
time the on going issue of the relocation of hill tribe communities in Tak
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and Petchaburi in Northern Thailand compounded opposition to the 
relocation program (16 Dec 1991, 8 Jan 1992 BP).
Forced evictions continued into 1992. Evictions in Phu Pa Marn 
district in Khon Kaen continued and were accompanied by widespread 
accusations of improper conduct and intimidation. Villagers reported that 
soldiers threatened to tear down their houses and scatter the wood so that 
they would not be able to rebuild their homes if they refused to sign 
documents agreeing to relocation. In another village soldiers threatened to 
destroy the only bridge that gave access to the village if residents resisted 
relocation. Others reported that they were physically forced to sign 
documents consenting to eviction and their personal possessions were 
smashed as evictions were carried out. Village representatives reported that 
it was more like an assault than a resettlement and asked why they were 
being treated like aliens instead of Thai nationals (9 Jan 1992 BP).
In Chaiyphum forced evictions were carried out before villagers could 
harvest their mango and coconut trees. Villagers were resettled on arid 
land with no school. One village in this province which was faced with 
eviction resembled the Dong Yai case in so far as it also had a long history of 
organising the conservation of forest and had a community land use plan 
already drafted. Once again, NGO criticism of the authorities focused on the 
reluctance of authorities to allow villagers to participate in the management 
of their own forests (13 Jan 1992 BP).
Rallies and protests proliferated throughout the Northeast in the first 
half of 1992. In the province of Sakon Nakon five rallies were held against 
KJK with 2500 villagers rallying in February, 4000 in March and 500 in April. 
Demands again centred around the inadequacy of resettlement conditions
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and the call for villagers to be able to return to their land (18 Feb 1992 BP, 20 
Mar 1992 BP, 26 Apr 1992). Rally speakers announced that villagers would 
be boycotting national elections because they had been treated like aliens 
instead of Thais and that participants in the boycotts would return their ID 
cards to authorities in protest (18 Feb 1992 BP). In April a rally spokesperson 
stated that Thailand was about to be set on fire because the military 
government refused to recognise social realities (26 Apr 1992 BP).
In Nong Khai in March 1992 1000 villagers held a march, protesting 
impending eviction. A procession led by monks ended with a religious 
ceremony with an anti KJK message. In this area, where villagers had 
previously had historical connections with CPT insurgents, the local abbot 
warned of violent retaliation by villagers who he predicted would escape 
across the Mekong and return to attack if evictions went ahead (3 Mar 1992 
BP).
There was also organised protest from villagers who were not relocated 
themselves but who were required to give up land to accommodate those 
who were. 500 rallied in Si Saket to demand the return of their land (17 
Apr 1992 BP). Many other smaller local rallies proliferated. Songkran 
parades and other traditional activities were used as forums where villagers 
could voice anti-KJK messages (14 Apr 1992, 14 Apr 1992 BP; Field notes 
1993).
Later in the campaign a new element emerged in criticism of KJK . By 
early 1992 there was increasing mention of the destructive affects of KJK on 
Isarn tradition and culture. The coordinating NGO for NGOs working on 
Northeast rural development (NGO CORD) described Isarn culture as being 
under risk under KJK (22 Jan 1992 The Nation). The Bangkok Post described
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KJK as having huge social consequences and warned it could tear apart the 
social fabric of the countryside (23 Jan 1992 BP). Bamrung Bunpanya, as a 
leader of the anti KJK campaign, was particularly vocal on this subject. He 
maintained that KJK would destroy the social fabric of traditional 
settlements, the stronghold of much of what is left of the Isarn folk culture 
(17 July 1992 BP).
In village level protest Lao identity amongst Isarn villagers did play a 
part. Villagers involved in KJK protests commented on the strength that 
traditional ceremonies had given them and NGO CORD staff concluded that 
the emphasis on traditional culture had been a good tactic and strengthened 
village protest. However it should be noted that the calls for villagers to 
have their rights as Thai citizens recognised, were higher profile than those 
involving Isarn ethnicity. As well as traditional Isarn ceremonies, Buddhist 
ceremonies such as Pra Prajak's tree ordinations were also used extensively 
(Field notes 1993).
The M ilitary
Overall, as the KJK campaign proceeded the military became more and 
more the explicit target of serious accusations. These accusations 
corresponded directly with the growing anti military mood in the country as 
a whole. In January to April KJK continued to have a high profile in the 
print media alongside the increasing coverage of the growing urban 
democracy movement. However in May as democracy rallies in Bangkok 
grew larger KJK received very little media attention at all. Following the 
May massacre of democracy demonstrators by the military KJK continued to 
have a low profile. However by June, with anti-military sentiment at a high 
point, the military were openly and frequently accused in the media of
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using KJK to control the countryside and bring it under dictatorial rule. For 
example Sanitsuda accused the military of attempting to move 1 million 
families into military controlled settlements to ensure a future power base 
for election purposes and warned that the countryside was set to slip under 
military rule if KJK was not stopped (6 Sep 1992 BP). The economic 
ambitions of the military were also recognised with Siam Rath accusing the 
military of wanting to be real estate agents (10 Apr 1991 SR).
In late Oct the military continued to justify the KJK program and brush 
off criticisms. The military deputy commander accused activists of inciting 
villagers and denied that any human rights violations had taken place, 
calling such criticisms "groundless" (25 Oct 1991 BP). However, opposition 
prompted the military to launch a public relations campaign in November 
"to create a better understanding of the aims of relocation in order to 
minimise resistance from residents"(4 Nov 1991 The Nation). Military 
officials announced that resettlement areas would be developed to make 
them suitable for settlement. In answer to criticisms that authorities could 
not adequately protect the forest to the extent that villagers had, military 
officials announced that the Governors of the target provinces were 
responsible for seeking the cooperation of various government agencies in 
protecting forest areas. Furthermore program officials would pledge to 
protect the forest before relocating villagers (4 Nov 1991 The Nation ).
At the same time military officials announced that the program was a 
success and that relocation in five Northeastern locations had been carried 
out successfully. However they acknowledged that mistakes had been made 
and blamed the violence in Nakorn Ratchasima on poor preparation. One 
military spokesperson announced that they had genuinely wanted to 
provide better lives for villagers in forest reserves but budgetary constraints
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had made this impossible (14 Nov 1991 The Nation). The extension of the 
program was approved shortly afterwards with a cabinet recommendation 
that relocations be carried out "persuasively" rather than coercively and that 
well-prepared relocation sites be provided (4 Dec 1991 The Nation).
However, by February 1992 dissent had gained enough momentum to 
push the military to make a surprising apology for the shortcomings of KJK. 
A public announcement publicly thanked students and academics for 
pointing out the mistakes in the program and announced that villagers 
should not be blamed for opposing KJK and that the goodwill of the groups 
in opposition to KJK was understood (8 Feb 1992 BP). Later in the month the 
Interior Ministry announced that there would be no further forcible 
evictions and that all relocation would be voluntary (17 Feb 1992 BP ).
This show of goodwill was greeted tentatively by anti-KJK activists. In 
public statements they were quick to argue that adequate provision of 
infrastructure was not the solution to the fundamental problems of KJK; 
rather, they called for plans for economic forests to be scrapped and argued 
that villagers be given the right to manage their own resources (8 Feb 1992 
BP).
In any case this conciliatory note from the military soon appeared as 
irrelevant. The second eviction of Nong Yai village, described in the 
previous section of this chapter, sparked a new round of public protest.
The protest a t Pak Chong
Within days of the second eviction of Nong village in June 1992 the 
Anand government announced the suspension of the KJK program. Soon
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after the second eviction of Nong Yai village a government committee was 
appointed to study the scheme for at least thirty days and recommend 
whether it should be amended or abolished (18 Jun 1992 The Nation). 
However villagers in various locations started to rally for an immediate end 
to KJK. In Nakorn Ratchasima villagers began to rally outside the 
provincial hall and called for the immediate abolition of KJK. Villagers also 
gathered in Khon Kaen with the same demand (21 June 1992, 22 June 1992, 
23 June 92 BP).
In Nakorn Ratchasima demonstrators refused to disperse and 
threatened that they would march to Bangkok unless their demands were 
met. The crowd was made up predominantly of villagers from Nakon 
Ratchisima with NGO supporters. Demonstrators submitted a letter in 
blood to Prime Minister Anand demanding an end to the program (24 June 
1992 The Nation).
On June 26 1000 villagers began a procession to Bangkok on foot and in 
trucks. Numbers swelled to 2500 within a few days as villagers from other 
provinces arrived. Demonstrators demanded an end to KJK and 
recognition of land ownership rights for villagers in forest reserves (27 June 
1992 BP). A lack of government response to protest demands soon led 
villagers to demand a meeting with prime minister Anand, and 3000 
gathered at Pak Chong to wait for an official delegation (30 June 1992 BP).
A fact finding mission led by the Deputy Permanent Secretary for the 
interior arrived but was turned away by demonstrators who said they would 
only meet with the Prime Minister Anand himself. The rally continued to 
call on the government for a definite decision regarding the KJK program 
and the release of the 17 villagers arrested in the second eviction of Nong
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Yai village. In answer to Deputy Interior Minister Anek's comments that 
the rally was organised and run by NGOs, villagers announced that they 
were not influenced by NGOs and that they had initiated the protest 
themselves. After the official envoy had been sent away demonstrators 
spilled onto the Friendship Highway and blocked traffic for fifteen minutes (
1 July 1992 The Nation; 1 July 1992 BP).
The following day the mood of the rally was more militant. This 
mood worried some anti-KJK academics who called for an end to the protest 
and alleged that villagers had been incited by students (2 July 1992 The 
Nation 2 July 1992 BP). On July 2 villagers blocked the highway for seven 
hours and officials finally started negotiations with the rally organisers who 
were both NGO activists and village leaders (3 July 1992 BP).
The highway blockade is described by NGO activists and villagers who 
were present as the turning point in the campaign. The blockade had taken 
on a symbolic importance for participants; they saw it as the final stand that 
led to the demise of KJK. Villagers and NGO workers who participated in 
the rally believe that without the blocking of the highway KJK would never 
have been stopped and villagers would never have been able to enter into 
negotiation with authorities (Field notes 1993).
The negotiations between officials and villagers accompanied by NGO 
workers that followed are retold with pride by villagers and NGO workers 
who were involved in them. Deviating from normal procedure which 
requires the phu noi, (junior less important people), to defer to the phu 
Yai, (important people), rally representatives refused to go to the meeting 
room prepared by provincial authorities and invited officials to a smaller 
room. The size of this room meant that only the most important
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government representatives could attend the negotiations and ensured that 
they did not outnumber villagers and NGO workers. The agenda of the 
negotiation meeting was set by village leaders who presented officials with 
typed proposals. Officials were then briefed on abuses in the KJK program 
and were presented with prepared documents and systematic proposals on 
forest management alternatives for circulation. The meeting was tape 
recorded and broadcast to the thousands waiting outside. Bamrung led 
negotiations and informed fellow negotiators that rationality was not 
enough to convince officials. At any sign of resistance from officials he beat 
the table and threatened to end the meeting. Apparently NGO workers 
were worried by such aggressive behaviour, but villagers at the rally site 
were very impressed (9 July 1992 BP, Field notes 1993; TDN no: 22 1993:41).
After eight hours of negotiations a written commitment from officials 
was finalised. Villagers and NGO workers were assured that KJK would be 
abolished and that they would be temporarily allowed to return to their 
land. Forestry Department officials were the most inflexible during the 
negotiations and demanded that villagers be defined as their RFD 
employees and under their legal jurisdiction. This demand was dropped 
after telephone calls to Anand who decided only families in A1 watershed 
areas would be under Forestry Department supervision. The next day it was 
announced that protesters would be allowed to return home for at least the 
next planting season and that the Forestry Department was instructed to 
suspend tree planting. However it was made clear that at this stage title 
deeds would not be issued and that the seventeen villagers arrested in the 
second eviction of Nong Yai village would have to go to court. However 
Deputy Interior Minister Anek offered to help pay the fines of the villagers 
if they were found guilty (3 July 1992, 5 July 92, 9 July 92 BP ).
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The agreement was greeted by the anti-KJK movement as a victory for 
the rural poor, and villagers returned home amid a general mood of 
celebration. Residents of Nong Yai village returned a little later than 
others as it seemed that forestry officials would not let them return. 
Although they were eventually permitted to return, the RFD had 
intensified planting and nearly half the village's farmland went under 
eucalyptus tree within a week. Planting had also been intensified over the 
course of the Pak Chong rallies in various other areas (11 July 1992 BP).
NGOs in the KJK protests
The anti KJK campaign obviously involved not only villagers who 
were directly affected by the relocations, but also a diverse array of other 
forces. The most prominent of these were NGOs who were involved in 
organisation and coordination of protest.
NGO activists involved in the anti KJK movement from the Thai 
volunteer centre, Project for Ecological Recovery (PER), N.E NGO-CORD, 
and the Northeast Farmers Assembly described the period as one of great 
change for NGOs and villagers. It was believed that a significant step had 
been achieved towards strengthening the alliance between NGOs and rural 
people. NGOs stated that the most important lesson they drew from the 
campaign was that NGOs alone are nothing, their importance is in their 
facilitation of the people's will. The most important outcome of the KJK 
campaign for villagers was seen by many NGOs involved to be the growth 
of an Isarn culture of protest which would strengthen the villagers in the 
future; a belief drawn from their belief in Communal Culture (Field notes 
1993).
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Over the KJK period many networks were created in Northeast 
Thailand and between regions. Networks of teachers, lawyers, and other 
professionals were created and existing networks strengthened. A villagers' 
network for thirty six different Northeast forests, called the Village 
Committee for Solving the Problem of Land in Thirty-Six Forests, was 
formed in conjunction with NGOs and Northeastern intellectuals. From 
this loose alliance developed the Northeast Farmers Assembly for the 
Protection of Land Rights and Natural Resource Recovery. Following this 
development various other networks formed around such issues as contract 
farming, livestock farming, salt mining and dams. A Small Farmers 
Council of Isarn was also created (Field notes 1993). This council has had a 
high profile over the last three years carrying out a succession of protest 
actions which will be described in the following chapter.
NGOs played a crucial role in providing regional coordination and 
drawing together the concerns of environmentalists and human rights 
organisations about KJK. NGOs provided avenues for discussion and 
communication between villages and provinces, brought people from the 
middle class in the Northeast into alliance with villagers and facilitated 
regional protest. In the case of the Pak Chong Rally, NGOs and students 
organised support action in Bangkok, provided food and facilities and made 
media contacts. It is clear that NGOs contributed greatly to the capacity of 
villagers to organise the KJK protests, especially by encouraging village level 
and intra-village organisation and coordination (Field notes 1993).
Conclusion
The most prominent themes in the KJK protests concerned the lack of 
consultation with villagers over the relocations, the coercion and violence
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involved, and the need for a democratic approach to the village. As Murray 
has concluded, the way in which relocations were carried out provided the 
main impetus for protest. However the existence of strong village level and 
village-led conservation movements added a distinct environmental 
flavour to the protests.
Although the conflict essentially pitted whole villages against the 
state, there were also divisions between villagers because of conflict over 
land and the involvement of some villagers in illegal logging. 
Nevertheless, NGO focus on the importance of village level decision 
making and village level organisation, from Communal Culture, can be 
seen to be both a strength for the KJK movement and to reflect basic realities 
about the conflict.
One final point concerning the military needs to be made here. The 
fact that the KJK protests occurred at a time when there was considerable 
nationwide agitation for greater democracy and a diminished role for the 
military meant that the campaign was particularly intense. Furthermore, 
the success of the protests was, in part, due to the democratic space opened 
up by nationwide campaigns for democracy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
AFTER THE KOR JOR KOR PROTESTS
The growing plurality of the Thai political arena and diminished 
military power in the period after 1992 and KJK has not meant that conflicts 
over natural resources have become less apparent. There have continued to 
be many conflicts over natural resources between state and business on the 
one hand and villagers on the other. Although KJK protests changed some 
government forest policy, land and forest have continued to be central 
factors in the natural resource conflicts and Dong Yai forest has again been 
the scene of more conflict in the third eviction of Nong Yai village in 1994.
Low prices for agricultural commodities have also caused protest and 
conflict between villager and state in this period. In the Northeast, natural 
resource conflicts and protests over pricing have been drawn together in 
protest actions that incorporate a range of demands. The coordination of 
these Northeastern protests has been carried out with NGO support and 
once again the leadership of Bamrung. Bamrung's central role illustrates 
the willingness of those activists who believe in Communal Culture to 
campaign for very concrete and realistic demands.
NGOs and their allies have continued to criticise government and 
corporate sector activity in rural areas. They have continued to campaign 
for the decentralisation of natural resource management to the village level 
and to promote village participation in decision making. However there 
has been evidence of a tendency to rethink the emphasis on the unity of 
interest in the village. Fundamental to this questioning were the 
circumstances surrounding the third eviction of Nong Yai and the decision 
of NGO-CORD to support this eviction.
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Forest policies after KJK
The Kor Jor Kor protests curtailed the expansion of large scale 
eucalyptus plantations and resulted in greater land reform efforts over 1993 
and 1994. Military influence in the forest also diminished. However 
eucalyptus trees remained part of reforestation efforts and villagers 
continued to be evicted from their villagers in national parks and wildlife 
reserves.
The Anand government abolished KJK and outlawed the leasing of 
land for plantations in forest reserves by private business. Shortly 
afterwards the second round of elections for 1992 were held. Military 
supported parties did badly and the military's role in politics was seriously 
curtailed. The party which attained the highest number of elected seats in 
parliament was the Democrat Party led by Chuan Leekpai who formed 
government in September. Whilst the contentious Thai forestry Master 
Plan remained under discussion and review, there were two main changes 
in forest policy under the Chuan coalition. The first was a move away from 
large scale eucalyptus reforestation and the second was an escalation of land 
reform for those villagers in forest reserves.
After KJK the focus on large scale monoculture plantations was 
revised, and no new large scale eucalyptus plantations were planned. 
Nevertheless plans for the profitable reforestation of forest reserves were 
not abandoned by officials. The RFD now plans that small holders will 
grow indigenous species and eucalyptus trees under contract farming with 
local pulp mills. Farmers receive subsidies of 2850 baht per year at 5% 
interest for fast growing species and 3000 baht per year for five years for
other species (Taylor 1994:8). In addition private business is still permitted 
to lease land in forest reserves in a decision that overturned the Anand 
government's decision. The future of eucalyptus plantations is not entirely 
clear (22 Oct 1993 BP). The RFD itself has continued to promote eucalyptus 
tree projects in their own reforestation of forest reserve land. Such activity 
led to protest and conflict between the RFD and villagers in Surin and Roi 
Et in 1994 (16 Feb 1994, 3 May 1995 BP).
In mid-1993 a cabinet resolution was passed which confirmed that all 
villagers who had lived in forest reserves before the reserves were declared 
would be granted land title. All those villagers who settled in the forest 
between the declaration of the reserve and the time land was declared to be 
part of the land reform program would be granted new land or issued with 
non-saleable deeds through land reform. Under the 1975 Land Reform Act 
only 3.4 million rai was distributed to landless farmers but from 1993 the 
Chuan government planned to distribute 4 million rai a year. It succeeded 
in redistributing 10 million rai of land in less than two years (22 May 1993, 1 
Jan 1995 BP). During 1994 a number of protests were held by villagers 
dissatisfied with land reform because they were granted non-saleable titles, 
given unsuitable sites or had not yet received any land or documentation. 
However the most serious criticism of land reform came from opposition 
parties who used it in the attempt to bring down Chuan's coalition. It was 
found that at least eight rich businessmen, including the husband of a 
Democrat MP, had been granted forest land in Phuket under the land 
reform program. The size of their plots varied; the husband of the MP was 
granted 98 rai. Accusations gained momentum over 1994 and resulted in 
the break up of Chuan's coalition in 1995. A new election had to be held 
before the government's term expired (18 Feb 1994, 24 Nov 1994 BP).
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Reforestation remained an issue of central political importance. A 
major reforestation effort, involving predominantly indigenous species, 
was also announced in honour of the king's 50th anniversary. The king's 
anniversary reforestation project did, however, also involve eucalyptus 
trees. It was reported that one village had its community forest removed to 
make way for eucalyptus tree under the reforestation project (6 Feb 1994 BP).
In other major changes to forest policy a National Parks Act was 
enacted in 1994. This act defined those villagers who lived in national parks 
as illegal occupants. Evictions from national parks began in the latter half of 
1994 resulting in widespread protest and conflict between authorities and 
villagers.
Two further changes in forest policy represent the weakening of the 
military's role in the forest and greater powers of decision making for the 
agricultural minister over the utilisation of forest reserves. In September 
1993 the Council of Economic Ministers decided to withdraw the military's 
privilege of being able to use protected forest land in security programs 
without having to seek government permission (27 Sep 1993 BP). Cabinet 
also approved the extended power of the agricultural minister in the forest 
the following year. They granted authority to the agricultural minister to 
approve state-run development projects in forest reserves, authority that 
had previously been limited to cabinet itself (14 Sep 1994 BP).
The movement against KJK did succeed in making some changes to 
forest policy, and direct military involvement in the forest was curtailed. 
However eucalyptus trees, evictions and land reform continued to cause 
conflict between villagers and the state after KJK.
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Rural protests post KJK
Conflict over forest reserve land has been one of several high profile 
resource conflicts since the end of the KJK program. The following 
description of rural protest since KJK illustrates the perpetuation of conflict 
between state and village over natural resources, particularly forest land. 
However, the problems of the market, panha talad, specifically the low 
prices for farmers' for agricultural produce, has also been frequently taken 
up by protesters. Protests held by Northeastern farmers since the KJK 
protests have raised a number of concerns together, with particular 
prominence given to problems of the market. This development seems to 
vindicate Turton's conclusion in a 1984 study that one of the biggest 
concerns held by farmers was "problems of the market" (Turton 1984:35).
Conflict between state and village over forest land certainly did not end 
after KJK. Although the TDN describes forestry conflicts as "relatively 
subdued" in 1993 (TDN no:26 1994:2), there were constant reports of conflict 
in the English language press. During the first half of 1993 protests occurred 
about forest land issues especially in Northern provinces where relocation 
from national parks began to take place. Chiengmai villagers tried to end 
large scale logging in watershed areas near their villages and ordained 1000 
trees which were subsequently cut down (24 Feb 1993 BP). Villagers in Tak 
protested at inadequate compensation for relocation from park land (24 
April 1993 BP), Udon Thani villagers protested at a village forestry project (1 
April 1993 BP) and villagers who were to be evicted from Krochan National 
Park in Petchaburi and Salaeng Luang National Park in Pitsanaluk also held 
protests (4 April 1993 BP). Villagers in Chachoengsao who received land 
under Chuan's land reform program gathered in protest at the
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unavailability of suitable fertile land (8 May 1993 BP). Khon Kaen villagers 
demanded land titles as promised under the KJK settlement in a number of 
rallies. After two protesting villagers were arrested protest escalated (14 
June 1993 BP).
As the year progressed various other conflicts over resources occurred 
in various provinces. Protests over the construction of Pak Mun dam 
continued to have a high profile over the year with the government ruling 
out any review of the project in March (5 March 1993 BP). Plans to build a 
quarry in Udon Thani were met with opposition by villagers and local 
monks who wanted to protect local pre historic paintings at the quarry site. 
Villagers also rallied against illegal pawn ponds in southern mangrove 
forests (27 March 1993, 8 Oct 1993, 2 July 1993 BP).
However conflicts over resources were not the only cause of rural 
protest or conflict between state and village. The problem of falling prices 
for rice caused protest in May. Farmers' representatives expressed 
disappointment with the Chuan government for failing to solve rice 
problems. When Chuan visited Khon Kaen in May he was met with rallies 
of farmers who condemned the falling price of paddy and called for a no 
confidence motion in the government because of their inaction on the 
matter (2 April 1993, 25 May 1993 BP). Soon afterwards a rally of thousands 
of farmers protested over the low price of paddy in Kampaeng Phet. 
Farmers came from eleven provinces, mainly from Central Thailand. This 
rally became violent when protesters blocked the Asian Highway and were 
attacked by police. As a result one protester was killed by police. However 
the rally did succeed in forcing the government to agree to raise the paddy 
price (12 May 1993 BP).
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Demand for higher farm produce prices was taken up in protest again 
later in the year in the Northeast. This campaign was held in conjunction 
with other demands. In November Bamrung led another protest to Pak 
Chong in his role as leader of the Association for Small Scale Farmers of 
Isarn (ASSFNE).1 This began with a rally in Nakhon Ratchisima which 
demanded official documents to certify land rights for those villagers who 
had been living in forest reserve for over ten years. The rally was soon 
joined by villagers who had various other demands, including higher prices 
for paddy, cassava and pigs and assistance with debts accumulated under 
unsuccessful government programs for the cultivation of silkworms and 
cashews. Villagers from Ubon Ratchatini also protested for compensation 
for losses caused by the construction of Pak Mun dam. As many as 20, 000 
villagers accompanied by students and NGO activists started to march to 
Bangkok to present their demands (3 Nov 1993 BP).
This march was taken seriously by the government who stopped 
protesters from proceeding to Bangkok by flying six farmers representatives, 
led by Bamrung, to Bangkok for negotiations. It was agreed that three sub­
committees would be convened immediately on the issues of low farm 
product prices, land rights documentation and the problems of government 
initiated cultivation projects (4 Nov 1993 BP).
However, within three months the ASSFNE had called another rally 
to condemn the government for their lack of action and for ignoring the 
plight of farmers. Rally demands again centred around land ownership 
rights, compensation for land lost to the Lam Sae Dam, prevention of
^The ASSFNE was formed out of existing networks in response to the formation of the 
National Agricultural Council in 1993. The council was conceived as an advisory body of 
business people and government officials which would advise on which crops should be 
planted and administer a crop registration system. Apichai characterised it as the strongarm 
of agri business and it was widely opposed by NGOs and farmers (TDN no:22 1993:27).
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falling agricultural commodity prices and assistance with debts incurred as a 
result of government projects (6 Feb 1994 BP). A convoy of 2000 people 
with 80 trucks blocked the friendship highway and headed towards Bangkok 
to join a planned protest in front of government house before being blocked 
by barricades of border police commandos (9 Feb 1994 BP), but protesters 
were eventually permitted to continue to march whilst negotiations place 
in Bangkok. Settlement was reached within a few days. Lam Sae Dam 
protesters were promised quick compensation and commitments given to 
find solutions for the other problems guaranteed (12 Feb 1994 BP).
Throughout 1994 specific protests over natural resources continued. 
High profile disputes over land between the state and villagers occurred in 
various provinces. The Dong Yai case discussed in the next section is one 
notable example. In the same month, Chachoengsao villagers who had 
been evicted and resettled on disputed land called on Chuan to return their 
original land to them (22 Mar 1994 BP), and a seven day protest in 
Kanchanburi attracted 20, 000 villagers from six districts who were involved 
in a dispute with the military over the right of villagers to own and occupy 
land they had lived on for generations but which was officially military 
owned (30 April 94, 3 May 94 BP). Later in the year villagers in Petchabun 
rallied against the resettlement of hill tribes in their district, which they 
claimed could not support an influx of people (16 Oct 1994 BP).
Eucalyptus trees, dams and pollution all continued to cause conflict. In 
February 1000 villagers in Roi Et gathered in protest at a eucalyptus tree 
project that had replaced community forest. They were granted permission 
to clear 1,700 rai of eucalyptus and plant fruit trees and indigenous species 
instead (16 Feb 1994 BP). Villagers in Surin rallied a few months later over 
the same issue when the RFD planted eucalyptus on their farming land (3
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May 1994 BP). Concerns about pollution from a proposed pulp mill in Si 
Saket and contamination from a sugar refining factory in Udon Thani 
sparked protest and the arrest of 22 farmers for encroaching on Thap Khwai 
National Park attracted thousands to rallies (7 April 1994, 9 July 1994 BP).
Renewed protest over the Pak Mun Dam took place. Villagers whose 
livelihoods have been affected by the dam construction, including those 
who found their fish catch was diminished, demanded compensation. A 
two month sit-in at the Ubon Town Hall was joined by Sirindhorn dam 
protesters and a fifteen day march to Pak Mun Dam site by protesters ended 
with violence when police and soldiers beat up protesters at the dam site 
(25 Apr 1994 BP). A hunger strike by villagers and students also took place 
but drew no concessions from the government over compensation (4 May 
1994, 11 May 1994 BP). Rallies and protest actions continued for the rest of 
the year even after construction work was complete (16 Oct 1994,16 Dec 1994 
BP).
Similarly the proposed Kaeng Sua Dam in Phrae also sparked protest. 
In June 1994 thousands of villagers who would be affected by the 
construction of the dam asked the study team sponsored by the World Bank 
to withdraw from the project (10 June 1994 BP). In an interesting 
development the government attempted to gain public support for the dam 
by using the developing democratic spirit and tradition of rallies and 
seminars, which had emerged during campaigns around resources. A 
"public hearing" was organised by the House Monitoring Committee in 
August. 30, 000 villagers were invited to the seminar which was addressed 
by pro dam speakers. Participants were handed out survey forms, and 25, 
000 forms supporting the construction of the dam were handed in. 
Villagers who were to be affected by the dam were not invited, and no time
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was allocated for critics of the dam on the agenda. The seminar was 
condemned by many NGOs and criticised in the Thai and English language 
press as biased and designed to misrepresent public feeling (TDN no:25 
1994:29).
1995 started with the third rally organised by the ASSFNE setting off 
from Nakhon Ratchasima in January with 10, 000 villagers. Demands 
included a delay in debt repayment to BAAC for the rice mortgage scheme, 
assistance for debt ridden farmers who participated in failed government 
initiated cashew, silkworm and cattle projects, and allowance for cattle 
raisers be allowed to manage the Cattle Fund. Villagers also demanded the 
allocation of money to villagers affected by the Lamsae dam, assistance for 
pork and cassava farmers, and investigation of certain land disputes in 
national forest reserves and national parks, and the right for small farmers 
to attend the National Farmers Council meetings. Negotiations with 
government representatives were successful, some demands were won and 
it was guaranteed that the ASSFNE would continue to be allowed to protest 
(26 Jan 1995,3 Feb 1995 BP).
In the same period there were various protests over natural resources. 
A prolonged campaign in Loei demanded the permanent closure of a quarry 
which caused serious air pollution problems (4 Mar 1995 BP). Villagers 
refused to make way for some Eastern Sea board development (5 Mar 1995 
BP). Protests over the Pasak and Kompolow dams in Lopburi were also 
reported (5 Mar 1995 BP). Villagers removed from Khao Ang Rue Nai wild 
life park in Prachin Buri reclaimed their land (30 Mar 1995 BP). Elsewhere, 
conflict over the removal of villagers from national parks continued (3 Mar 
1995 BP) and the conflict between the military and Kanchanburi villagers 
flared up ( 6 Mar 1995 BP).
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Conflict over natural resources, particularly forest land, clearly 
continues to result in considerable conflict between the village on the one 
hand and state and business on the other. Protest over the low prices of 
various agricultural commodity has been the other major protest evident 
since KJK, and this protest has also been a direct confrontation between the 
government and villagers. The ASSFNE protests are particularly 
interesting in that they were able to draw villagers with various problems 
together. This organisation illustrates the presence of significant 
organisational strength on the part of Northeastern farmers.
One final comment needs to be made about Bamrung's strong role as 
an activist leader of the ASSFNE protests. Bamrung's ideas about the 
Communal Culture have already been discussed in chapter four. His 
rejection of centralised industrial society, his promotion of a return to self 
reliance and the romanticism of the village do not prevent him from 
entering into negotiations with the government on a range of demands that 
are designed to make life within centralised industrial society easier for 
those villagers involved. Once again it can be seen that those activists who 
advocate many of the ideas of Communal Culture, in this case a leading 
figure in the formulation of Communal Culture thought, can be very 
pragmatic in their political action.
The third eviction in Dong Yai Forest and the disappearance of Pra 
Prajak
Of the many protests in rural Thailand over land and natural 
resources he third eviction of Dong Yai forest in 1994 was to be one of the 
most widely publicised and most violent. If the KJK campaign contributed
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to changes in forest policy and the construction of a growing movement in 
Isarn the central symbol of Pra Prajak and the villagers in Dong Yai forest 
were not so enduring.
In December 1992 Pra Prajak left Huay Nam Phud Sanctuary with the 
Deputy Interior Minister carrying his belongings. He was given degraded 
forest land in Dong Yai forest and was quoted as saying that he had been too 
rigid in the past and had to adjust himself to a new situation (25 Dec 1992 
BRW). It was not clear why he had been convinced to leave the sanctuary, 
although rumours of corruption and bribery abounded. Through 1993 and 
1994 Pra Prajak was often in the news as the central figure in various 
logging scandals. Photographs implicating him in the trade of illegal logs 
were printed in a number of newspapers but were eventually found to be a 
misrepresentation of the truth. The RFD filed several charges against Pra 
Prajak concerning his presence in the forest, the last one being a charge of 
illegal tree cutting in a national forest after he cut some dying trees to build 
an open air prayer hall (17 Apr 1994 BP).
By the end of 1994 Pra Prajak had left the monkhood and disappeared.
The English and Thai press and NGOs speculated on his disappearance and 
various theories were suggested to explain his demise. However the World 
Wildlife Fund's Project Working with Forest Monks concluded that he has 
simply succumbed to exhaustion and fear against the power of vested 
interests in illegal logging (TDN no:26 1994:60). Whatever the truth behind 
Pra Prajak's disappearance, it clearly brought an end to his role as figurehead 
for the cause of village management of forests. By mid 1995 reports of his 
fate in the print media simply reported that he had recently been captured 
by police in a Khon Kaen condominium wanted on allegations of illegal 
dice games and forest encroachment (10 May 1995 BP).
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The villages in Dong Yai Forest suffered a comparable fate. In the two 
years since the end of the KJK four villagers had been resettled in Dong Yai 
Forest. Internal conflict beset Nong Yai forest and a young village leader 
against illegal logging and relocation was shot in 1993, presumably by 
someone with a vested interest in the illegal logging trade. His relatives 
and wife were convinced powerful interests were involved and described 
frustration and despair at the probable fate of their village and forest (Field 
notes 1993).
Meanwhile an illegal real estate racket gained momentum in the forest 
and Thaplan National Park. Villagers from surrounding provinces paid 
money to a group of Pakham villagers to settle in the forest with the 
promise that they would receive title deeds under land reform. In fact this 
was based on a misunderstanding of land reform measures as only those 
villagers present before October 1992 were eligible for land reform. 
Nevertheless settlers poured into Dong Yai Forest from nineteen different 
provinces to live on prepared plots which were powered by an electric 
generator. Forestry officials were also implicated in the real estate scam and 
it was alleged that leaders of the scam were ex communist insurgents who 
had weapons to fight authorities and were organising themselves for armed 
conflict ( 3 Mar 1994, 20 Mar 1994 BP).
The National Security Council was given the responsibility to evict 
villages in Dong Yai forest. NGO-CORD entered into an agreement with the 
National Security Council to cooperate in the eviction of villages from the 
forest in order to declare a wildlife sanctuary. NGO-CORD agreed in 
principle that the villagers had to be evicted in order to save the forest but 
insisted no violence be used. However, after shots were fired at officials by
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villagers in November authorities developed a more aggressive approach. 
After a February deadline one thousand policeman and border police carried 
out a pre dawn raid on the village. Shots were fired by both sides and five 
policeman and twelve villagers were injured. Villager blocked a nearby 
highway, commandeered a bus and closed the road for several hours. 
Twenty seven villagers were arrested (3 Mar 1994, 20 Mar 1994 BP).
After this incident the arrest of seven villagers involved in the real 
estate racket the quiet eviction of the forest was possible. NGO-CORD 
conducted an inquiry into the violence which had occurred and concluded 
that the force used was unnecessarily harsh. It was concluded by NGO- 
CORD that the incident proved the continuing inability of bureaucrats to 
negotiate with the villagers in the forest. Many of the villagers, in the view 
of NGO-CORD, realised they had been cheated with the sale of the land and 
had encroached on the forest and wanted to find solutions to their 
predicament. However NGO CORD representatives accepted the arrests of 
villagers acting as leaders for the land scales and logging and announced 
that the most important outcome was that those people behind the land 
sales and logging in Dong Yai forest were stopped and punished (20 Mar 
1994 BP; TDN no:24 1994). Importantly this incident led some NGO 
members to question earlier assumptions about the essential unity of the 
village and to recognise the existence of conflicts of interest within village 
communities.
The demise of Pra Prajak and the villagers' conservation movement in 
Dong Yai forest and NGO-CORD's cooperation with the National Security 
Council in the eviction of Nong Yai village are all, in part, the results of 
conflicts of interest at the village level. Some villagers worked for the 
conservation of forests and others carried out illegal real estate
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developments and logging. In the third eviction of Nong Yai village 
government and village were still in conflict over natural resources. 
However this time the government could safely claim environmental 
motives whilst villagers could not. In this scenario NGO-CORD chose to 
support government evictions. Their concern became the humanitarian 
eviction of villagers, not village management of the forest.
N G O s P o st KJK
As the military have receded from the political arena, NGOs, including 
rural development NGOs in Northeast Thailand, have increasingly focused 
on the nature of government and big business alliances and the affect of this 
alliance on villagers. Democracy and the participation of villagers in the 
national democratic process was a strong focus of NGO work in the 1992 
elections. However, disappointment in the chuan government led to some 
disillusionment with the commitment of the government to dealing with 
villagers' problems and a growing criticism of civilian politicians. 
Strengthening community organisations in the village and the 
decentralisation of the management of natural resources remained at the 
forefront of NGO policy after KJK, and NGO commitment to such policies 
were even strengthened by the growing antagonism to civilian politicians 
and their promotion of big business. At the same time there has been some 
revaluation of the central motif of Communal Culture, the belief that the 
village is the main unit of change.
The participation of villagers in the national democratic process was of 
high priority for rural development NGOs in all regions, including the 
Northeast in the latter half of 1992. NGO committed themselves to 
involving villagers in the national elections in 1992 through Pollwatch.
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This was the body working to combat vote buying and corruption in the 
election campaign and its activities drained a great deal election campaign, 
draining NGO resources and energy (17 Sep 1992 BP).
However after the election of the Chuan government in 1992 and a 
flush of first optimism in the potential of elected government there was a 
growing cynicism with the ability and motivation of the government to 
deal with rural problems. During 1993 NGOs started to express 
disappointment with the Chuan government. The issue of Pak Mun Dam 
and the Chuan government's determination to complete the project as 
planned is pinpointed by NGO workers as being the initial cause of this. As 
the military disappeared as the main antagonist of democracy the big 
business- government alliance became the focus of NGO criticism. Chuan 
started to come under increasing criticism from NGOs, and several NGO 
activists and students compared the Chuan administration unfavourably 
with the Anand government who were perceived as far more conciliatory 
(Field notes 1993). The CPD claimed the government were actually jealous 
of NGOs for being so close to the people (2 Apr 1993 BP), and Saneh 
Chamarik accused the Chuan government of being authoritarian (TDN 
no:22 1993:21-22). Prawase predicted a massive bloodbath in the future 
because of the problems of poverty, emphasising that this was a problem 
caused by civilian politicians rather than the military. Chamlong accused 
Chuan of forgetting about the rural poor (23 Feb 1992 BP).
The domination of the minority in the business industrial sector over 
the majority rural agricultural sector was articulated in increasingly militant 
and urgent tones in NGO literature. In the words of the Thai Development 
Support Committee, "Thai society has now come to a crossroads, marked by 
the direct confrontation between the Business-Industrial sector on the one
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hand and the disadvantaged rural agricultural sector on the other"(TDN no: 
24 1994:1). Sanitsuda described the cult of industrial development being 
overtaken by and the power of industrial giants. She envisaged the task of 
influencing this trend as very difficult and described the last two decades of 
NGO work as being like "banging our heads on a brick wall " (31 May 1994 
BP).
The environment and the right of villagers to manage their own 
resources remained a central theme in NGO work and the government was 
urged to speed up the progress of the Community Forestry Bill to display 
their commitment to community forests (3 May 1994 BP ). 2 Flowever it is 
worth noting that there was significant dissent about the possibility of the 
decentralisation of natural resource management from a minority 
participants in the regional environmental forums organised by NGOs in 
1993. In the Northern forum Apichai told the forum that it was futile at 
this stage to hope that the government would give more power to 
communities to manage their own resources. Apichai believed that 
people's organisations had not yet proved themselves to be capable of 
resource management. In fact Apichai was doubtful about the potential of 
people's organisations because he believed that the local traditions and 
norms that supported conservation and community action have been 
severely eroded and people's organisations are not sufficiently united or 
strong (22 Sep 1993 BP; Field notes 1993).
2In fact some Environmentalists can be seen to now use the possibility of village protest as a 
threat to authorities.- Environmentalists warned EGAT that the construction of a nuclear 
power plant would result in trouble from nearby villagers who had recently sustained a 
protest over illegal prawn ponds (29 Oct 1993 BP ).
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Since the KJK program ended Northeastern NGOs tended to change 
their strategy and withdrew from the very public role they had during the 
height of the KJK campaign. Instead they have gone back into the village to 
carry out education campaigns and strengthen community organisations. 
This trend has been strengthened by the fact that foreign funding is 
increasingly being directed to Indochina instead of Thailand. There has 
been discussion about the need for new tactics and strategies to deal with 
this. One result has been that there is a greater feeling of urgency to create 
and strengthen self sufficient village organisations. In Southern Thailand 
NGO CORD is creating small fisherman's clubs along the coast to negotiate 
with big fishing companies and in Northeast Thailand the ASSFNE 
remains a focus (Field notes 1993).
The final issue in the NGOs under discussion is the increased 
questioning of the NGOs theoretical and strategic orientation to the village 
and the question of broader societal alliances. A 1993 NGO panel discussion 
on NGOs and the middle class illustrate some of the differences in approach 
which have emerged over the role of the middle class. To a large extent 
differences are based on different ideas of exactly where the interests of the 
middle class lie, with some NGO representatives equating the interests of 
the middle class directly with the interests of the corporate sector. A Project 
for Ecological Reconstruction (PER) representative defined the interests of 
the middle class as being in conflict with those of NGOs because the Thai 
middle class has not yet developed into a progressive force and stressed that 
it is essential for NGOs to retain their role as a force to lessen the power of 
the state and as facilitate peoples participation in society . On the other hand 
some participants emphasised the potential of the middle class to 
strengthen the NGOs cause and the important role that professionals 
already take in the NGO movement (17 Oct 1993 BP).
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Of course this debate on the participation of the middle class seems 
rather strange coming from institutions who actually represent progressive 
middle class forces at work themselves. NGOs represent the largest face of 
middle class dissent. The discussion is really one about strategy and about 
how to best affect future developments in Thailand. Is it better to make 
strong alliances with middle class forces and government and participate in 
national politics or should strengthening the village and grassroots 
democracy be the central role of NGOs?
Many NGOs are hesitant to work with authorities. NGO CORD was 
criticised by some NGOs for working with the NSC in the third eviction of 
Nong Yai. However in one particularly interesting report NGO-CORD 
representative Anek Nakabut concluded from the illegal land deals in Dong 
Yai forest that NGOs need to broaden their alliance because criminal 
influences have infiltrated all levels of society, including the village. 
Therefore he drew the conclusion that NGOs need not only identify 
themselves only with local villagers, but try harder to form a broader 
movement. He believes that although the NGO's goal is to strengthen local 
communities against outside forces there needs to be a redefinition of the 
word "community", because the village is simply no longer a good enough 
definition, society has become more plural than that (31 May 1994 BP).
These comments and the debate about definitions of the "community" 
and the place of the village in NGO strategy illustrate some weakening in 
the commitment of NGOs to the acceptance of the village as a central entity 
in Thai society. This trend could be very significant for rural NGOs if their 
focus on the village shifts and broadens. However the discussion on the 
village is simply one noticeable tendency. Just as importantly, NGO
commitment to decentralisation to the village level and the creation of and 
strengthening of community organisations within the village remains 
central to their activity. Furthermore, experience with the Chuan civilian 
government did not lead to the establishment of strong links between rural 
development NGOs and the government and new commitments which 
could draw such NGOs out of the village.
Conclusions
Natural resource conflicts and conflict over the pricing of agricultural 
commodities continue to illustrate a conflict of interests between the village 
on the one hand and state and corporate sector on the other. An urban- 
rural divide is clear, and villagers often emerge with a unity of interests. 
For NGOs and their allies involved in the conflicts, the state and corporate 
sector continue to disempower and deprive villagers. The essential unity of 
the village remains central to NGO work. However this essential unity is 
not going unquestioned.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
State and corporate sector in conflict with the village
The conflict over natural resources in Thailand has occurred primarily 
between the state and corporate sectors on the one hand, and villagers on 
the other. Conflict has also been characterised by a broad dichotomy 
between urban interests and rural interests, rural interests being represented 
by the village and urban interests by the state and corporate sector.
The Kor Jor Kor example clearly illustrates the struggle over forest land 
and the motivations of the state, the corporate sector and the villager. 
Villagers needed to retain their place in the forest to preserve their 
livelihood, and in the Dong Yai example protect the forest from illegal 
loggers and eucalyptus plantations. Big business, government and the 
military all had economic interests in reforestation with eucalyptus 
plantations. Furthermore, the military had strong political motivations in 
the countryside and the government had urgent environmental 
considerations.
Amongst the many high profile resource conflicts in the 1990s the KJK 
conflict had the peculiarity of being directly connected with the political 
ambitions of the military. The KJK conflict took place during nationwide 
calls for democracy and a diminished role for the military. As a result, the 
demands from villagers in the forest were in unison with urban middle 
class calls for democracy, which gave the campaign a particular strength and 
intensity. Nevertheless the KJK conflict conforms in essence to a host of 
other conflicts over natural resources. It is the increase in the 1980s of the
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direct economic influence of the state and big business in the countryside, in 
the context of dwindling natural resources, that laid the basis for resource 
conflict to occur. The conflict over eucalyptus plantations that preceded KJK 
are of course directly connected to the conflict under KJK. Villagers had 
already experienced the negative affects of the extension of state and 
corporate economic activity in the shape of eucalyptus plantations. KJK was 
in many ways simply an extension of these earlier conflicts over forest land. 
In addition conflicts other than forest conflict, such as conflict over the 
construction of dams and pollution from industrial enterprises, illustrate 
the economic objectives of government and business in the countryside and 
the resulting conflict with villagers.
After KJK there were many conflicts over resources between state and 
business, and villagers, predominantly over forest land, dams and pollution 
from business enterprises. These conflicts often stemmed from the 
extended utilisation of natural resources in the countryside by state and 
business. However there is another factor that caused conflict between state 
and village in this period: the environmental objectives of the government 
evident in the eviction of villagers from national parks and reserves.
Environmentalism and environmental objectives have been claimed 
by both state and village at various times during resource conflicts. During 
the KJK conflict villagers and NGOs campaigned extensively for the 
conservation of the forest against the intrusion of eucalyptus and the 
destruction of indigenous forest. The state and corporate sector were 
characterised as destroyers of the forest and villagers as protectors. The 
activity of the Dong Yai conservation group, the clearance of Thaplan 
National Park and the strong economic motivations of state and business to 
reforest with eucalyptus vindicate NGO and villagers' claims. There is
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indeed strong evidence of the ability and motivation of villagers to protect 
natural resources and to campaign for environmental objectives, and for 
the state and business to pursue economic political objectives regardless of 
environmental costs.
However village and government interests in conservation are not 
undifferentiated. There are strong environmental tendencies within the 
RFD and conflict among officials working to protect the forest. RFD 
employees patrolling the forest suffer a high rate of intimidation and injury 
from those people involved in illegal logging. Furthermore there are 
conflicts of interest at a village level between those villagers involved in 
conservation and those involved in illegal logging and real estate 
development. This dynamic is clearly illustrated in the developments in 
Dong Yai forest and the third eviction of Nong Yai village.
Social and economic cleavages within the village
It has been clear from the beginning of this thesis that the conflicts 
under discussion are a stark illustration of the conflict between the state 
and corporate sectors and the village but this picture also obscures the reality 
of a differentiation of village society, or at least a conflict of interests at 
village level.
A comparison of the farmers' movement of the 1970s, and the 
literature written about it, with the situation today illustrates a fundamental 
difference. The 1970s emphasis on rural differentiation, and the polarisation 
between land owners and landless in the countryside, is very different from 
contemporary conflict. Contemporary conflict and the literature about it 
emphasises the dichotomy between rural and urban, state and village.
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There is a regional factor here. The farmers' protests of 1973-1976 involved a 
lot of farmers from the central plains, the most highly differentiated region 
of rural Thailand, where issues of differentiation were most explosive. 
However, it was a national movement and had its strongest base in 
Northern Thailand and included involvement from Northeast farmers. 
Since this time tenancy has simply not emerged in any region as an issue 
that has fuelled significant discontent from villagers in rural Thailand.
We know from the literature described in chapter two that in fact social 
and economic differentiation in village society has been steadily deepening, 
even although tenancy has not increased substantially. Yet authors do not 
describe any definitive class formation and describe differentiation as both 
fluid and flexible (Turton 1982,1984,1989; Hirsch 1990b, 1993; Wattana 1991). 
In com parison regional differentiation, particularly  urban-rural 
differentiation, is concrete and obvious.
In the resource conflicts institutionalised social and economic 
cleavages within the village do not emerge as factors that fuel protest. 
Nevertheless a conflict of interests at village level does emerge clearly. The 
conflict of interests between those villagers interested in conserving forest 
and those villagers interested in exploiting the forest was clearly illustrated 
in the example of Dong Yai forest in the Kor Jor Kor campaign and the 
evictions that followed the abolishment of the program. Evidence of 
fundamental conflict of interests over natural resource utilisation at village 
level is important. Such evidence challenges some of the fundamental 
ideas in the discourse of the middle class groups who campaign in support 
of villagers in the resource conflicts.
Communal Culture and middle class activism
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Non-government organisations (NGOs) and the other middle class 
groups who have allied themselves with villagers in the resource conflicts, 
such as students, intellectuals and environmentalists, have been highly 
influenced by Communal Culture thought. This influence has put the 
village, often a very romanticised village, at the centre of theory and action, 
an approach that has both strengths and weaknesses. Romantic notions of 
the village hold fundamental problems for those organisations working 
with villagers. Nevertheless NGOs and their allies have been able to 
organise and coordinate significant protest at a village level and strongly 
articulate demands for environmentalism and democracy.
Communal Culture rests on the vision of the pre-capitalist village as 
an abundant, non-stratified, self-sufficient, communal and harmonious 
unit. Communal Culture encourages the middle class activist to strengthen 
these characteristics, which are said to have been weakened by modern 
capitalism and the triple alliance of state, capital and international capital in 
Thai society. Such visions of the pre-capitalist village actually echo older 
traditions within Thai historiography which stressed rural abundance and 
utopian visions of a non stratified village. Many of the ideas of Communal 
Culture also conform to populist traditions which have arisen in other parts 
of the world in periods of industrialisation, indicating that some of these 
ideas about the village are part of a universal response to the effects of 
industrialisation on the countryside. Furthermore there are strong 
international trends in contemporary world development theory which 
advocate models of development that concentrate on local grass roots 
community organisation and as such strengthen Communal Culture 
discourse.
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The increasing social and economic differentiation within village 
society discussed in chapter one casts doubt on the validity of treating the 
village as a unified unit (or a potentially unified unit if the communal 
values of the village are strengthened according to Communal Culture 
theory). Nevertheless in the resource conflicts, and certainly within the KJK 
protests, the clear polarisation between village interests and the interests of 
the state and corporate sectors emphasise the village as a pragmatic and 
obvious orientation.
With Communal Culture discourse NGOs are committed to 
strengthening the village and unifying villagers to make use of their 
common strength. In the KJK protests NGOs played a crucial role in 
facilitating inter-village discussion, and coordinating central protest rallies. 
With the help of a forest monk, NGOs also supported existing village 
conservation efforts, encouraged new initiatives and lobbied for 
decentralisation of forest management to the local level. Such campaigns 
were crucial to the success of the KJK movement.
Furthermore NGO campaigns for the decentralisation of natural 
resource management and promotion of village conservation efforts have 
greatly benefited many local communities whose ability to manage local 
resources are not readily recognised by the government. NGOs also play a 
strong role in encouraging participation and democracy for villagers at a 
village and national level.
However we know that it will not always be possible to work with the 
village as a unit. Villages are not always united. There will always be 
divisions within villages and elements within the village which NGOs 
cannot work with. In the third eviction of Nong Yai village NGO-CORD
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chose to support the government in the eviction of villagers because those 
communities who had recently resettled in Dong Yai forest were not 
committed to conservation of the forest. NGO-CORD could not build 
village organisations and campaigns within these communities because 
they did not share the same vision for the future of the forest.
Nevertheless NGO-CORD did advocate for the villagers in Dong Yai 
forest in the third eviction of Nong Yai village. Their support of the 
eviction was based on the condition that villagers would be respected and 
that no violence would be used by the government. Campaigns for the 
democratic rights of villagers are central to NGO work. This is certainly 
illustrated in the campaign against KJK when the coercive and brutal nature 
of the evictions, the importance of involving villagers in consultations and 
awarding appropriate compensation were the most central demands of the 
campaign.
Utopian visions of the village in NGO discourse has not necessarily 
meant that programs are not realistic. Bamrung, as a leader of communal 
Culture thought, has recently coordinated campaigns for compensation for 
dam construction, higher agricultural prices, and financial help for farmers 
involved in government agricultural development projects which sent 
farmers bankrupt. Such campaigns are not attempting to recreate a 
communal village, which may of course never have existed, but are reacting 
to the urgent problems of Isarn villagers.
The emphasis on the village is fundamentally connected with a 
commitment to local politics. However NGOs and those activists 
influenced by Communal Culture will find situations in which there are 
divided interests in village communities or village interests that do not
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coincide with NGO interests. It will be interesting to see if this problem will 
indeed lead to m ore flexible definitions of a com m unity and greater 
recognition of village level differences.
Village activism
V illagers are not passive actors in the process of T hailand 's 
m odern isa tion . N o t on ly  have they  g rasped  the possib ilities of 
m odernisation , as described in chapter two, bu t they have actively 
cam paigned  to influence the  transfo rm ations tak ing  place in the 
countryside.
The division betw een rural and urban Thailand has been, and  is 
continuing to be, a major them e in in ternational m edia coverage of 
Thailand (H andley 1993:48). During the 1995 election cam paign FEER 
journalists titled their article " The Instability Within"; the instability being 
that leadership and politics means different things to Thailand's rural and 
urban voters and that w ithout politicians to bridge the divide another 
period of instability  w ould follow. A uthors stressed the param ount 
importance of local concerns, patronage netw orks and vote buying in the 
countryside as opposed to a m ore issue based approach in urban areas that 
focuses on democracy and efficient m anagem ent of a globalising economy 
(Tasker and Vatikiotis 1995:14).
H ow ever we have seen tha t the conflict over na tu ra l resources 
between village and the state and corporate sectors involves villagers in 
issue based politics. We have also seen that urban m iddle class interest in 
democracy and environm entalism  does converge w ith village interests, 
bridging the urban-rural divide. If perhaps the work of NGOs in the
resource conflicts misrepresents village level ideas it has not become clear 
in this thesis. In fact it seems there is significant common ground.
Rural villagers in Thailand remain significantly the most poor and 
disadvantaged group in Thailand. Natural resources have been villagers' 
safety valve and source of wealth but are now diminished and in increasing 
demand from the state and corporate sector. Whether greater numbers of 
the rural population are absorbed into the non-agricultural sector as a result 
of structural reform or not there will be a need to ensure rural populations 
have choices and can make a comfortable space for themselves within 
modern Thailand. In the short term, resource conflicts between the village 
on the one hand and the state and corporate sector on the other, will 
continue to proliferate. Furthermore NGOs and their middle class allies 
will continue to coordinate and organise campaigns with villagers, using 
utopian visions of the village to inspire campaigns to strengthen villagers 
bargaining power with state and corporate sector. However if social and 
economic cleavages at a village level and conflicts of interest within the 
village become more serious, NGOs and other middle class actors who 
subscribe to ideas about Communal Culture, will have to do some 
revaluation of their vision of the village.
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